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ABSTRACT
One big non-blocking switch is one of the most powerful and pervasive abstrac-
tions in datacenter networking. As Moore’s law begins to wane, using parallelism
to scale out processing units, vs. scale them up, is becoming exceedingly popular.
The one-big-switch abstraction, for example, is typically implemented via lever-
aging massive degrees of parallelism behind the scene. In particular, in today’s
datacenters that exhibit a high degree of multi-pathing, each logical path between
a communicating pair in the one-big-switch abstraction is mapped to a set of paths
that can carry traffic in parallel. Similarly, each one-big-switch abstraction func-
tion, such as the firewall functionality, is mapped to a set of distributed hardware
and software switches.
Efficiently deploying this pool of networking connectivity and preserving the
functional correctness of network functions, in spite of the parallelism, are chal-
lenging. Efficiently balancing the load among multiple paths is challenging be-
cause microbursts, responsible for the majority of packet loss in datacenters to-
day, usually last for only a few microseconds. Even the fastest traffic engineering
schemes today have control loops that are several orders of magnitude slower (a
few milliseconds [1, 2] to a few seconds [3]), and are therefore ineffective in con-
trolling microbursts. Correctly implementing network functions in the face of
parallelism is hard because the distributed set of elements that in parallel imple-
ment a one-big-switch abstraction can inevitably have inconsistent states that may
cause them to behave differently than one physical switch.
The first part of this thesis (§2) presents DRILL, a datacenter fabric for Clos
networks which performs micro load balancing to distribute load as evenly as
possible on microsecond timescales. To achieve this, DRILL employs packet-
level decisions at each switch based on local queue occupancies and randomized
algorithms to distribute load. Despite making per-packet forwarding decisions,
by enforcing a tight control on queue occupancies, DRILL manages to keep the
degree of packet reordering low. DRILL adapts to topological asymmetry (e.g.
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failures) in Clos networks by decomposing the network into symmetric compo-
nents. Using a detailed switch hardware model, we simulate DRILL and show it
outperforms recent edge-based load balancers particularly in the tail latency under
heavy load, e.g., under 80% load, it reduces the 99.99th percentile of flow com-
pletion times of Presto and CONGA by 32% and 35%, respectively. Finally, we
analyze DRILL’s stability and throughput-efficiency.
In the second part (§3, §4), we focus on the correctness of one-big-switch ab-
straction’s implementation. We first show that naively using parallelism to scale
networking elements can cause incorrect behavior. For example, we show that an
IDS system which operates correctly as a single network element can erroneously
and permanently block hosts when it is replicated. We then provide a system, CO-
CONUT, for seamless scale-out of network forwarding elements; that is, an SDN
application programmer can program to what functionally appears to be a single
forwarding element, but which may be replicated behind the scenes. To do this,
we identify the key property for seamless scale out, weak causality, and guaran-
tee it through a practical and scalable implementation of vector clocks in the data
plane. We build a prototype of COCONUT and experimentally demonstrate its
correct behavior. We also show that its abstraction enables a more efficient im-
plementation of seamless scale-out compared to a naive baseline (§3). Finally,
reasoning about network behavior requires a new model that enables us to distin-
guish between observable and unobservable events. So in the last part (§4), we
present the Input/Output Automaton (IOA) model and formalize networks’ be-
haviors. Using this framework, we prove that COCONUT enables seamless scale
out of networking elements, i.e., the user-perceived behavior of any COCONUT
element implemented with a distributed set of concurrent replicas is provably in-
distinguishable from its singleton implementation.
Overall, our results show that building an observationally correct, efficient
parallelized one big switch is surprisingly feasible in best-effort datacenter net-
works.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Programmable modular abstractions are the corner stones of Computer Science
[4]. One of such key abstractions in datacenter networking is the one-big-switch
abstraction. For practical requirements such as scalability, the one-big-switch ab-
straction is in reality implemented via massive degrees of parallelism. Network
parallelism is everywhere in today’s datacenter networking: from edge switches
that collectively implement the one-big-switch abstraction functionality [5, 6], to
multiple equal cost paths between every source and destination pair that carry the
traffic in parallel [7, 8, 2, 9].
To get the utmost degree of scalability and performance, in all these examples,
a set of autonomous agents make parallel and independent decisions in order to
avoid the fundamental costs of coordination. Specifically, we focus on two areas
of network parallelism:
• Efficient use of the data plane pool of connectivity: In today’s multi-
rooted datacenters with a high degree of multi-pathing, each source of traffic
(switch or host) autonomously selects one of the available paths [7, 8, 2, 9].
• Fast and efficient implementation of network functions: the one-big-
switch abstractions are exceedingly used to implement network functions
such as firewalls, IDS, etc. Once the networking state is replicated to imple-
ment a one-big-switch abstraction, each replica processes traffic indepen-
dently with no coordination with other replicas [5, 6].
While, by avoiding the prohibitive latency and throughput costs of coordination,
these approaches enhance the scalability of network elements, they can potentially
jeopardize both correctness and in some cases, interestingly, performance if the
decisions of non-coordinating agents have interdependencies. In multi-path data-
centers, for example, independent sources of traffic can overload parts of the net-
work while leaving the rest underutilized, resulting in load imbalance and degra-
dation of throughput and latency (§2). Indeed, when highly synchronous traffic
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patterns such as incast cause short-lived bursts, even the fastest exiting traffic en-
gineering approaches are too slow and therefore ineffective in suppressing such
bursts (§2).
In addition to the performance degradation caused by the inefficiency of the ex-
isting traffic engineering techniques in exploiting multi-paths, existing techniques
for network function parallelisms may cause incorrect application-level behaviors.
As an example, if a firewall allows external traffic only after an internal request,
two separate firewall replicas might process the internal request and its subsequent
external reply; leading to one of the replicas incorrectly blocking the external traf-
fic. We show that incorrect behaviors can happen frequently as a result of using
the current techniques of implementing parallel functions such as the existing net-
work virtualization techniques (§3). In other words, such techniques can break the
semantics of best-effort networks.
One might think that the tussle between performance/scalability and strong se-
mantics is a fundamental one. Preserving strong consistency in databases and
distributed systems, for instance, fundamentally requires a few rounds of com-
munication which adds to the performance costs (latency, throughput) and hence
limits the scalability of the system [10]. When it comes to the significant per-
formance costs of guaranteeing strong consistency, best-effort networks are not
an exception. Providing strong consistency among the replicas of network func-
tions in a small network, for instance, can add an average latency of 50ms to each
packet [11]1.
It is therefore hardly surprising that today’s datacenters, with stringent require-
ments on latency, availability, and scale [12, 13, 8, 14], typically forfeit strong
semantics in favor of maximizing scalability and performance. In load balancers
that exploit multi-paths, for example, sources of traffic typically work in an un-
coordinated manner, based on potentially inconsistent traffic and topology states
[9, 2, 7]. Similarly, the systems that offer the function parallelism usually settle
for eventual consistency [11, 5].
Weak unfamiliar semantics, however, makes network programming complex,
error prone, and inefficient. We argue that in the datacenter setting, the trade-off
between performance and strong semantics is not fundamental, i.e., one can have
the best of both worlds. Our position is based on two key observations:
• In highly regular datacenter topologies, near optimally exploiting parallel
1Note that the avg RTT is below 1ms in datacenters.
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paths can be achieved via local load sensing and a slight degree of intelli-
gence in the network while strictly avoiding coordination (and its costs).
• The native service model that networks provide, best-effort-networking, has
a distinct—and more relaxed—semantics compared to some of extensively
studied and rigorously formalized service model in other domains such
as distributed file systems and databases [10]. We show that it is possi-
ble to preserve strong semantics in best-effort networks, i.e., make parallel
network functions indistinguishable from their singleton implementation,
while incurring relatively low costs.
The two parts of this thesis investigate the above observations in turn. In the first
part of this thesis (§2), we introduce DRILL, a system for exploiting multi-paths
at microsecond timescales. In the second part, we introduce a logical property,
which we call weak causal correctness, that parallelized network functions should
retain to be indistinguishable from their singleton counterparts. We present CO-
CONUT, a system we built which guarantees this property with minimal overhead
(§3). We then introduce an analytical framework for formalizing and reasoning
about the behavior of networks, and formally prove that parallelized networks
under COCONUT are observationally indistinguishable from singleton networks
(§4). We give a brief overview of these two parts below.
Micro load balancing in datacenters with DRILL. Data centers are over-
whelmingly built as topologies that are characterized by large path diversity such
as Clos networks (Figure 2.1) [15, 2, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 16, 20]. A critical issue in
such networks is the design of an efficient algorithm that can evenly balance the
load among available paths. While Equal Cost Multi Paths (ECMP) is extensively
used in practice [9], it is known to be far from optimal for efficiently exploiting all
available paths [9, 2, 21]. Data center measurement studies, for instance, indicate
that a significant fraction of core links regularly experience congestion despite the
fact that there is enough spare capacity elsewhere [22].
Many proposals have recently tried to address this need [2, 9, 23, 24, 21].
Aligned with the recent trend of moving functionality out of the network fabric
[25], these proposals strive to delegate load balancing to centralized controllers
[26, 23, 3, 27], to the network edge [2], or even to end-hosts [9, 21]. This recent
move of the load balancing functionality is motivated largely by the perceived ne-
cessity of having global congestion or load information about the potential paths
for evenly balancing the load among them [2, 26, 23, 3, 27]. Collecting global
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traffic information and routing based on that information could more easily be
managed at separate controllers or at the edge. A notable example is CONGA [2],
a recent in-network load balancing scheme that gathers and analyzes congestion
feedback from the network at the network edge (leaf switches in Clos networks) to
make load balancing decisions. CONGA’s central thesis is that global congestion
information is fundamentally necessary for evenly balancing the load.
We explore a different direction: What can be achieved with decisions that
are local to each switch? We refer to this approach as micro load balancing be-
cause it makes “microscopic” decisions within each switch without global infor-
mation, and because this in turn allows decisions on microsecond (packet-by-
packet) timescales.
Micro load balancing has hope of offering an advantage because load balanc-
ing systems based on global traffic information have control loops that are sig-
nificantly slower than the duration of the majority of congestion incidents in data
centers (§2.4). It has been shown that majority of congestion events in data centers
are short-lived [22, 28]. The bulk of microbursts that are responsible for over 90%
of packet loss, for instance, last for less than 3 microseconds [29]. Systems that
attempt to collect and react based on global congestion information typically have
orders of magnitude slower control loops than the duration of the majority of con-
gestion events [1, 2]. For example, even though CONGA adds mechanisms to leaf
and spine switches to assist in obtaining congestion information, it still typically
requires a few RTTs (tens to hundreds of microseconds), by which time the con-
gestion event is likely already over. In addition, we found that amassing macro-
scopic traffic information can lead to a pitfall: feeding global traffic information to
distributed, non-coordinating sources of traffic (input ports of all the leaf switches
in CONGA) can cause them to select the same set of least-congested paths in a
synchronized manner which in turn leads to bursts of traffic in those paths.
To study whether micro load balancing offers a viable solution, we designed
and evaluated DRILL (Distributed Randomized In-network Localized Load-
balancing). DRILL is in essence a switch scheduling algorithm that acts only
based on local switch queue length information without any coordination among
switches or any controllers. Even within a single switch, deciding how to route
and schedule packets is nontrivial. DRILL’s scheduling algorithm is inspired by
the “power of two choices” paradigm [30]. To make it practical for packet routing
within a data center switch, we extend the classic design to accommodate a dis-
tributed set of sources (input ports) and show that the key stability result holds in
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the distributed version as well (§3.6, §3.3.3, §2.3.2). More concretely, DRILL as-
sumes that a set of candidate next-hops for each destination have been installed in
the forwarding table, using well-known mechanisms such as the shortest paths (as
in ECMP). Next, upon arrival of each packet at any input port, that input port, in-
dependently and with no coordination with other input ports, compares the queue
lengths of two randomly-chosen candidate output ports and the port that was least
loaded during the previous samplings, and sends the packet to the least loaded of
these three candidates. Note that this is unlike ECMP since the decision is based
on local load rather than static hashing of the packet header. We show how to
optimize DRILL’s parameters—number of choices and amount of memory—so
as to avoid damaging synchronization effects where many input ports choose the
same output.
In contrast to the works that operate on a global “macroscopic” view of the net-
work, DRILL’s micro load balancing enables it to instantly react to load variations
as the queues start building up. DRILL results in dramatically better performance
than CONGA in heavily loaded systems (78% improvement in average flow com-
pletion time §2.4) and in incast scenarios (2.5× improvement in average flow
completion time §2.4). In addition, DRILL offers a simpler switch implemen-
tation than CONGA since DRILL does not need to detect flowlets or send and
analyze feedback.
Presto [9], a very recent host based load balancing scheme, offers an interest-
ing comparison point to DRILL. Unlike schemes with global information, Presto
is congestion-oblivious. Presto argues that the main culprit of inefficiencies in
schemes like ECMP is the coarse granularity: each flow, even a large one, hashes
all its packets onto one path. Therefore, Presto partitions flows into equal size
chunks of 64KB, called flowcells, and “sprays” them in a round-robin fashion
among available paths. This can be executed by the source with a form of source
routing, releasing the network from that burden. A key assumption in this design
is that the small size and size-uniformity of data units is sufficient for preserv-
ing balanced load in symmetric topologies. Our simulations confirm that Presto
outperforms CONGA in non-incast scenarios, but DRILL in turn performs better
than Presto (§2.4). DRILL’s improved performance even for identical small size
flows (Presto’s ideal setting) results from (a) the load adaptation of DRILL, in
contrast to the load-agnostic nature of Presto, and (b) balancing finer granularity
of load: packets vs. flowcells. We also show that DRILL has significantly better
flow completion time in an incast scenario (9.5× better than Presto) because of its
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fast reaction to congestion (§2.4).
DRILL’s micro load balancing raises several concerns. First, how can we deal
with packet reordering that results from load balancing at sub-flow granularities?
Interestingly, we find that in a symmetric Clos data center network, DRILL bal-
ances load so well that packets nearly always arrive in order despite traversing
different paths. This is because queue lengths have very small variance and hence
packets have almost identical queueing delays, even under heavy load (§2.3.3).
Regardless, the occasional re-orderings could still adversely affect TCP’s perfor-
mance. Hence, similar to prior work [24, 9], we deploy a buffer under TCP to
restore correct ordering of packets. Practical challenges of deploying such a tech-
nique are solidly addressed and solved by Presto [9]. Compared to Presto, DRILL
causes significantly less frequent out of order delivery of packets, shorter buffers,
and smaller buffering latencies (§2.3.3).
The second concern is that load-based scheduling algorithms within a switch
could result in instability and hence low throughput [31]. Therefore, we formally
prove DRILL’s switch-level stability and show that it guarantees 100% throughout
for admissible traffic (§2.3.2).
Third, is DRILL’s micro load balancing sufficient alone, or is some macro-
scopic information necessary? For topological changes such as link failures that
reduce the number of paths, however, it is likely that more global path planning is
necessary.
Since these changes, unlike congestion, happen in slow time scales [32],
DRILL leverages existing distributed or centralized topology-information dissem-
ination techniques to detect the new topology, it decomposes the network into
symmetric component, and performs micro load balancing inside each compo-
nent. We prove that for admissible traffic, this approach provides throughput ef-
ficiency. In summary, our results in the first part of this thesis strongly indicate
that micro load balancing belongs in the data center fabric to achieve the key goal
of high performance traffic delivery; and that a significant and interesting ques-
tion for future research is when and how micro load balancing and macroscopic
information should be combined to get the best of both worlds.
Seamless scale-out of network elements with COCONUT. In the second part
of this thesis (§3, §4), we turn our attention to the parallelism in network functions
which is used as the primary way for scaling out network elements.
An important use of software-defined networking (SDN) is to automate scaling
of networks, so that individual network functions or forwarding elements can be
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replicated as necessary. Replication of network elements allows capacity to scale
gracefully with demand [33], provides high availability [33], assists function mo-
bility [34, 35], and overcomes lack of capacity of physical elements (e.g., when
the capacity of one switch is insufficient for a full implementation of the logical
abstraction).
Multiple systems use replication of network elements, in different ways. One
key use is in network virtualization for software-defined data centers. Each tenant
in a virtualized data center might be presented one logical “big switch” abstraction
that in reality spans multiple physical hardware or software switches [33, 36, 37].
As another example, Microsoft Azure’s host-based SDN solution leverages VM-
Switches to build virtual networks where each host performs all packet-actions for
its own VMs2 [38]; these VMSwitches act in parallel and independently despite
the fact that they might form a single virtual network. Google’s virtualized SDN,
Andromeda [39], integrates software network function virtualization (NFV), such
as virtual firewall, rate limiting, etc. into the data-path, and deploys replication in
the data plane to meet its performance and scalability needs. Replication is used
outside of virtualization as well. Caching of forwarding rules at multiple loca-
tions enhances performance in [40, 41, 42]. Caching at finer granularity—from
user-space to kernel-space – is critical for performance of software switches such
as Open vSwitch [43]. All these systems deploy replication techniques where one
logical network element is implemented using a distributed set of physical repli-
cas, typically by simple duplication of forwarding rules across multiple locations.
Our work begins by asking: Do these techniques for scaling out network el-
ements preserve the semantics of a single element? For example, if a developer
writes a network function such as a firewall on top of a single virtual “big switch”,
is its functional behavior the same as if it were running on an actual single physi-
cal switch? We show that such incorrect behavior can in fact occur with common
replication techniques; for example, a replicated firewall can erroneously and per-
manently block hosts. In fact, our experiments show there are scenarios that these
problems occur frequently (§3.3).
How, then, could an SDN programmer deal with this problem? Living with
the risk of incorrect functionality is unappealing, as critical infrastructure ele-
ments such as security appliances (firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc.) are
increasingly being deployed in order to scale out their capacity. Alternately, the
2This is done to make SDN scale.
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programmer could write her application so that it takes into account the distributed
implementation of network elements and associated race conditions. But this is
inconvenient for the programmer at best, and in many cases is infeasible, because
the fact that network elements are replicated may be explicitly hidden from the
network programmer/operator—as is the physical infrastructure underneath a ten-
ant’s virtual network. Indeed, one lure of the virtualized cloud for tenants, for
instance, is the prospect of migrating their workloads and network applications to
the cloud “as-is”, i.e., with no re-designing and re-architecting of their applica-
tions, and expect them to perform in a way exactly akin to their non-virtualized
networks [44, 6].
Our goal is thus to build a system that provides a seamless scale-out abstrac-
tion for network forwarding elements: an SDN application writer (or tenant) can
program to the abstraction of a single device, which may be implemented behind
the scenes by multiple replicated elements. Achieving this is not easy. The most
generic solution would be to synchronize replicas to provide a strongly consistent
logical view, but the required locking would not achieve the performance neces-
sary for the data plane [38, 42]. Recent work [45, 46, 47, 48] provides a form
of consistency in the data plane in the sense of ensuring “trace” properties of a
single packet’s path, as in Consistent Updates (CU) [46]. But this is essentially
orthogonal to our goal; seamless scale-out does not require per-packet path con-
sistency, and systems that provide per-packet path consistency can even cause the
correctness problems described above (§3.3.3).
The system we present here, COCONUT (“COrrect COncurrent Networking
UTensils”), provides seamless scale-out of network elements with provable cor-
rectness, for network elements defined by an OpenFlow-like abstraction. We ob-
serve that the culprit of scale-out correctness problems is weak causality violation.
For example, a simplistic replication technique can cause a replicated firewall to
miss the causal dependency between a client’s outbound request and a server’s
inbound response, so it sees a seemingly-unsolicited inbound response first and
permanently blocks traffic from that server. We design a set of high-level algo-
rithms to avoid such causality violations, drawing on the classical concept of log-
ical clocks [49] to track the state of each forwarding rule at each abstract network
element. Although conceptually simple, providing a practical and scalable imple-
mentation of these high-level algorithms is challenging; switches do not directly
implement logical clocks, and emulating a large vector of logical clocks in packet
header fields is impractical. We provide a practical realization of those algorithms
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that emulates their behavior using OpenFlow-compatible switches, leveraging the
distinguishing characteristics of SDNs and virtualized networks, and is thus suit-
able for deployment in the context of a modern virtualized data center with soft-
ware switches in each physical host. Our design uses limited bits in header fields
of a physical network to emulate logical clocks in the virtual network, while deal-
ing with concurrent creations and changes of multiple virtual networks that may
interleave with each other and compete for use of these bits.
Finally, we implemented a prototype of COCONUT using Floodlight [50],
Open vSwitch [43], and OpenVirtex [5]. Our experiments with our prototype
on an SDN testbed and Mininet [51] with data center topologies of various scales
and with different load and traffic patterns demonstrate that COCONUT provides
observational correctnessunder scenarios in which existing replication techniques
often result in incorrect behavior, at reasonable cost in terms of update delay and
rule overhead (§3.5). In particular these costs are lower than for CU [46] for
large-scale networks (§3.5).3 We also demonstrate that COCONUT enables an
SDN application to be conveniently written so that it provides 19-30% lower la-
tency, compared with the natural implementation where the programmer deals
with replication manually within the application.
To prove that COCONUT correctly provides seamless scale-out, we need a new
analytical framework. In §4, we introduce the Input/Output Automaton (IOA)
framework which allows us to model the network, define its behavior, and reason
about its correctness. Our goal is that the scaled-out network is indistinguishable
from the case of a singleton network element. Thus, we need to take into account
the sequence of observations made by the end-points, with potential interdepen-
dencies. We formalize this with a definition we call observational correctness
that requires that any sequence of end-point observations in the scaled-out net-
work is plausible for the singleton version. In tune with what applications expect
from best-effort networks, this model is permissive of occasional packet drops
and re-ordering, while prohibiting weak causality violations that could jeopardize
applications’ correctness. We formally prove that COCONUT provides observa-
tional correctness(§3).
In summary, the second part of this thesis presents the design, evaluation, and
formal analysis of COCONUT and demonstrate that achieving true correct seam-
less scale-out, in the context of OpenFlow forwarding elements in a virtualized
3As mentioned above, CU provides trace properties which are different than causal consistency,
but it provides a useful reference point in terms of performance.
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data center, is surprisingly feasible. We believe this lays the foundation for a prac-
tical and dependable service model for virtualized network infrastructure, as well
as a powerful abstraction for programming SDNs.
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Chapter 2
MICRO LOAD BALANCING IN
DATACENTERS WITH DRILL
The trend towards simple datacenter network fabric strips most network function-
ality, including load balancing capabilities, out of the network core and pushes
them to the edge. We investigate the opposite direction — incorporating minimal
load balancing intelligence into the network fabric — and show that this slightly
smarter fabric significantly enhances performance.
In this chapter we present DRILL, a data center fabric for Clos networks which
performs micro load balancing to distribute load as evenly as possible on mi-
crosecond timescales. To achieve this, DRILL employs packet-level decisions
at each switch based on local queue occupancies, randomized algorithms to dis-
tribute load, and adaptation to asymmetry caused by link or device failures. Us-
ing a detailed switch hardware model, we simulate DRILL and show that it out-
performs recent edge-based load balancing techniques. Finally, we analyze the
switch-level stability and throughput-efficiency of DRILL’s scheduling algorithm.
2.1 Introduction
Datacenters are overwhelmingly built as topologies that are characterized by large
path diversity such as Clos networks (Figure 2.1) [15, 2, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 16, 20].
A critical issue is the design of an efficient algorithm that can evenly balance the
load among available paths. While Equal Cost Multi Path (ECMP) is extensively
used in practice [52, 8, 9], it is known to be far from optimal for efficiently exploit-
ing all available paths [9, 2, 21]. Datacenter measurement studies, for instance,
indicate that a significant fraction of core links regularly experience congestion
despite the fact that there is enough spare capacity elsewhere [22].
Many proposals have recently tried to address this need [2, 9, 23, 24, 21].
Aligned with the recent trend of moving functionality out of the network fab-
ric [25], these proposals strive to delegate load balancing to centralized controllers
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[26, 23, 3, 27], to the network edge [2], or even to end-hosts [9, 21]. These entities
serve as convenient locations for collecting global or cross-network information
about congestion. A notable example is CONGA [2], a recent in-network load
balancing scheme that gathers and analyzes congestion feedback from the net-
work at the network edge (leaf switches in Clos networks) to make load balancing
decisions. Planck [1], MicroTE [3], Mahout [27] and Hedera [23] also collect
global load information to balance load. All these approaches are based on a cen-
tral thesis that global congestion information is necessary for evenly balancing
the load.
We explore a different direction: What can be achieved with decisions that
are local to each switch? We refer to this approach as micro load balancing be-
cause it makes “microscopic” decisions within each switch without global infor-
mation, and because this in turn allows decisions on microsecond (packet-by-
packet) timescales.
Micro load balancing has hope of offering an advantage because load balanc-
ing systems based on global traffic information have control loops that are signif-
icantly slower than the duration of the majority of congestion incidents in data-
centers, which are short-lived [22, 28]. The bulk of microbursts responsible for
most packet loss, for instance, last for a few microseconds [53, 29]. Systems
that attempt to collect and react based on global congestion information typically
have orders of magnitude slower control loops than this [1, 2]. For example, even
though CONGA adds mechanisms to leaf and spine switches to assist in obtaining
congestion information, it still typically requires a few RTTs (tens to hundreds of
milliseconds), by which time the congestion event is likely already over.
To understand the problem, we consider a particular fluid version of ECMP,
ESF (§2.3.1), which is optimal for Clos networks, and then attempt to design and
evaluate a practical approximation of it that we call DRILL (Distributed Ran-
domized In-network Localized Load-balancing). DRILL is in essence a switch
scheduling algorithm that acts only based on local switch queue length informa-
tion without any coordination among switches or any controllers. Even within a
single switch with multiple forwarding engines (§2.3.2), deciding how to route and
schedule packets is nontrivial. DRILL’s scheduling algorithm for such switches
is inspired by the “power of two choices” paradigm [30]. To make it practical
for packet routing within a switch, we extend the classic design to accommodate
a distributed set of sources (forwarding engines) and show that the key stability
result holds in the distributed version as well (§2.3.2).
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More concretely, DRILL assumes that a set of candidate next-hops for each
destination have been installed in the forwarding table, using well-known mecha-
nisms such as the shortest paths (as in ECMP). Next, upon arrival of each packet
at any engine, that engine, independently and with no coordination with other en-
gines, compares the queue lengths of two randomly-chosen candidate output ports
and the port that was least loaded during the previous samplings, and sends the
packet to the least loaded of these three candidates. Note that this is unlike ECMP
since the decision is based on local load rather than static hashing of the packet
header. We show how to optimize DRILL’s parameters—number of choices and
amount of memory—so as to avoid damaging synchronization effects where many
engines choose the same output. We further investigate whether DRILL’s load-
based scheduling algorithms within a switch could result in instability and hence
low throughput [31]. We formally prove DRILL’s stability and show that it guar-
antees 100% throughout for all admissible independent arrival processes (§2.3.2).
DRILL’s micro load balancing raises several concerns. First, how can we deal
with packet reordering that results from load balancing at sub-flow granularities?
Interestingly, we find that in Clos datacenter networks, even with failures, DRILL
balances load so well that packets nearly always arrive in order despite traversing
different paths. This is because queue lengths have very small variance and hence
packets have almost identical queueing delays, even under heavy load (§2.4). Re-
gardless, the occasional reorderings could still be undesirable for certain applica-
tions. Hence, similar to prior work [24, 9], in virtualized datacenters, we option-
ally deploy a buffer in hypervisors to restore correct ordering of packets. Practical
challenges of deploying such a technique are addressed by Presto [9]. Com-
pared to Presto, DRILL causes significantly less frequent out of order delivery of
packets (§2.3.3).
The second challenge is: how does a purely local scheme like DRILL adapt to
topological changes, such as failures? To handle asymmetric topologies, DRILL
decomposes the network into symmetric partitions and applies micro load bal-
ancing inside each partition. We show that this technique results in bandwidth
efficiency for admissible traffic (§2.3.4) and short flow completion times even un-
der multiple failures (§2.3.4, §2.4).
Via extensive simulations using a detailed switch hardware model and a variety
of topologies and workloads, we find that, in contrast to the works that operate
on a global macroscopic view of networks, DRILL’s micro load balancing en-
ables it to instantly react to load variations as the queues start building up. DRILL
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(a) A leaf-spine or folded Clos. (b) An arbitrary switch in the first stage
(leaf layer) of a Clos network.
Figure 2.1: A simple Clos network.
results in dramatically shorter tail latencies, especially in incast scenarios (2.5×
reduction in the 99.99th percentile of flow completion times (FCT) compared to
CONGA) and under heavy load (32% shorter 99.99th percentile of FCT compared
to CONGA under 80% load). Plus, DRILL offers a simpler switch implemen-
tation than CONGA since DRILL does not need to detect flowlets or send and
analyze feedback. We implement DRILL in Verilog to test its hardware feasibility
(§2.4).
Presto [9], another recent host-based scheme, offers an interesting comparison
point to DRILL. Unlike schemes with global information, Presto is congestion-
oblivious. Presto argues that the main culprit of inefficiencies in schemes like
ECMP is the coarse granularity: each flow, even a large one, hashes all its pack-
ets onto one path. Therefore, Presto partitions flows into equal size chunks of
64KB, called flowcells, and “sprays” them in a round-robin fashion among avail-
able paths. This can be executed by the source with a form of source routing, re-
leasing the network from that burden. A key assumption in this design is that the
small size and size-uniformity of data units is sufficient for preserving balanced
load in symmetric topologies. We find that the nature of workload dynamics, in
addition to the flow size distribution, is also key in load balancing. In bursty work-
loads, for instance, load-sensitive load balancers such as DRILL have better FCT
due to their reaction to congestion (e.g., 3.5× improvement in FCT’s tail in an
incast scenario; §2.4). DRILL’s improved performance results from (a) the load
adaptation of DRILL, in contrast to the load-agnostic nature of Presto, and (b)
balancing finer granularity of load: packets vs. flowcells.
In summary, our results strongly indicate that micro load balancing belongs in
the datacenter fabric to achieve the key goal of high performance traffic delivery.
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2.2 Background and Motivation
Clos topologies enable the datacenter providers to build large scale networks out
of smaller, and significantly cheaper, commodity switches with fewer ports con-
nected with links of less capacity [54, 15]. Today, most datacenter and enterprise
topologies are either built as one two-stage folded Clos, also called leaf-spine
topologies (one example is shown in Figure 2.1) [2] or incorporate Clos subgraphs
in various layers in their design. Various generations of datacenter at Google, for
instance, are built out of different variants of the Clos topology [8]. As another
example, the VL2 network [15] is composed of a Clos network between its Aggre-
gation and Intermediate switches. Similarly, in the fat-tree network of [54], Clos
networks are used to build pods and the network between pods and core switches.
A key characteristic of Clos networks is having multiple paths between any
source and destination hosts. The common practice in datacenters today for bal-
ancing load among these paths is ECMP [52]. When more than one “best path”,
commonly selected to minimize the number of hops of each path, is available for
forwarding a packet towards its destination, each switch selects one via hashing
the 5-tuple packet header: source and destination IPs, protocol number, and source
and destination port numbers. This path selection mechanism enables ECMP to
avoid reordering packets within a TCP flow without per-flow state. All the exam-
ples of the Clos networks given above deploy ECMP [8, 15, 54].
ECMP, however, is routinely reported to perform poorly and cause congestion
when flow hash collisions occur [9, 2, 8, 29]. Datacenter measurement studies,
for instance, show that a significant fraction of core links regularly experience
congestion despite the fact that there is enough spare capacity elsewhere to carry
the load [22]. Many proposals have tried to enhance ECMP’s performance by
balancing finer-grained units of traffic. Aligned with the recent trend of moving
functionality out of the network fabric [25], these proposals strive to delegate this
task to centralized controllers [23, 1, 26, 3, 27], to the network edge [2], or even
to end-hosts [9, 21]. In Presto, for instance, end-hosts split flows into flowcells,
TSO (TCP Segment Offload) segments of size 64KB; the network balances flow-
cells, instead of flows, in a load-oblivious manner [9]. Presto is built on a major
premise that per-flow coarse granularity of ECMP combined with the existence
of large flows in datacenters is the primary deficiency of ECMP, and in any Clos
network with small flows, ECMP is close to optimal [9]. In CONGA, as another
example, each edge switch balances flowlets [2] based on global load information.
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Its central thesis is that not only the fine granularity of the load to balance, but also
that global load information is essential for optimal load balancing and reacting
to congestion. Presto and CONGA balance granularities coarser than packets to
reduce reordering.
While improving ECMP, these proposals cannot effectively suppress short-lived
congestion events that tend to persist for only sub-millisecond intervals [55, 53],
sometimes called microbursts [22, 53, 56, 57], as even the fastest ones have con-
trol loops with 10s of millisecond to a few second delays [2, 1, 3]. However, mi-
crobursts are responsible for majority of packet loss in datacenters [22]. In today’s
datacenters, despite the reportedly low average link utilizations (1% to 20-30% at
various stages [14, 8]), the highly bursty nature of traffic [3, 2, 14] makes very
short-lived periods of buffer overrun and consequently high loss rates the norm
rather than the exception. The buffer utilization statistics at a 10-microsecond
granularity from Facebook datacenters for switches connecting web servers and
cache nodes, for instance, demonstrate a persistent several orders of magnitude
difference between the maximum and the mean queue occupancies [14]. Plus,
the maximum buffer occupancy in these Facebook web server racks is reported
to approach the configured limit for approximately three quarters of the 24-hour
measurement period, even though the mean link utilization for the same rack is
only 1% [14]. These ephemeral high buffer occupancies are correlated with high
drop rates [14]. The inherent traffic burstiness also results in high congestion drop
rates in Google datacenters as utilization approaches 25%; so the utilization is
typically kept below that level [8]. Given the pervasiveness of microbursts and
their adverse impact on the performance, in terms of low flow completion times
and high throughput, our first goal is to provide high performance especially when
microbursts emerge.
Despite ECMP’s suboptimality in handling congestions, its extreme simplicity
and scalability effectively has turned it into the de facto load balancing practice in
most of the datacenters [8, 14, 15]. Notably, the fact that it is local to each switch
in the sense that, for forwarding packets, each switch autonomously selects among
available paths, irrespective of the load and choices of other switches, makes
it easily deployed in conjunction with most routing protocols. Once the global
topological information is gathered, each switch makes local forwarding deci-
sions. Networks are therefore relieved of the burden of complex mechanisms for
gathering global load information either via distributed algorithms (as in CONGA
[2]) or in a centralized manner (as in Planck [1]). Ideally, we would want to share
16
ECMP’s scalability and simplicity. Hence, in designing DRILL, our second goal
is to make load balancing decisions that are local to each switch.
2.3 Design and Algorithms
In this section, we provide a high level overview of DRILL’s overall design
(§2.3.1), how it achieves micro load balancing in symmetric networks (§2.3.2),
how it handles reordered packets (§2.3.3), and how it deals with failures (§2.3.4).
2.3.1 Design Overview
Defining an ideal model for symmetric Clos networks: Equal Split Fluid
(ESF). In order to work towards a solution, we define a theoretical ideal that we
call Equal Split Fluid (ESF). ESF assumes a fluid model of traffic (rather than a
discrete packet-based model). At each switch with n least-cost paths towards a
particular destination, ESF sends exactly 1/n of the fluid traffic to that destination
along each of the n least-cost paths. ESF is switch-local and, in any symmetric
leaf-spine topology, with a bipartite graph between the leaf and spine switches
with identical links, it has precisely optimal load balance regardless of the traffic
pattern. To briefly explain why: the fact that the first hop traffic, going out of
leaves to spines, is balanced across all paths follows immediately from the defini-
tion of ESF—each leaf splits its incoming traffic among all available paths. As a
result of that, the spines act as an intermediary stage where each spine receives an
exactly equal fraction of the traffic destined to each leaf. Hence, the second hop
traffic, from spines to the destination leaf, is also balanced, resulting in an overall
perfectly balanced load across paths. This intuition extends to more general Clos
networks (see Theorem 4 in §A) and is essentially the fluid-model intuition be-
hind why Valiant load balancing (VLB) [58] is an effective load-oblivious routing
algorithm.
While optimal, ESF is merely a theoretical fluid-model ideal that the switching
fabric needs to approximate in a real discrete world. We can interpret several exist-
ing load balancing schemes as attempting to approximate ESF. In ECMP, instead
of exactly equally splitting outgoing traffic, (a) decisions are made in very coarse-
grained chunks of whole flows, and (b) decisions are pseudorandom, resulting in
occasional unlucky load collisions. Presto [9] shrinks the unit of discretization to
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the 64 KB flowcell, and randomly spreads these flowcells using end-host source
routing; this partially mitigates problem (a). One could imagine going a step fur-
ther down to what we call per-packet VLB which sends each packet through a
random intermediate (spine) switch. This design was considered in [9] but was
avoided in order to reduce end-host CPU overhead and packet reordering. Even if
per-packet VLB could be implemented, it would help problem (a) but not (b), and
we will see experimentally that both problems are important.
DRILL as a near-optimal approximation of ESF. The previous discussion
did not introduce any truly new material, but helps us frame the problem in a way
that provides a direction forward: Can we approximate ESF even more closely? If
we could succeed in doing so, the ESF approach could achieve our goals of high
performance even at microsecond timescales, and using a switch-local algorithm.
But approximating the theoretical ideal is nontrivial. To achieve this, DRILL first
chooses the smallest practical unit of discretization, i.e., single packets. This is
also a decision unit that is simple for switches to deal with statelessly, and with
forwarding in switches, we can avoid the concern mentioned in [9] of overhead
of per-packet forwarding decisions at endhosts. Second, DRILL does not forward
traffic uniform-randomly. Instead, DRILL leverages switch-local load informa-
tion, sampling some or all outgoing queues when making each packet’s forward-
ing decision and placing the packet in the shortest of these queues. Intuitively,
this minimizes the “error” between the ideal fluid-based ESF and actual packet
forwarding. In particular, we prove in §2.3.2 that DRILL is stable and can deliver
100% throughput for all admissible independent arrival processes.
Together, these mechanisms achieve a significantly better approximation of
ESF than past designs. However, two key challenges remain, which we discuss
next.
DRILL causes minimal packet reordering. DRILL’s fine grained per-packet
load balancing based on potentially rapidly changing local load information raises
concern about reordering that could imperil TCP throughput. We show in §2.3.2
and §2.3.3 that under this algorithm, the load is so well balanced that even under
heavy load, the probability of reordering is very small—in most cases, well be-
low the degree that damages TCP throughput, and indeed well below the degree
that can be resolved by some recent proposals for handling reordering at the end
hosts such as Presto [9]. DRILL can employ a shim layer as in [9] to eliminate
reordering completely, but in many environments, even without the shim DRILL
provides a substantial benefit.
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DRILL handles topological asymmetry by decomposing the network into
symmetric components. In a symmetric Clos, for perfect load balancing, the
objective of each source of traffic is clear: equal splitting of its traffic among
available paths. In its nature, this is an oblivious objective since it does not depend
on the load of the other nodes in the network. Different versions of the oblivious
routing then deploy different mechanisms for achieving that objective, from local
load sensing combined with randomization in DRILL to pure randomization in
VLB and ECMP.
If the paths are asymmetric, however, the optimal splitting ratio of traffic at each
source may depend on the load from other sources, a potentially rapidly chang-
ing, and inherently non-oblivious goal. Naively splitting traffic equally among all
paths in this case, as is done in ESF as well as some other variants of oblivious
routing such as VLB and Presto, can cause excessive bandwidth loss and packet
reordering. Intuitively, in a asymmetric network, multiple paths that a flow can
take may have different capacities. Therefore, splitting the load equally among
them effectively limits the rate on each path equal to the rate of the path with
minimum capacity. This implies that the paths with more capacity will have idle
bandwidth even if the flow has a demand for that bandwidth. In addition to band-
width inefficiency, splitting flows among a set of paths with differential load, and
hence different latencies, can potentially cause high degrees of packet reordering.
We observe that both problems rise due to splitting flows among asymmetric
paths. Hence, in an asymmetric Clos, DRILL initially decomposes the graph into
symmetric components, and then runs the DRILL(d,m) inside each component.
The rate independence across components implies that the rates in a component
can grow unaffected by congestions of other components; thus the bandwidth in-
efficiency problem is resolved. Plus, since each component is symmetric, splitting
flows across its paths does not lead to excessive packet reordering; so the reorder-
ing problem is mitigated.
In the spectrum of strictly load oblivious schemes such as VLB, ECMP, and
Presto [9] to globally load aware and adaptive ones such as CONGA [2] and
Planck [1], DRILL occupies the middle ground: it retains most of the simplic-
ity and scalability of the first class by requiring only local load information and
negligible amount of state independent of the number of flows, while improving
upon the performance of the state of the art load balancers in both classes (§2.4).
We explain how DRILL achieves near optimal load balancing for a wide range of
switching hardware in a symmetric Clos (§2.3.2), and how it handles reordering
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(§2.3.3) and asymmetry (§2.3.4).
2.3.2 DRILL Approximates ESF in a Symmetric Clos
In a symmetric Clos, our mission is to get as close to ESF as possible. We show
that a slight degree of load sensing and intelligence in the switches can get us
close to this goal, significantly closer compared to a past approach, VLB, which
is considered close to optimal by some load balancing proposals that try to ap-
proximate it [9, 23], and ECMP. Before presenting the algorithms, we provide a
high level overview of the switching hardware that might affect load balancing.
Switching hardware: Switches have forwarding engines that make forward-
ing decisions for packets. While many of the simple switches deployed in dat-
acenters have one centralized engine [59], higher-performance switches invari-
ably have multiple forwarding engines [60, 61, 62, 63]. Very high performance
switches might have multiple engines on each interface card [63]. These engines
make parallel and independent forwarding decisions. Cisco 6700 Series [64],
Cisco 6800 Series [64], Cisco 7500 Series [65], Cisco Catalyst 6500 backbone
switch series [64], and Juniper MX Series [66] are some examples of switches
that support multiple forwarding engines. In Cisco switches, for example, multi-
ple Distributed Forwarding Card (DFC) are installed for line cards. The forward-
ing logic is then replicated on each DFC-enabled line card, and each card makes
forwarding decisions locally and independent of other cards. Some switches have
constant access to queue depth, typically as a means for micro-burst monitoring
[53, 56, 67, 68, 55]. This feature allows the network provider to monitor traffic on
a per-port basis to detect unexpected data bursts within a very small time window
of µsec. [53]. Our discussions with [59] indicate that while this information is
easily accessible for packet forwarding, it is not always precise: the queue length
does not include the packets that are just entering the queue until after they are
being fully enqueued. Our simulator models this behavior.
DRILL(d,m) scheduling policies: We show that a simple O(1) algorithm
achieves near optimal load balancing in a symmetric Clos irrespective of the num-
ber of switch engines. We assume that a set of candidate next-hops for each des-
tination has been installed in the forwarding tables of each engine of the switch,
using well-known mechanisms such as the shortest paths used by ECMP. DRILL
is essentially a switch-local scheduling algorithm inspired by the seminal work on
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power of two choices [69] that, whenever more than one next hop is available for
the destination of a packet, decides which hop the packet should take.
DRILL(d,m): Upon each packet arrival, the forwarding engine chooses d
random output ports out of possible N next hops, finds the one with the current
minimum queue occupancy between these d samples and m least loaded samples
from previous time slots, and routes its packet to that port. Finally, the engine
updates the contents of its m memory units with the identity of the least loaded
output queues.
This algorithm has the complexity of O(d + m). Our experiments with Clos
networks with various sizes, switches with diverse number of engines, and differ-
ent load show that (a) having a few choices and few units of memory is crit-
ical to the efficiency of our algorithms, e.g., DRILL(2,1) significantly out-
performs VLB, (b) increasing d and m beyond 2 and 1 has less of an im-
pact on DRILL’s performance, and in some cases may degrade performance,
i.e., while DRILL(2,1), with complexity of O(1), consistently outperforms
VLB and ECMP, DRILL(d,m) where d  2 and m  1 may underperform
DRILL(2,1) due to a phenomenon we call the synchronization effect. We ex-
plain each of these points in turn.
Setting the right parameters: the pitfalls of choice and memory: We show
in §2.3.2 that for stability, it is necessary to setm ≥ 1. To set d andm, we evaluate
DRILL(d,m)s’ performance and compare it with ECMP and VLB using the
following methodology: We build Clos datacenters of different sizes in a packet
level simulator (details in §2.4), draw flow sizes and interarrival times from [14],
and scale the interarrival times to emulate various degrees of network load. Given
that the dominant source of latency in datacenters is queueing delay [70], in this
section, we measure queue lengths as the load balancing evaluation metric. §2.4
measures higher level metrics such as flow completion times and throughput. An
ideal load balancer should be able to keep the queues balanced at both leaf and
spine layers, i.e., it should balance the load across uplink queues of each leaf
switch as well as across the spine layer’s downlink queues connected to the same
leaf switch. Hence, as the performance metric, at every 10µsec. during the 100
sec. experiments, we measure the standard deviation (STDV) of uplink queue
lengths for each leaf switch and the STDV of queue lengths of all downlinks of
spine switches connected to each leaf switch. ESF keeps this metric constantly
zero, and we strive to get close to zero.
Small amounts of choice and memory dramatically improve performance.
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Figure 2.2: (a) 80% load. (b) 30% load. Adding a choice and a memory unit
improves performance dramatically.
Our experiments show that in networks with different sizes, deploying switches
with different number of engines, and under high and low load, adding a slight
amount of choice and memory, e.g., DRILL(2,1) instead of VLB, significantly
improves the load balancing performance especially under heavy load. In net-
works with 48 spines and 48 leaves each connected to 48 hosts, for instance, under
80% load, DRILL(2,1) reduces the avg. STDV of queue lengths by over 65%
compared to VLB, irrespective of the number of engines switches have, (Figure
2.2 (a)). DRILL’s improvement upon VLB is more pronounced when the num-
ber of engines is small, e.g., DRILL’s mean queue length STDV is approximately
80% smaller than VLB’s for single engine switches. VLB, in turn, improves
upon ECMP by around 94% as a result of its finer grained, per-packet operations.
When the network is less loaded and switches have more engines, however, the
improvement is less dramatic. As an example, under 30% load, DRILL(2,1)
outperforms VLB by around 20% if the network is built out of 48 engine switches,
and by over 75% with single-engine ones (Figure 2.2 (b)).
Too much memory and too many choices may degrade performance. While
a few choices and units of memory improve performance dramatically, excessive
amounts of them degrade the performance for switches with large number of en-
gines (number of engines > 6 in our experiments) under heavy load. Figures 2.3
shows an example for a network with 48-engine switches under 80% load. While
the first extra choice, i.e., DRILL(1,2) vs. DRILL(1,1) reduces the mean
queue length STDV by 11%, having 20 choices, i.e., DRILL(1,20), increases
this metric by 8%. The reason is that the larger number of random samples or
memory units makes it more likely for a large number of engines to simultane-
ously select the same set of output ports which will in turn cause bursts of packets
at those ports. We call this phenomenon synchronization effect. The resulted load
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Figure 2.3: With 48-engine switches & 80% load, too many choices and memory
units cause a synchronization effect.
imbalance may cause more queueing delays, e.g., while the 99.999th percentile of
queue lengths is below 1 under DRILL(1,2) (i.e., the queues are almost always
empty), the 99th percentile of queue lengths under DRILL(1,20) is slightly
larger than 1, i.e., under DRILL(1,20), in 1% of the cases, packets experience
some queueing latency because of the synchronization effect. For other cases
(under light load or having fewer engines), setting d 2 and m 1 results in
more balanced load, but the impact on queue lengths is marginal given that the
queues are already almost perfectly balanced under DRILL(2,1). With one en-
gine switches under 80% load, for example, while the mean queue length STDV is
considerably lower in DRILL(12,1) compared to DRILL(2,1), the 99.999th
percentile of queue lengths is under 1 for both, i.e., packets rarely experience any
queueing delays.
DRILL guarantees stability
A system is stable if the expected length of no queue grows without bound [31].
We consider an M ×N combined input output queued switch with FIFO queues
in which the arrivals are independent and packets could be forwarded to any of
the N output ports. We assume traffic admissible, i.e.,
∑M
i=1 δi ≤
∑N
i=1 µi, where
δi is the arrival rate to input port i and µj is the service rate of output queue
j. We place no restriction on the heterogeneity of arrival rates or service rates.
These rates can be different and could dynamically change over time. Particularly,
we focus on the more interesting and more challenging case where service rates
could vary over time because of various reasons such as failures and recoveries
that are common in data centers [32]. We first prove that purely randomized algo-
rithms without memory, e.g., DRILL(d,0), are unstable then prove the stability
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of DRILL(d,m) for m >0.
Pure random sampling is unstable. First, we consider DRILL(d,0), i.e.,
the algorithm in which every forwarding engine chooses d random outputs out of
possible N queues, finds the queue with minimum occupancy between them and
routes its packet to it. Theorem 1 proves that such algorithm cannot guarantee
stability.
Theorem 1. For admissible independent arrival processes, DRILL(d,0) cannot
guarantee stability for any arbitrary number of samples d < N .
Proof. Let δi be the arrival rate to engine i, and µj be the service rate of out-
put queue j. Now consider output queue I . For any forwarding engine, the
probability that it chooses I as a sample is d
N
. So, maximum arrival rate to I is
d
N
×∑Mi δi. Thus, the minimum arrival rate to the remaining N -1 output queues
is ζ =
∑M
i δi − dN ×
∑M
i δi = (1− dN )×
∑M
i δi. Clearly, if ζ is larger than the
sum of the service rates of these N -1 queues, the system is unstable.
It should be noted that the argument does not hold: (a) when there are some
restrictions regarding arrival or service rates, e.g., when the service rates are equal,
or (b) when d=N . These special cases, however, are of little interest, since the
former opts out some admissible traffic patterns, and the latter nullifies the benefit
of randomization and may cause a synchronization effect (§2.3.2). The results of
our experiments suggest that the system performs well with d N .
Random sampling with memory is stable. We showed above that randomized
policy cannot guarantee stability without using unit of memory. Similar to [31]
and using the results of Kumar and Meyn [71], we prove that DRILL’s schedul-
ing algorithms are stable for all uniform and nonuniform independent arrival pro-
cesses up to a maximum throughput of 100%.
Theorem 2. For all admissible independent arrivals, DRILL(1,1) is stable and
achieves 100% throughput.
To prove that the algorithm is stable, we show that for an M ×N switch sched-
uled using DRILL(1,1), there is a negative expected single-step drift in a Lya-
punov function, V. In other words,
E[V (n+ 1)− V (n)|V (n)] ≤ V (n) + k,
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where k,  >0 are some constants. We do so by defining V (n)=V1(n)+V2(n),
V1(n)=
∑N
i=1 V1,i(n), V1,i(n) = (q˜i(n)−q∗(n))2, V2(n)=
∑N
i=1 q
2
i (n). qk(n), q˜i(n),
and q∗(n), respectively, represent the lengths of the k-th output queue, the output
queue chosen by the engine i, and the shortest output queue under DRILL(1,1)
at time instance n. Details of the proof are included in §A.
2.3.3 DRILL Causes Minimal Packet Reordering
DRILL makes forwarding decisions for each packet, independent of other packets
of the same flow, based on the local and potentially volatile switch load informa-
tion. One might expect this approach to cause excessive degrees of packet reorder-
ing that could degrade TCP performance. Reordering may degrade TCP’s perfor-
mance by triggering its duplicate ACK mechanism, one of the primary means of
TCP for detecting packet loss. As explained in RFC2581 [72], when a segment ar-
rives out of order, the receiver immediately sends a “duplicate ACK” to the sender.
The sender uses the TCP retransmission threshold, the arrival of three duplicate
ACKs, as an indication of packet loss and infer that the network is congested.
It then reacts by retransmitting the packet that is perceived lost and reducing its
transmission rate. Wary of this rate reduction, the majority of load balancing
schemes, from ECMP to to CONGA [2] to Presto [9], balance coarser units of
traffic in an effort to mitigate the risk of packet reordering.
Although DRILL splits flows into packets, the finest practical unit, and for-
wards them independently, it causes minimal packet reordering. This may be
somewhat surprising, but using multiple paths only causes reordering if the de-
lays along those paths differ by more than the time between packets in a flow.
Queueing delay is famously the dominant source of network delay in datacenters
[70], and DRILL’s well balanced load and extremely low variances among queue
lengths (as demonstrated in §2.3.2) imply that packets experience almost identical
queueing delays irrespective of the paths they take. Hence, even though flows’
packets take divergent paths at very fine granularity, they should not be reordered
frequently. Our experiments, using the actual TCP implementations taken from
Linux 2.6, confirm this hypothesis and show that TCP performance is not signifi-
cantly impacted (§2.4).
However, for certain legacy or specialized applications it may be desirable to
eliminate all reordering. In a modern virtualized data center, can be accomplished
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Figure 2.4: L1-S0 link failure increases FCT in DRILL.
with an end-host “shim” layer transparent to the guest OS as developed in [9]. In
§2.4 we evaluate both variants of DRILL, with the shim and without.
2.3.4 DRILL Decomposes Asymmetric Networks Into Symmetric
Components
For the majority of failures—failures of hosts, switches at any stage, and the links
between switches and hosts—ESF (and DRILL(d,m)as its approximation) is
self-healing because such changes turn the topology into a smaller, but still sym-
metric, Clos. For such failures, the underlying topology dissemination mecha-
nisms, such as those deployed by ECMP, purge the failed parts from forwarding
tables and DRILL continues to distribute traffic among the remaining paths as
before.
If a link between a leaf and a spine fails or leaf-spine links have different capac-
ities, however, local load balancers that try to split the load equally among avail-
able paths may waste bandwidth because of their interactions with TCP’s control
loop, as noted in [2]. This happens because the asymmetric paths available to a
flow may have different and varying capacities for it (depending on the load of
other flows that use those paths). Flow rates on each path are controlled by TCP
to avoid congestion. So splitting the load of the flow equally among asymmetric
paths effectively limits its rates on each path to the rate of the most congested path.
This implies that the paths with more capacity will be left underutilized even if
the flow has a demand for their bandwidth.
As a simple example, consider Figure 2.4 (left) where hosts under leaf switches
L0 and L1 have infinite TCP traffic demands to send to those under L2. Assume
that the link between L1 and S0 fails and that all links have 1Gbps capacity. Un-
der local schemes such as ESF, this link failure can cause collateral damage to the
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flows going through other links. This happens because the flows from L0 and L1
that are sent to S1 share the bottleneck link S1 → L2. Assuming that the number
of these flows are equal and they are all in the steady state, TCP does not allow
the rate of the flows from L0 that take the path Q, L0 → S1 → L2, to increase be-
yond 0.5Gbps to avoid congestion on S1 → L2. Now if the load balancer tries to
keep the load on path P (L0 → S0 → L2) and Q equal, it keeps the rate on P also
equal to 0.5Gbps, in spite of the fact that P can serve traffic at 1Gbps. In other
words, 50% of the bandwidth of P will be lost. A similar experiment, discussed
later in this section, shows that, without its failover mechanism, DRILL(2, 1) also
wastes around 50% of the capacity of this path. Note that some other local load
balancers also suffer from this problem. Presto’s failover mechanism [9], for ex-
ample, prunes the spanning trees affected by the failure and uses a static weighted
scheduling algorithm, similar to WCMP [7], over the remaining paths. In this ex-
ample, since P andQ have static capacity of 1Gbps each, their associated weights
will be equal and Presto continues to equally spread L0 → L2’s load across them.
Note that changing weights in a load oblivious manner does not solve this prob-
lem since the appropriate weight values depend on the load from other sources—a
potentially rapidly evolving parameter. In the above example, for instance, op-
timal weight assignments would be w(P )=1 and w(Q)=0, but if the L1 → L2
demand was 0, then the optimal weights would be w(P )=w(Q)=1 as the previous
weight assignment leaves Q idle.
Also note that in addition to this bandwidth inefficiency in the asymmetric case,
local schemes such as Presto and DRILL that split flows across asymmetric paths
may cause an extra problem of excessive packet reordering. In the example above,
packets traversingQ experience higher queueing delay compared to those travers-
ing P given that S1 is more congested than S0. Splitting flows between P and Q,
therefore, may result in an exceeding degree of reordering under heavy load.
We observe that both problems are rooted in imposing rate dependencies across
asymmetric paths, e.g., keeping P and Q rates equal in the example above. In-
tuitively, to solve these problems, DRILL needs to break the rate dependencies
between asymmetric paths. To achieve this, DRILL decomposes the network into
components with symmetric paths (defined below), assigns each flow to one com-
ponent, and balances it among the paths inside it. The utilization factor [73] of
the path Lsrc → Si → Ldst is defined as u(src, i, dst) =
capacity(Si→Ldst)
capacity(Lsrc→Si) . At leaf Lsrc, for any two paths
Lsrc → Si → Ldst and Lsrc → Sj → Ldst towards leaf Ldst, to be symmetric, not
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only their utilization factors through Si and Sj should be equal, but also the uti-
lization factors of any other leaf switch, Lk, that use those 2 spines towards Ldst
should be equal as well, i.e., u(k, i, dst)=u(k, j, dst). The reason to impose this
condition on utilization factors is to keep each component’s queues, in both its
leaf and spine layers, balanced. Theorem 3 in §A shows that, for admissible in-
dependent traffic, this condition is sufficient to guarantee DRILL’s stability and
100% throughput. In the example above, u(1, 0, 2)=0 whereas u(1, 1, 2)=1. This
implies that the load towards L2 may be different at S0 and S1. Thus, L0 puts P
and Q in different components and avoids splitting flows across them.
DRILL’s failover algorithm: If the topology is asymmetric, DRILL follows 3
steps: Step 1: Network decomposition. For each destination leaf Ldst, each leaf
Lsrc first detects the group of all available spines ∪iSi connected to both Lsrc and
Ldst. Lsrc then annotates each spine Si in this group with a set of pairs, where each
pair shows the ID of the leaf that can send traffic to Ldst via Si and its utilization
factor, i.e., ASi,Ldst = ∪j(Lj, u(j, i, dst)). In the example above, L0’s annotation
for S1 towards L2 is AS1,L2={(L0, 1), (L1, 1)}. Components are then the largest
sets of spines with identical annotations, i.e., any two spines Si and Sj are in the
same component iff ASi,Ldst=ASj ,Ldst . Once each leaf decomposes the set of avail-
able paths to each destination into symmetric components, each DRILL’s source
assigns a weight to each component which is proportional to the aggregate uti-
lization factor of its paths from that source. In the example above, L0 detects that
P and Q have different annotations but equal utilization factors. So it puts them
in different components with equal weights. This weight assignment to compo-
nents is similar to the path weight assignments in [9, 7] and can be implemented
in switches with the techniques discussed in [74]. Step 2: Flow classification.
By hashing the 5-tuple header of each packet, DRILL assigns it to a component
considering the weights set in the previous step. Step 3: Intra-component micro
load balancing. Inside each component, DRILL uses DRILL(d,m) to balance
the load across its symmetric paths.
The algorithm above avoids bandwidth loss and reduces reordering by restrict-
ing application of per-packet load balancing to symmetric paths. As an example,
consider the topology depicted in Figure 2.4, with a workload similar to the Inter-
pod Incoming workload [54] where hosts send traffic to those under L0 and L2.
In this experiment, each leaf is connected to 40 hosts each sending TCP flows to
a random host under L0 or L2 with equal probability. Assume further that flows
sizes are drawn from a normal distribution with the mean flow size equal to 20MB,
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Figure 2.5: DRILL improves latency in a symmetric Clos.
and flow interarrival times are generated by a poisson process (similar to [2]) in
such a way to keep the offered core load equal to 80%. DRILL(2,1), without its
failover algorithm, keeps the utilization of P to 43%, and causes 13% packet re-
ordering (the rate of packet reordering with Presto’s failover mechanism is 37%).
These two factors can increase flow completion times (FCT) as Figure 2.4 (right)
shows. DRILL’s failover algorithm mitigates this problem by avoiding reordering
and increasing the utilization of P to 74%.
While, for ease of exposition, we focus on a two-tier Clos here, our design and
results are recursively applicable to a Clos with arbitrary depth.
2.4 Evaluation
We evaluate DRILL in detailed simulations. We find that DRILL achieves high
performance, e.g., it has 0.77×, 0.68×, and 0.6× lower mean FCT than ECMP,
CONGA, and Presto, respectively, under 80% load. Both our fine granularity
and load-awareness are important factors in that performance, with the second
becoming more important in highly bursty traffic patterns such as incast, and with
link failures. DRILL is especially effective in handling incast as it is the most agile
load balancer to react to spontaneous load bursts; it results in 2.5× and 3.5× lower
99.99th percentile of FCT compared to CONGA and Presto, respectively. We also
show DRILL has minimal packet reordering, and explore the effect of failures,
synthetic traffic patterns, and scaling out. Finally, we implemented DRILL in
Verilog to evaluate deployability. Details of these evaluations follow.
Performance evaluation methodology: To test DRILL’s performance at scale,
we measure flow completion times (FCT) and throughput under DRILL, and com-
pare it with CONGA, Presto, and ECMP via simulation. We use the OMNET++
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Figure 2.6: (a) 30% load (b) 80% load. DRILL’s improvement is greater under
heavy load.
simulator [75] and the INET framework [76], with standard Ethernet switches’
and hosts’ networking stacks. We port the real-world TCP implementations taken
from Linux 2.6 via the Network Simulation Cradle library [77]. For DRILL, un-
less stated otherwise, we use single engine switches under DRILL(2,1). We
use 2 and 3 stage Clos networks with various sizes, without failures and with mul-
tiple link failures, under a set of realistic and synthetic workloads, and an incast
application.
In a symmetric Clos, DRILL reduces mean and tail latencies. We use trace-
driven workloads from real datacenter traffic for flow sizes, flow interarrival times,
and traffic pattern from [14], and use a Clos with 8 spine and 10 leaf switches,
where each leaf is connected to 40 hosts; all links are 1Gbps. To emulate various
degrees of the core offered load, we scale flow interarrival times. Under this set-
ting, we find the load balancing granularity to be a key player in the effectiveness
of the load balancer. DRILL achieves lower FCT compared to Presto which in turn
has lower FCT than CONGA. The difference is larger under heavy load and in the
tail, e.g., under 80% load, DRILL reduces the 99.99th percentile of FCT of Presto
and CONGA by 32% and 35%, respectively (Figure 2.5). Figure 2.6 shows the
FCT CDFs for 30% and 80% load. Datacenters today experience high congestion
drops as utilization approaches 25% [8]. Thus, the average load is kept around
25% to control the latency [8, 14]. We note that compared to ECMP, DRILL al-
lows the providers to use 10% more of their bandwidth capacity while keeping the
99.99th percentile of FCT lower than ECMP’s under 25% load. That is, DRILL
supports 1.4× higher load with the same tail FCT performance compared with
ECMP, 1.32× higher than CONGA and 1.25× higher than Presto.
Note that despite the importance of the load balancing granularity, load-
awareness is important too even in the symmetric case. We show a strawman
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Figure 2.7: DRILL keeps FCT short in a VL2 network under (a) 30% and (b)
60% load.
“per-flow DRILL” which makes load-aware decisions for the first packet of a flow
and then pins the flow; this marginally improves the tail latency of Presto and
CONGA while being coarser grained than both.
DRILL has minimal packet reordering. The previous figures show that FCT
is low despite reordering, but next we dig deeper to see why. Figure 2.8 shows
amount of reordering measured in terms of the number of TCP duplicate ACKs,
under 30% and 80% load. ECMP and CONGA do not cause reordering, but as a
strawman comparison, we also show the amount of reordering in per-packet VLB
(i.e., random forwarding of each packet with no load-awareness). We note two
important conclusions. First, per-packet VLB and DRILL have the same granular-
ity of load balancing but DRILL has dramatically lower packet reordering. This
demonstrates how local load awareness keeps queues extremely well-balanced
across paths.
Second, the degree of reordering under DRILL rarely reaches the TCP retrans-
mission threshold. Under 30% load only 0.9% of flows have any duplicate ACKs,
and only 0.08% have more than the typical TCP retransmission threshold of 3.
Even under 80% load, these numbers are 5.8% and 0.6%, respectively – more
than 3.2× lower than per-packet VLB and 2.6× lower than Presto without its shim
layer. This minimal degree of reordering shows why DRILL with and without the
shim layer have very similar performance.
DRILL gracefully handles failures. Even though high scale datacenters show
high reliability [32], with the majority of links having higher than four 9’s of re-
liability [32], there is still a high probability of at least one failure at each point
in time [78, 7]. Therefore, handling failures gracefully is imperative for any load
balancer. We test the performance of DRILL under 2 failure scenarios: (a) one
single leaf-spine link failure, as single failures are the most common failure cases
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Figure 2.9: DRILL gracefully handles single link failures.
in datacenters [32], and (b) 5 randomly selected leaf-spine link failures; this sce-
nario presents a rare, but still possible, case. Even in large scale datacenters, big
groups of correlated link failures are rare with only 10% of failure groups (failures
with downtimes either simultaneous or close together in time) containing more
than four failures [32]. As before, we load the system up to 90% of the avail-
able core capacity. We observe that DRILL and CONGA are more effective in
handling multiple failures (Figures 2.9 and 2.10). This is because CONGA shifts
the load towards the parts of the topology with more capacity, and DRILL breaks
the rate interdependencies between asymmetric paths, effectively allowing flows
to grab the available bandwidth, increase their rates, and finish faster. Note that
in all these cases, DRILL’s performance with and without the shim layer that re-
orders the out-of-order packets (from [9]) are almost identical, since its degree of
reordering is so low that it rarely reaches TCP’s retransmission threshold (§2.3.3).
DRILL reduces the tail latency in incast scenarios. A common and vexing
traffic pattern in datacenters is incast [8, 70]. It is one of the key factors in causing
excessive congestion and packet loss [8]. With the exception of a recent study
from Google that reports incast-induced packet drops at various layers [8], most
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Figure 2.10: DRILL gracefully handles 5 link failures.
of the works on incast study the problem within a cluster (hosts connected via
one switch or a tree topology), and naturally focus exclusively on overrun of the
last hop buffer (connected to the receiver) [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87,
88]. Consistent with the observation in [8], our experiments show that in multi-
rooted datacenter topologies, the incast traffic pattern triggers buffer overruns at
other layers too. Furthermore, our results underscore the fact that this problem
is interwoven with load balancing and can be mitigated by an agile load balancer
capable of reacting to microbursts. Figure 2.11 shows an example for a network
under the typical load of 20%; hosts run an incast application similar to [79],
and 10% of them send simultaneous requests for 10KB flows to 10% of the other
hosts (all randomly selected). The background traffic and interarrival times are
drawn from [14] as before. DRILL significantly reduces the tail latency; it has
2.5× and 3.5×lower 99.99th percentile of FCT compared to CONGA and Presto,
respectively. As the load increases, the gap widens, e.g., the reduction is 3.1×
and 4.7× under 40% load (not shown). This happens because this highly bursty
traffic pattern causes microbursts not just at the last hop, but at other layers of
the topology too. DRILL can swiftly divert the load and reduce the loss rate; its
loss rate is, respectively, 32% and 40% of that of Presto and CONGA. Plus, only
11% of the packet loss with DRILL happens at layers other than the last hop; the
corresponding number is 41% and 29% under Presto and CONGA, respectively.
Synthetic workloads: In addition to the trace driven workload, similar to pre-
vious works [54, 23, 1, 9], we use a set of synthetic workloads, known to either ap-
pear frequently in datacenters or to be challenging for load balancing designs [23]:
Stride(x) in which server[i] sends flows to server[(i+x) mod number of servers],
Random where each server communicates with a random destination not under
the same leaf as itself. We use Stride(8), and Shuffle in which each server sends
flows to all other servers in a random order. Similar to [9], we use 1GB “elephant”
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flows, and in addition we send 50 KB “mice flows” every 100 ms. We use a Clos
with 4 leaf and 4 spine switches with each leaf connected to 8 hosts where all
links have 1Gbps capacity. Table 2.1 reports the mean and 99.99th percentile of
FCT for mice and mean flow throughput for elephants, all normalized by ECMP.
For the Random and Stride workloads, DRILL significantly reduces mice laten-
cies particularly in the tail and achieves higher throughout for the elephant flows.
None of the tested schemes improve ECMP much for the shuffle workload since
it is mainly bottlenecked at the last hop.
Effect of scale: We also test DRILL’s ability to balance load in Clos topologies
with more than 2 stages such as VL2 [15] and fat-tree [54]. Figure 2.7 shows the
result of an experiment with a VL2 network with 4 ToR switches, each connected
to 40 hosts, 4 Aggregate switches, and 2 Intermediate switches. All links are
1Gbps. We put 30% and 60% load on the network. Figure 2.7 shows that DRILL
is effective in keeping the FCT short in such networks.
We also tested the effect of scale in terms of number of forwarding engines in
each switch. We find the impact of the number of engines to be negligible on
FCT for DRILL(2,1), e.g., we find less than 0.9% difference in the mean FCT
between 1- and 48-engine switches under 80% load (no plot).
Hardware and deployability considerations: We implemented DRILL in
Verilog in less than 400 lines of code. We estimate DRILL’s area overhead by
using Xilinx tools from ISE9.1i and the area estimation from [89, 90]. DRILL is
estimated to require 0.04mm2 of chip area. Using the minimum chip area esti-
mate of 200 mm2 in [91], similar to [92], we estimate this to be about 0.2% of
the area of a typical switch chip. This demonstrates the feasibility and ease of
implementing DRILL in hardware.
DRILL involves two additional components. In the case of topological asym-
metry, switches need to calculate the weights of traffic for each symmetric com-
ponent; this can be done in control software local to the switch (if topology in-
formation is available via the routing algorithm) or through a central controller.
Optionally, DRILL can employ a shim layer, deployed in a hypervisor as in [9].
As we have shown, this is not always necessary, and [9] showed it is feasible for
modern virtualized datacenters.
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2.5 Related Work
Recent works attribute the poor performance of ECMP to (a) its lack of global
congestion information, or (b) hash collision when there are large flows. In the
first group, Planck presents a fast network measurement architecture that enables
rerouting congested flows in milliseconds [1]. Fastpass [26] posits that each
sender should delegate control to a centralized arbiter to dictate when and via
which path each packet should be transmitted. Hedera [23], MicroTE [3], and
Mahout [27] re-route large flows to compensate for the inefficiency of ECMP
hashing them onto the same path.
In the second category, Presto argues that in a symmetric Clos where all flows
are small, ECMP provides near optimal load balancing [9]. Presto divides flows
into “flowcells” which are source-routed so they are striped across all paths; a cen-
tralized controller helps respond to failures. Other efforts in this category include
dividing flows into “flowlets” [93, 2] and balancing flowlets instead of flows, or
per-packet spreading of traffic in a round robin fashion [21, 24]. Presto’s choice
of flowcells is motivated by the fact that flowlets are coarse grained and dictated
by the practical challenges of performing per-packet load balancing in hosts. The
assumption among the work in this category is that ECMP’s inefficiency is mainly
caused by large flows and can be addressed by splitting flows into small units and
routing them separately in a proactive manner, with no need for load information.
CONGA takes a hybrid approach by both splitting traffic into flowlets and us-
ing in-network congestion feedback mechanisms to estimate load and allocate
flowlets to paths based on the congestion feedback. Their main thesis is that ef-
ficient load balancing requires global load information. Our experiments indicate
that DRILL’s micro load balancing outperforms these proposals.
DRILL’s queueing algorithm is inspired by the seminal “power of two choices”
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Table 2.1: Mean elephant flow throughput and mice FCT normalized to ECMP for the
synthetic workloads.
work on using randomized load-sensitive algorithms for load balancing [30].
Mitzenmacher showed that in the supermarket model, with a single input queue
and many output queues, load balance greatly improves with d ≥ 2 choices [30].
[94] and [95] study the impact of using memory on the performance and stability
of randomized load balancing. Central to these theoretical models is having one
arbiter responsible for balancing the load among multiple servers. Our setting,
however, may have multiple arbiters (i.e. forwarding engines), which produces
distinctly different behavior; in particular, as d increases, performance can worsen
(Figure 2.3). This has led us to experimentally optimize parameter choice, but a
theoretical analysis of our model may be valuable work in the future.
2.6 Conclusion
Contrary to the pervasive approach of load balancing based on macroscopic view
of traffic, we explore micro load balancing: enabling the fabric to make deci-
sions at µsec. timescales based on traffic information local to each switch. Our
experiments show that our simple provably-stable switch scheduling algorithm,
DRILL, outperforms the state-of-the-art load balancers in Clos networks, partic-
ularly under load. To achieve this, DRILL makes per-packet decisions at each
switch based on local queue depth and randomization. DRILL adapts to asymme-
try by decomposing the network into symmetric parts. We implement DRILL in
Verilog to show its switch implementation feasibility. We leave the study of micro
load balancers in other topologies to future work.
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Chapter 3
SEAMLESS SCALE-OUT OF NETWORK
ELEMENTS WITH COCONUT
A key use of software-defined networking is to enable scale-out of network data
plane elements. Naively scaling networking elements, however, can cause incor-
rect behavior. For example, we show that an IDS system which operates correctly
as a single network element can erroneously and permanently block hosts when it
is replicated.
In this chapter, we provide a system, COCONUT, for seamless scale-out of net-
work forwarding elements; that is, an SDN application programmer can program
to what functionally appears to be a single forwarding element, but which may be
replicated behind the scenes. To do this, we identify the key property for seamless
scale out, weak causality, and guarantee it through a practical and scalable imple-
mentation of vector clocks in the data plane. We prove that COCONUT enables
seamless scale out of networking elements, i.e., the user-perceived behavior of any
COCONUT element implemented with a distributed set of concurrent replicas is
provably indistinguishable from its singleton implementation. Finally, we build a
prototype of COCONUT and experimentally demonstrate its correct behavior. We
also show that its abstraction enables a more efficient implementation of seamless
scale-out compared to a naive baseline.
3.1 Introduction
An important use of software-defined networking (SDN) is to automate scaling
of networks, so that individual network functions or forwarding elements can be
replicated as necessary. Replication of network elements allows capacity to scale
gracefully with demand [33], provides high availability [33], and assists function
mobility [34, 35]. Multiple SDN systems replicate network elements, in different
ways. Each tenant in a virtualized data center might be presented one logical “big
switch” abstraction that in reality spans multiple physical hardware or software
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switches [33, 36, 37]. As another example, Microsoft Azure’s host-based SDN
solution leverages VMSwitches to build virtual networks where each host per-
forms all packet-actions for its own VMs [38]; these VMSwitches act in parallel
and independently despite the fact that they might form a single virtual network.
Outside of virtualization, caching of forwarding rules is a form of replication; for
example, [40, 41, 42] cache rules at multiple locations in the network, and Open
vSwitch [43] caches rules from user-space into kernel-space, which is critical to
improve performance.
All these systems replicate logical network elements by duplicating forward-
ing rules across multiple locations, without coordination between them, which
we call simple replication. Our work begins by asking: Does simple replication
for scaling out network elements preserve the semantics of a single element? If
the network elements are stateless, the simple replication approach taken by ex-
isting systems is enough (§3.3). But if a developer writes a network function or
application such as a stateful firewall on top of a single virtual “big switch”, is
its functional behavior the same as if it were running on an actual single physi-
cal switch? We show that simple replication does indeed change the network’s
semantics: for example, a replicated firewall can erroneously and permanently
block hosts. In fact, our experiments show there are scenarios that these problems
occur frequently (§3.3).
How, then, could an SDN programmer deal with this problem? Living with the
risk of incorrect functionality is unappealing, as critical infrastructure elements
such as security appliances (firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc.) are in-
creasingly deployed in a scale-out manner. Alternately, the programmer could
write her application so that it takes into account the distributed implementation
of network elements and associated race conditions. But this is inconvenient for
the programmer at best, and is infeasible at worst, when replication is explicitly
hidden in the physical infrastructure underneath a tenant’s virtual network. In-
deed, one lure of the virtualized cloud for tenants is the prospect of migrating
their workloads and network applications to the cloud “as-is”, i.e., with no re-
designing and re-architecting of their applications, with the expectation that they
perform exactly akin to their non-virtualized networks [44, 6].
Our goal is thus to achieve seamless scale-out for network forwarding ele-
ments: a system which guarantees that an SDN application writer can program
to the semantics of a single device, but which utilizes multiple replicated elements
behind the scenes.
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Achieving seamless scale-out is not easy. The most generic solution would be to
synchronize replicas to provide a strongly consistent logical view, but the required
locking would not achieve the performance necessary for the data plane [38, 42].
Recent work [45, 46, 47, 48] provides a form of consistency in the data plane in
the sense of ensuring “trace” properties of a single packet’s path, as in Consis-
tent Updates (CU) [46]. But this is essentially orthogonal to our goal; seamless
scale-out does not require per-packet path consistency, and systems that provide
per-packet path consistency can even cause the correctness problems described
above (§3.3.3). Also, the mechanisms used to implement CU assume a single
atomic update point (the ingress switch of a packet’s path). No such atomic up-
date point exists in our setting, because we need to preserve the single-device se-
mantics across a large number of flows across the whole network with potentially
unspoken dependencies.
The system we present here, COCONUT (“COrrect COncurrent Network-
ing UTensils”), provides seamless scale-out for network elements defined by a
dynamically-updatable OpenFlow-like abstraction. To work towards a solution,
we observe that the culprit of scale-out correctness problems is violation of what
we call weak causality. For example, simple replication can cause a replicated
firewall to miss the weak causal dependency between a client’s outbound request
and a server’s inbound response, so it sees a seemingly-unsolicited inbound re-
sponse first and permanently blocks traffic from that server.1 We design a set of
high-level algorithms to avoid weak causality violations, drawing on the classical
concept of logical clocks [49] to track the state of each forwarding rule at each
abstract network element. But providing a practical and scalable implementation
of these high-level algorithms is challenging; switches do not directly implement
logical clocks, and emulating a large vector of logical clocks in packet header
fields is impractical. We provide a practical realization of those algorithms using
OpenFlow-compatible switches, leveraging the distinguishing characteristics of
SDNs and virtualized networks, and is thus suitable for deployment in the con-
text of a modern virtualized data center with software switches in each physical
host. Our design uses limited bits in header fields of a physical network to emu-
late logical clocks in the virtual network, while dealing with concurrent creations
and changes of multiple virtual networks that may interleave with each other and
1Note that even this simple example involves multiple flows entering the network at different
points, illustrating the aforementioned insufficiency of using a single atomic update point as in
CU [46].
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compete for use of these bits.
To prove that COCONUT correctly provides seamless scale-out, we need a new
analytical framework. To show that the scaled-out network is indistinguishable
from a singleton network element, we need to take into account the sequence of
observations made by the end-points, with potential interdependencies. We for-
malize this with a definition we call observational correctness that requires that
any sequence of end-point observations in the scaled-out network is plausible for
the singleton version. In tune with what applications expect from best-effort net-
works, this model is permissive of occasional packet drops and re-ordering, while
prohibiting weak causality violations (breaking “happened before” relations [49]
adopted for best-effort networks, §3.4.1) that could jeopardize applications’ cor-
rectness. We formally prove that COCONUT provides observational correctness.
We implemented a prototype of COCONUT integrated with Floodlight [50],
Open vSwitch [43], and OpenVirtex [5]. We evaluated COCONUT and several
alternative schemes on a hardware SDN testbed arranged to emulate a 20-switch
fat-tree topology and in Mininet [51] emulations up to 180 switches, with multiple
topologyies, load patterns, and SDN application scenarios. Our findings are as
follows: (a) A strawman solution, providing strong consistency (SC) similar to
[34] by routing all data traffic through a controller during updates, would come at
too high a cost: about 12 Gbps bandwidth overhead and a 20× increase in user
traffic latency even in a modest-sized network. COCONUT incurs no measurable
data plane performance overhead, and has significantly lower overhead in terms
of forwarding rule update delay (3.5× faster in a network with 128 hosts and 80
switches) and number of forwarding rules (2× lower).
(b) Compared with baseline simple replication (which lacks seamless scale-
out), COCONUT correctly achieves seamless scale-out with modest overhead.
For a 180-switch network, for example, the mean forwarding rule updates is only
1.2× slower than simple replication, and the mean number of forwarding rules
increases by only 1.6×, with just 0.7% of that overhead persisting for longer than
100ms.
(c) We also compare with a natural implementation where the programmer
avoids replication-related race conditions “manually” within the SDN applica-
tion. COCONUT enables an implementation that is both more convenient for the
programmer and provides 2.8× lower mean latency for user data flow initiation
due to its efficient logical clock-based approach.
In summary, our key contributions are: (1) we observe that simple replication
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breaks the semantics of a single network element and show experimentally that
it causes application-level incorrect behavior; (2) we present COCONUT , a sys-
tem for seamless scale-out in the context of OpenFlow forwarding elements in a
virtualized data center, and prove it correctly preserves a single-element abstrac-
tion; (3) we demonstrate experimentally that COCONUT achieves its goals with
modest performance overhead. We believe this lays the foundation for a practical
and dependable service model for virtualized network infrastructure, as well as a
powerful abstraction for programming SDNs.
3.2 Background
In this section, we discuss the logical abstractions we provide and some of the
applications of replication.
3.2.1 Basic Abstractions
COCONUT provides seamless scale-out for network elements. The abstraction of
a network element that we work with here is essentially an SDN device such as
an OpenFlow switch. Each element or switch has a table of rules, each rule con-
taining a priority, a match on packet headers, and a list of actions. Although each
individual rule may be stateless, the system is not: the controller can dynamically
update rules based on dataplane events, e.g., failures. Upon receiving a packet the
switch executes the actions for the highest priority rule that matches the packet.
These actions could result in changes in the packet, dropping it, or forwarding it.
(How) are networking elements scaled-out today? Scaling out can be re-
alized via simple replication or one-to-many mapping, where a logical rule is
mapped to a distributed set of physical rules, each individually capable of fully
implementing the logical rule. In this technique, before installing a rule in mul-
tiple physical flow tables, an entity such as the network hypervisor [6] typically
rewrites the rule. For example, a rule that matches on virtual ports will need to be
rewritten to refer to physical ports [33, 34]; virtual addresses may be translated to
physical addresses or packets may be placed into tunnels [6]; and rules that match
in part with wildcards may be “cloned” into multiple entries in which wildcarded
fields are replaced by exact-match values [96, 6]. The latter mechanism is used in
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software switches, where wildcard entries in userspace are cached as exact match
ones in the kernel to enhance performance [6].
Prior to COCONUT , a number of systems have provided simple replication,
mostly for scaling out the static stateless network elements, i.e., those whose ac-
tions or presence in the network do not depend on the history of previous matching
packets or previous actions [97]. Simple replication of stateless elements pre-
serves the semantics of applications [97].
Modern programmable networks, however, are exceedingly more dynamic.
This can come in the form of controllers adding, removing, or modifying for-
warding rules dynamically in response to application traffic. The question is, can
these stateful elements be replicated via simple replication technique? In §3.2.2,
we list a few key existing applications of simple replication, before showing in
§3.3 that this technique may cause incorrect application behavior when used for
implementing dynamic stateful network functions; We also show that the exist-
ing works on correctness in network not only do not solve this problem but can
exacerbate it (§3.3).
3.2.2 Applications of Replication
Network virtualization: Simple replication is a key technique for building dis-
tributed virtual switches. Nicira’s NVP [6] and OpenVirtex [5], for example,
provide a one-big-switch abstraction that can connect VMs on the same virtual
network even though they are located in different physical hosts or regions of
the physical network, and whose locations may change due to spinning up VMs
or VM mobility. This is implemented with simple replication from a single vir-
tual switch onto a distributed set of software switches. Composition of multiple
virtual switches can also result in replication. Under existing composition tech-
niques, multiple logical rules are jointly mapped to a set of physical rules where
each physical rule is individually capable of implementing multiple logical rules
[98, 37, 99]. For example, Figure 3.1 shows (a) a monitoring module that performs
monitoring based on source address, (b) a destination-based routing module, and
(c) a Monitoring+Routing application resulting from parallel composition of the
previous two modules (rules ordered from highest to lowest priorities) [37]. The
first rule of the monitoring, module, for example, is implemented with 2 rules in
the composed application.
Network Function Virtualization (NFV): Performance is a critical consider-
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  Routing
  dstip=127.2.*.* fwd(1)
  * drop
  Monitoring + Routing
  srcip= 127.1.*.*, dstip=127.2.*.* count,fwd(1)
  srcip= 127.1.*.* count
  dstip=127.2.*.* fwd(1)
  * drop
 Monitoring
 srcip=127.1.*.* count
 * drop
Figure 3.1: Composing monitoring and routing.
ation in NFV where software is used to implement network functions or applica-
tions such as firewalls, load balancers, etc. Simple replication, used in caching,
is a key technique to enhance forwarding performance in software switches and
NFVs [6, 43, 42, 41, 40].
Implementing higher level abstractions: In the context of network program-
ming languages, Frenetic [98] provides high-level primitives such set difference,
not directly supported by the hardware, by mapping those primitives to multiple
OpenFlow rules, e.g., a rule with the match field src-IP=186.206.176.* OR
src-IP=62.205.112.38, is implemented via two rules.
In all of the above techniques, each physical instance or replica is function-
ally equivalent to a faithful implementation of one (or more) logical rules, i.e.,
the replica performs identical actions as the logical rule. In a fully static network,
packets traversing the physical network result in the same end-to-end fate as if
they were processed directly by rules in the ideal, non-replicated implementation
of the logical network. However, as network state changes over time, there may
be inconsistent state among the multiple replicas that implement one logical el-
ement. Furthermore, this problem may become more serious if the changes are
interdependent with application-level behavior (rather than simple route changes).
We next see how this may cause application-level incorrect behavior.
3.3 What Can Go Wrong?
We show with a few examples that the simple replication can break the semantics
of a single element and lead to incorrect application behavior. Per-packet consis-
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Figure 3.2: SDN-enabled security architecture.
tency [46] does not fix the problem, and interestingly, can even trigger the problem
in an otherwise-correct network.
3.3.1 Example 1: SDN-enabled Security
Network Intrusion Detection systems (IDS) and stateful firewalls perform com-
plex traffic processing and analysis that are CPU intensive and hard to implement
at high speed. Performance can be improved significantly by programming faster
devices like SDN switches to act as an initial triage filter [100]. As depicted in
Figure 3.2, the switch whitelists traffic known to be benign, forwarding it directly
to its destination; blacklists traffic known to be malicious, dropping it immedi-
ately; and sends only the remaining unclassified traffic to the IDS device for more
expensive analysis (e.g., DPI). The controller uses external input, traffic measure-
ment tools, and notices from the IDS cluster to craft whitelists and blacklists in
the ACL table of the switch.
This concept is the crux of several security and DoS protection systems such as
Radware’s SDN-enabled DefenseFlow [101], and SciPass used in the TransPAC
network and Indiana University [102]. At Lawrence Berkeley National Labora-
tory (LBNL) and NCSA, a similar system that whitelists GridFTP traffic, which
is uninteresting from a security standpoint in such scientific environments, report-
edly reduces the total traffic volume to their security appliance cluster by about
32-37% on a typical day [103].
This architecture results in frequent ACL changes on switches. Using custom
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setups that interface with the Bro and Snort IDS, for instance, LBNL and Indiana
University block an average of 6,000-7,000 and 500-600 IPs per day, respectively
[103], and systems that whitelist GridFTP traffic at LBNL and NCSA result in a
few hundred to several tens of thousands ACL operations per day [104].
The traffic which is unclassified is sent to a cluster of security appliances. Such
devices usually ship with analyzers for many protocols and applications to detect
protocol and application specific attacks. The weird.bro and scan.bro scripts
in Bro, for instance, give notices when Bro observes data being transferred in a
session without seeing the SYN ACK packet of that session, data being transferred
without observing ACK, repeated SYN ACK packets for the same session, and
failed connection attempts to multiple hosts over a time interval. The notices
from the IDS are then sent to the controller application which might in turn install
rules on the ACL to block IPs. In some systems, such as SciPass, this blocking is
by default permanent [105]. Erroneous IP blocking is notoriously hard to debug;
in most cases it requires the owner of the IP to call the network operator who then
manually inspects the IDS logs [106].
However, this system can encounter a problem if the triage switch is replicated.
Consider the following setup. The IDS cluster is set to analyze some protocols
including TCP port 80, i.e., if it receives a reply, it checks if the reply is solicited
or not. If it is, it forwards the packet to its destination. Otherwise, it sends a notice
to the controller to block the source of the traffic. A popular web service on the
internal network receives a continual stream of incoming requests from clients
on port 80.2 Let P1 refer to the initial policy that TCP port 80 on the switch is
unclassified. Next, the network operator chooses to update the policy from policy
P1 to P2 where TCP port 80 is whitelisted. The only affected module is the ACL
that should add a rule to forward TCP port 80 to the forwarding table instead of
the IDS cluster.
Without replication, at any point during the update, if a server receives a re-
quest, it is allowed to reply: its solicited reply either traverses the forwarding
table and reaches its destination, or through the IDS that already knows about the
request—the request can only be forwarded to its destination by the IDS after the
IDS observes the request.
With simple replication, however, the switch might be implemented using
rules across multiple physical devices. For example, in a one-big-switch setup
2Similar problems arise if the service is external and the client is internal.
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Figure 3.3: Simple replication causes incorrect blocking.
with OVX [5], the single rule that sends TCP port 80 traffic to the forwarding
table is now translated into multiple rules, one residing on each physical edge
switch that acts as part of the one-big-switch. These rules cannot be installed all
at once.
Hence, the following race condition can happen: The new rule for P2 is in-
stalled at the edge switch connected to host A. Then, A sends a request to host
B. The request is directly forwarded to B; therefore, the IDS does not observe
the request. B replies, and its reply hits a different edge switch which still uses
policy P1. Thus, B’s reply is forwarded to the IDS. Since the IDS never saw the
request, the IDS sends (false) notices to the controller informing it that the server
is sending a stream of unsolicited replies. This will eventually cause the controller
to block the server even though the traffic it is sending is already whitelisted and
it is legitimately replying to requests it receives. In other words, the hosts observe
the following invalid sequence of events: A sends a request, B receives it and
replies, B is blacklisted.
This problem is troublesome to resolve. Even though the controller knows a
certain type of traffic was whitelisted, it is difficult for the controller to realize
the mistake, because a host with some valid traffic might still have sent malicious
traffic as well. If the server owner realizes a mistake and phones the network op-
erator, the problem would be hard to resolve as the IDS logs indicate a suspicious
server activity (sending unsolicited replies).
To determine how frequent this error can be, we implemented a tree topology
with up to 50 leaf switches acting as the logical ACL. Each leaf switch is con-
nected to 5 hosts in Mininet. Each host sends requests to randomly selected hosts
with flow interarrival times and sizes drawn from the web-server workload infor-
mation in [14]. Control delays are drawn from the measurements of HP Procurve
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switches in [107]. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of hosts incorrectly blocked
following a single P1→ P2 policy change, averaged over 100 trials. The percent-
age of incorrectly blocked hosts rapidly increases with scale, e.g., with a medium-
sized network of 20 switches, it approaches 60%. An alternative approach of using
symmetric paths for all related flows in that example imposes great overhead for
some applications such as GridFTP, used in both NCSA and LBNL [103], that
depend on many flows.
3.3.2 Example 2: Logical Firewall
Imagine that an enterprise network has a firewall at the periphery of its network
that permits an external server to talk to an internal client if and only if the client
has sent a request to the server. This policy could be achieved as follows, using a
single switch and a firewall application FW running on the controller (Figure 3.4).
Initially, FW installs in the switch a low priority flow table entry that matches all
client and server traffic and sends the packet to the controller. When FW receives
a packet from a client, it instructs the switch to do three things: (1) install rules to
allow bidirectional communication between the client and the server, bypassing
the controller, (2) wait for these rules to take effect, via a BarrierRequest
message, and (3) process the original packet again using the new rules. When
FW receives a packet from a server, it must have been unsolicited, so it blacklists
the server by installing a permanent high priority rule that drops packets from
the server. This rule provides the desired property of safeguarding clients from
connecting to malicious servers, even if the client tries to connect.
With simple replication, i.e., if that logical switch is in reality mapped to
more than one physical switch, the client-to-server traffic could traverse one
physical switch, s1, and the resulting server-to-client traffic traverses a differ-
ent physical switch s2. In this case, the response traffic may reach s2 before the
rules for bidirectional communication are installed on it, intuitively because the
BarrierRequest now waits for rules to take effect at only one switch, rather
than all. The packet, therefore, will be handled by the default rule which sends
it to the firewall application, which proceeds to install a high priority rule D to
block all traffic for that flow—an undesirable outcome and something that would
not happen without replication. Note that even when the rules that allow client-
server communication are installed on s2, the switch continues dropping traffic
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2.   FlowMod(match=[src­ip=pkt.dst­ip, 
3.   dst­ip=pkt.src­ip], 
4.   actions=forward, priority=10)
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8.   BarrierRequest()
9.   PacketOut(pkt, actions=OFPP_TABLE)
10.else 
11.  FlowMod(match=[src­ip=pkt.src­ip, 
12. dst­ip=pkt.dst­ip], 
13. actions=drop, priority=20)
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switch
Figure 3.4: Replicated firewall incorrectly blocks communication.
due to rule D, since it has a higher priority. In an experiment with similar setup
as §3.3.1, when the client and server are connected to two separate replicas, we
found the communication is incorrectly blocked 21% of the time. This example is
similar to the previous IDS example in its effect, but here it is triggered by normal
client-server traffic rather than an administrator’s policy change.
3.3.3 Example 3: Logical Load Balancer
Server load balancers (SLBs), that distribute incoming traffic among available
servers, are fundamental to create scale-out web services in public clouds; they
serve almost the entire inter- and half of intra-datacenter traffic [12]. Web services
have uptime SLA as high as 99.9 to 99.999 [12, 13]; therefore load balancers’ up-
time has to be at least as high but often significantly higher to account for failures
in other parts of the infrastructure [12].
Cloud services put huge pressure on SLBs: inbound traffic, where every packet
needs to hit the SLB, could be greater than 100 Gbps for each single service
[12]. Plus, by enabling convenient deployment, scaling, deleting, and migration
of service, the pay-as-you-go model imposes a high rate of configuration changes
on SLBs: an average of 12,000 changes per day peaking at one per second for a
cluster of 1,000 servers [12].
Given the high and rapidly changing load that SLBs handle, it is perhaps no
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surprise that they dominate in terms of failure occurrences in datacenters [32] and
could cause high rates of SLA violations and failures accounting for 37% of all
live site incidents [12]. While modern SLBs such as Microsoft’s Ananta [12] or
Google Maglev [13] offer significant improvement over traditional SLBs, scaling
out and failure handling remain challenging and cause connection drops even in
these modern designs.
We give a brief overview of such systems focusing on Ananta, and explain
how inconsistent replica state could cause connection drops (as also reported in
[12]). In §3.5, we show how COCONUT could reduce the rate of such drops in
those systems and enable their seamless scale-out—a challenging task today that
can cause excessive connection drops—while strictly avoiding the performance
penalties, such as increased latency, of an alternative approach.
Anatomy of a modern SLB: In a SLB, one or more high performance routers
spread the incoming traffic to the datacenter among a set of SLB replicas3, using
the stateless and fast Equal Cost Multi-path (ECMP) algorithm. These replicas
spread traffic among the set of currently available servers by hashing packet head-
ers, similar to ECMP4. Unlike ECMP, however, they have to save connection state.
Keeping per-connection state in replicas is essential for maintaining high uptime
due to the dynamic nature of the cloud (ever changing set of servers that a service
deploys). Once a replica selects a server for an incoming connection, it remem-
bers that decision in a flow table. Every non-SYN TCP packet is first matched
against this table, and if no match is found the packet is treated as the first packet
of the connection; a server will be selected and the decision will be remembered
in the table5. These operations help preserve connection affinity and consequently
reduce the rate of connection drops when the set of servers changes if the set of
SLB replicas is static.
In reality, however, this set changes due to replica failures; in fact, SLBs are
among the most failure prone devices in datacenters [12, 32]. Plus, in environ-
ments as dynamic as public clouds with rapidly varying demands, elasticity of
different resources including the SLBs is indeed a desirable property. It enables
the providers to scale them out whenever they are overloaded. Overloading SLBs
is conceivably one of the main culprits of low availability with 50% of the low
3Called Mux pool in Ananta [12].
4In addition to load balancing, these systems also offer capabilities such as NAT and direct
server return. For simplicity, we focus exclusively on the load balancing functionality in this
example.
5The notion of pseudo connections in used for protocols other than TCP such as UDP [12].
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availability conditions in the measured time period (January 21 to 26) being re-
portedly caused by SLB overload [12].
Alas, changes in the SLB set today can cause connection drops, even when
all other parts of the system, including the server, links, and all replicas serving
the connection, are all up: when the set of SLBs change, e.g., due to failures,
ongoing connections will be redistributed among the live replicas. This happens
because high-end routers, with standard (stateless) implementation of ECMP, are
used to efficiently spread the incoming traffic among available SLB replicas [12].
Therefore, any change in the set of replicas causes rehashing and redistribution
for incoming traffic, and may result in an ongoing connection to be assigned to
a different replica even when the original replica is functional. Different replicas
may have inconsistent state since the set of servers constantly changes and in
an asynchronous distributed systems, different replicas learn and react to these
changes at different times. This means that the connections that relied on the
flow state on another replica could now be directed to a different server if there
has been a change in the mapping entry since the connection started [12]. Such
connections will be dropped.
3.3.4 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches
Per-packet Consistency Is Not Enough. A line of work has preserved prop-
erties of a single packet’s journey, even during network updates — for example,
avoiding loops and black holes [45, 47] or preserving per-packet (or per-flow)
consistency, wherein every packet (or flow) traversing the network is processed
by exactly one global network configuration and never by a mix of multiple con-
figurations [46]. These properties do not achieve seamless scale-out, because they
do not preserve dependencies across different packets or flows. In the IDS ex-
ample, each source-to-destination flow was processed by only a single policy; the
problems are only visible across flows, violating the request/reply orderings that
the IDS policy depends on. This is a critical distinction, because Consistent Up-
dates (CU) [46] implements per-packet consistency by relying on each packet’s
entry point as a single point of atomic update. Seamless scale-out involves be-
havior of packets across many flows from multiple entry points and potentially
flowing through endhosts; no atomic update is possible.
In fact, application-level incorrectness can occur because of deploying CU [46]
to guarantee per-packet consistency. This is because the two-phase update algo-
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rithm of CU itself causes replication. In the example above, in the non-replicated
setting, if the network uses CU to update the policies from TCP port 80 traffic
to whitelisted, the update will no longer be a single step, because the flows using
rule R1 on the ACL need to be updated one by one. Suppose that the flow from
A to B is updated, but other flows (including the one from B to A) are not still
updated. In this case, the ACL will have 2 rules corresponding to R1 on the ACL
in Figure 3.2 (not shown): an old rule to match traffic using old tags (old policy
traffic) and the new rule with new tags (new policy traffic). Now, host A sends
TCP port 80 traffic with the new tag, which is forwarded to B (new policy). B
receives the packet, and replies. Its reply to A, however, is delivered to the IDS
since it has the old tag. The IDS consequently blocks B given that it has not seen
the request, something that would not happen if CU was not being used. The
underlying problem in this case is that CU maps a single logical rule to multiple
physical rules with different tags.
Strong Consistency Is Cost Prohibitive. SDN switches do not directly pro-
vide primitives to preserve strong consistency, but one can implement it using the
controller [11, 34, 108]: when a rule needs to be updated, direct all related flows
to the controller, which temporarily emulates the switches’ behavior; perform an
atomic rule update at the controller; update the switches; and finally shift traffic
back to the switches. This technique would correctly achieve seamless scale-out.
But we show in §3.5 that it has dramatic performance penalties, e.g., 20× increase
in delay for the IDS example. Shifting traffic to the controller is thus appropriate
for relatively rare virtual network migration events supported by [11, 34, 108] but
not for the ongoing process which we hope to support.
3.4 Design of COCONUT
The previous examples demonstrate that simple replication does not provide
seamless scale-out. In this section, we begin by presenting the intuition of what
logical property the network requires to achieve seamless scale out. We call
this property weak causal correctness, formalize it (§3.4.1), demonstrate the intu-
ition behind our design with simple (but impractical) algorithms to preseve weak
causal correctness (§3.4.2), and finally present a practical realization of the design
(§3.4.3).
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3.4.1 Not All Orderings Are Created Equal
Causality violations in §3.3, e.g., receiving a response before or without the re-
quest that caused the response, are caused by inconsistent state among replicas of
one single logical rule—a packet is handled by a new instance of a logical rule
and another packet that “comes after” it is handled by an old instance of the same
logical rule. In the IDS example in §3.3.1, for instance, the request packet is han-
dled by a new instance of the ACL rule, but the reply that it triggers is handled by
the old instance of the same logical rule. As a result, the IDS receives the reply
packet first, missing its dependency (the request).
On the surface, it might seem counter-intuitive that the ordering between those
packets is a problem that could compromise application correctness, since even
in non-replicated best-effort networks, packets can be reordered or dropped. The
sublety here is that even in best-effort networks some orderings, that we call weak
causality, are always preserved. For example, no amount of reordering or packet
loss will change the fact that with a standard TCP implementation, receiving a
SYN packet always happens before sending the first SYN ACK.
We use this intuition to formally define weak causality and observational cor-
rectness. We first formalize network events and define networks’ behaviors.
The endpoints interact with the network with send and receive events. These
are the only events we are ultimately interested in because they are the only ex-
ternally visible events, i.e., while the network could have multiple internal events
such as rule lookup, packet rewrite, etc., those internal events are not visible to the
endpoints. The distinction between internal and external events is a common tech-
nique for defining correct behavior of state machines [109]. The notation rh,i(pkt)
and sh,i(pkt) are used to respectively refer to the event of receiving and sending
packet pkt by endpoint ph where this event is the ith event happening at ph. Each
sequence of external events is a trace. The behavior of a system is the set of all
plausible traces in that system [109]. In a system with n endpoints, pi∈{0,...,n−1},
a local history of endpoint pi, denoted by Li, is a sequence of ei,js, the external
events that happen at pi, i.e., the system’s behavior observable by pi. A history
H=〈L0, L2, ..., Ln−1〉 is a collection of local histories, one for each endpoint.
Observational correctness: For a physical network, P , to be an
observationally-correct implementation of a logical or abstract network, L, any
trace in P ’s history should be a plausible trace in the history of an ideal, non-
replicated implementation of L. That is, the possible behavior of P is a subset
52
of the possible behavior of a non-replicated implementation of L. We see in §3.3
that this condition does not hold under simple replication, e.g., the following trace
that happens in the replicated network in the example in §3.3.1 is not plausible in
the non-replicated networks: A sends a request, B receives the request, B sends a
reply, IDS receives the reply. (i.e., the trace misses the event of the IDS receiving
the request that triggers the reply).
Weak causality: Event ek,l has weak causal dependency on event ei,j , shown
by ei,j → ek,l, if one of the following cases hold:
R1: local dependencies. This applies when i=k (i.e., both events happen in the
same endpoint), j < l (i.e., ei,j comes before ek,l), and ek,l is a send event. Note
that we replace the traditional “program order” [110] with local dependencies in
rule R1. This is done to account for the fact that a best-effort network can reorder
packets. The above condition on ek,l is what distinguishes our notion of weak
causality from the original definition of causality in [110].
R2: sends-to. ei,j and ek,l are respectively the events of sending and receiving
the same packet.
R3: transitivity. there is some other er,t event such that ei,j → er,t → ek,l.
If an event ei,j(p) involving packet p has weak causal dependency on an event
ek,l(q) involving packet q, we say that p has weak causal dependency on q, denoted
by p → q. Events and packets with no weak causal dependencies are called
concurrent.
While best-effort networks can drop packets and reorder concurrent packets,
they preserve weak causality. For instance, if concurrent packets pkt1 and pkt2
are sent to endpoint pi, receiving them with any order or not receiving one or both
of them are permissible, e.g., ∅, 〈ri,j(pkt1)〉, and 〈ri,j(pkt2), ri,j+1(pkt1)〉 are
plausible traces. However, a host always receives a SYN ACK packet after send-
ing a SYN packet (its weak causal dependency). Receiving a SYN ACK without
sending a SYN packet, or receiving it before sending a SYN packet, therefore, are
not plausible traces.
Unlike non-replicated networks, replicated ones can violate weak causality,
e.g., the IDS in §3.3.1 receives a reply while missing its dependency. This im-
plies that replicated networks can have traces (those that violate weak causality)
that are not plausible in logical networks that they intend to implement, and con-
sequently are not correct.
Root cause of weak causality violation: It is not hard to see that if no rule
changes, then any trace in the replicated network is a plausible trace of the logi-
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cal network (§B). The fact that a replicated network can have implausible traces,
therefore, results from handling packets with inconsistent instances of rules. Intu-
itively, handling concurrent packets with inconsistent instances does not result in
a implausible trace. Even in non-replicated networks, it is permissible to handle
two concurrent packets with inconsistent state while the network state is chang-
ing. The problem happens when orderings of packets are known, e.g., p → q.
In non-replicated networks, p cannot be handled by a newer state compare to q.
Under simple replication, in contrast, this property does not automatically hold
because the instances handling p and q could be different. Therefore, p might be
handled by a newer state compared to q. In the IDS example, for instance, the
event of the IDS receiving the reply (e3) happens after the event of B sending the
reply (e2), which in turn happens after the event of B receiving the request (e1).
Yet, even though e1 → e3, the packet associated with e1 (request) is handled by a
newer instance compared to the instance that handles the packet associated with
e3 (reply). We provide algorithms to ensure that with COCONUT’s replication,
for any two packets p and q where p→q, applying a logical rule on q implies that
no newer version of the same logical rule is applied on p. We show in §B that
preserving this property is sufficient for observational correctness:
Theorem 1: Any behavior of COCONUT’s implementation of replicated net-
works could have happened in the logical network.
The intuition behind the proof is to show that COCONUT is weak causality-
aware6 (Lemma 2 in §B) and this is sufficient for observational correctness (The-
orem 1 in §B).
3.4.2 COCONUT’s High-level Algorithms
In an implementation of a logical network with m logical rules, LR0≤i<m, one
single logical rule, LRi, is mapped to multiple physical instances, PRi,j , where j
is the ID of the switch hosting the PRi,j instance.
Changes to a logical rule should be replicated across all the physical rules that
implement it. Without enduring the prohibitive cost of synchronization for atom-
ically updating all the physical rules at once and in unreliable networks where
elements can fail, inevitably, there exist instances when different physical replicas
are in different and inconsistent states. Fortunately, this different network state
6A network is weak causality aware iff for any two packets p and q and for any logical rule R,
p→ q implies that the version of R that handles q is at least as large as the one that handles p.
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usually does not cause anomalous application behaviors — unless endpoints’ ap-
plications receive packets from the network, they are unaware of the network state.
The problem happens when the packet is handled by a new version of the rule and
then triggers a causal sequence of events leading to some packet (perhaps the same
or newly generated packet) being handled by an old version of the rule.
We leverage this observation and the classical concepts of logical and vector
clocks to prevent such weak causality violations. We use logical clocks for track-
ing network state changes and restricting the space of executions to those that are
weakly causally consistent. Endpoints affix vectors of logical clocks to packets
that show their latest observed network state. These clocks prohibit switches from
applying outdated rules that might violate weak causal correctness, and prompt
them to update their rules before applying them to packets.
More specifically, in a network with m logical rules, each packet pkt carries an
m-dimensional vector of logical clocks, V Cpkt, in which V Cpkt[j] shows the latest
version number of logical rule LRj that pkt has “observed”—that is, the latest
version known at the sender of pkt when it was sent, or the version applied to pkt
along its path (whichever is more recent). As an example, the switch that handles a
packet p with the second version of the logical rule LRj sets its V Cp[j]=2, and the
endpoint that receives p sets V Cq[j]=2 for a packet q that it sends after receiving
p. We assume that switches are preloaded with all versions of rules, similar to the
way that OpenFlow switches can be preloaded with failover rules.
Algorithm 1 Ideal Switch sw
1: procedure UPDATE(rule PRi,sw)
2: V Csw[i]++
3: regular-update(PRi,sw)
4: end procedure
5: procedure RECEIVE(packet pkt, port ip)
6: rule PRi,sw =lookup(pkt, ip)
7: while (V Csw[i] < V Cpkt[i]) do
8: update(PRi,sw)
9: end while
10: V Cpkt[i] := max(V Csw[i], V Cpkt[i])
11: regular-apply(PRi,sw, pkt, ip)
12: end procedure
The reader will have already realized that in large-scale multi-tenant datacenters
hosting 10Ks of virtual networks [111, 112], storing a clock value for every rule
in every packet, performing operations on these V Cs, and preloading switches
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with all rules are infeasible. Our goal in this section is to convey the intuition be-
hind our design and reason about its correctness. Later, §3.4.3 presents a scalable
and OpenFlow-compatible, but slightly more complex, emulation of these algo-
rithms. Three types of entities—switches, shells, and the controller —work with
the vector clocks carried by packets. We describe the role of each next.
Switch operations: Each physical switch sw has a logical clock V Csw[j] for
each logical rule PRj,sw hosted at the switch. This clock stores the current version
number of the rule that the switch will apply to matched packets. Note that one
logical rule can be hosted at multiple physical switches, and these may have differ-
ent clock values while the rule is being updated. When a switch needs to update
a rule, it also increments its corresponding logical clock (procedure UPDATE;
Algorithm 1; regular-update is the regular rule update operation without
COCONUT).
When receiving a packet pkt on input port ip (procedure RECEIVE; Algorithm
1), the switch sw looks up the rule that needs to be applied on the packet, PRi,sw.
If V Cpkt[i] > V Csw[i], the packet or a packet that happened before was already
handled by a newer version of LRi than the one currently active on sw. Hence,
applying the outdated version risks weak causality violations once pkt is received
by any endpoints. So at this point, sw is required to update the rule before han-
dling pkt. The update(PRi,sw) function has the switch update PRi,sw using
the preloaded rules, its clock for this rule, and the packet’s clock for this rule,
V Cpkt[i], to show the latest version number. Finally the switch acts on pkt by
applying the rule (line 11; Algorithm 1).
Deleting a rule PRj,sw is a special case of updating it: the logical clock of the
deleted rule, V Csw[j], is incremented and its value is set to ∅ (a special value)
dictating sw to apply other rules for matching packets.
Controller’s operations: The controller sits between the network hypervisor
and the network, and is tasked with installing the physical rules, such as those sent
by the network hypervisor to it, on switches.
Shell’s operations: A shell is a shim layer sitting between each endpoint and
the network, which can run in the hypervisor. Shells hide V Cs from the endpoints
by performing the necessary logical clock operations on their behalf. For each
endpoint pi, its shell shelli keeps an m-dimensional vector V Ci of logical clocks.
V Ci[j] contains the max version number of logical rule j observed in the logical
clock of any packet pi has received.
For each incoming packet, pkt, shelli updates V Ci if the packet carries any
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Algorithm 2 Shelli
1: procedure RECEIVE(packet pkt)
2: for j ∈ V Ci do
3: if V Cpkt[j] > V Ci[j] then
4: V Ci[j] := V Cpkt[j]
5: end if
6: end for
7: remove-VC(pkt)
8: regular-fwd-to-host(pkt)
9: end procedure
10: procedure SEND(packet pkt)
11: add-VC(pkt, V Ci)
12: regular-send-to-net(pkt)
13: end procedure
newer information, i.e., ∀j, V Ci[j]=max(V Ci[j], V Cpkt[j]). It then removes
V Cpkt from the packet before passing it to the endpoint (procedure RECEIVE
in Algorithm 2). For any outgoing packet pkt, shelli appends its local V C, V Ci,
to the packet before sending pkt (procedure SEND in Algorithm 2). This V C
prevents switches from handling pkt with outdated rules that could violate weak
causality.
3.4.3 OpenFlow-compatible Implementation
Having a scalable implementation of the simple algorithms in §3.4.2 is challeng-
ing. A major scalability bottleneck is the size of the time vectors. In general, in
a distributed computation with N processes, causality can only be characterized
by vector timestamps of size N , i.e., the causal order has in general dimension
N [113]. For implementing weak-causally consistent SDNs, where the vector
timestamp tracks the version of every forwarding rule in the network, it would
be overly burdensome (in terms of bandwidth and CPU) for packets to carry such
large vectors and endpoints, switches, and controllers to operate on them. Another
scalability challenge is preloading switches with all versions of rules. In addition
to these scalability challenges, there is a feasibility challenge: vector clocks and
their related operations cannot be readily implemented with the match/action op-
erations on commodity switches today.
To overcome the feasibility challenge, we note that the weak causality problem
that VCs solve only arises when a logical rule is in flux: there are both old and new
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physical instances of the rule in the network. Vector operations are not needed for
stable rules that are not in flux (i.e., before or after updates). Even when rules
are in flux, their exact version numbers are not necessary for preserving weak
causality. As long as the old versions of a rule are eliminated from the network,
it is sufficient to know that the rule is being updated which can be sufficiently
characterized by one single bit, which we call a tag bit (TB), to identify the current
and new versions. Switches and endpoints then need to “mark” the TBs of the
packets that are handled by such rules or any packet after them (by a tagging
operation which can be implemented in existing switch hardware), and for in-flux
rules, switches need to apply their updated versions to the tagged packets (e.g.,
by having the updated rules as higher priority rules that match on the tag). These
simple tricks enable us to emulate vector operations for updating a logical rule by
reserving a TB for it and deploying regular match-action operations, thus solving
the feasibility challenge. Concurrent updates could use separate update TBs.
The fact that only the in-flux rules require tags for correct operations, along
with coordination at the SDN controller, also aids us to sidestep the scalability
challenge: once an update operation terminates, i.e., once the controller learns that
all the physical instances of a logical rule LR are updated, it can re-use its TB for
updating other rules. We can thus concurrently update as many logical rules as the
number of bits dedicated to TBs. While this is likely to be sufficient for a single
virtual network, it will still be a scalability bottleneck for cloud providers that
host 10Ks of virtual networks and should support millions of concurrent updates
of all of these networks per day [111, 112]. We resolve this by capitalizing on
the fact that virtually all network virtualization platforms [6, 5, 114, 43] isolate
traffic within each virtual network, so that traffic cannot leak between two virtual
networks. Packets carrying extra bits disjoint from the bits used by the hypervisor
and rules matching on them do not violate this property. Hence, multiple virtual
networks can concurrently use the same TBs. Furthermore, the controller can
preload switches with only the necessary rules.
We describe the practical implementation of COCONUT’s algorithms as well
as its failover operations after explaining the notations and requirements.
Requirements: In addition to requiring traffic isolation between virtual net-
works, COCONUT requires that the TB bits are dedicated to COCONUT’s op-
erations, i.e., no other entity (such as the tenants or the network hypervisor) is
allowed to use these bits. For simpler presentation, we further assume that ar-
bitrary bitmask (supported since OpenFlow 1.1, early 2011) is supported for the
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header-field used for TBs. Note that this is not a fundamental requirement; algo-
rithms that emulate the §3.4.2 algorithms using only longest prefix match rules are
presented in [115]. COCONUT requires that the network hypervisor should not
cause ambiguity, i.e., it should not install multiple rules with overlapping match
fields and identical priority on a switch. Moreover, assuming that by default rule
priorities are integer values between 0 and max-priority, COCONUT requires the
priorities of the physical rules that the network hypervisor sends to the controller
to be integers between 0 and b(max-priority)/2c, i.e., COCONUT uses half the
priority-space to “pre-install” rules to accelerate the update process without caus-
ing ambiguity. As we will see, for any rule P with priority x, the priority of the
stable rule that COCONUT eventually installs is 2x and the priority of the pre-
installed rules for P is 2x+1. This implies that for any two rules P and L, where
x=P.priority and y=L.priority, if y ≥ x + 1, then L’s priorities (2y and 2y + 1)
will be strictly larger than P ’s priorities (2x and 2x+ 1) throughout.
Algorithms: For updating a set of physical rules corresponding to a logical rule
of a virtual network v-net, the network hypervisor sends a set called the rule-batch,
the identifier of v-net, and the identifiers of the v-net’s shells to the controller
(arguments of the UPDATE procedure in Algorithm 3). Each element of the rule-
batch set, b, is a tuple that includes the new rule that needs to be installed b.new-
rule, and the old rule that is being replaced, b.old-rule. Also, rule-batch.new-rules
and rule-batch.old-rules show, respectively, the set of all new and old rules in the
rule-batch. For any given physical rule, R, we denote the match, action, priority,
and the switch hosting R by, respectively, R.match, R.action, R.priority, and
R.sw. We show the action of installing a set of rules SR by install(SR),
the action of updating SR by overwriting value val on the var header field by
update(SR,var,val). For instance, updating the priority values of all rules
in SR to 10 is shown by update(SR,priority,10).
Algorithm 3 starts by installing a set of temporary rules T that are identical
to the new rules, except: (1) they have higher priorities; (2) they match on an
unused TB, tag=1, in addition to the rules’ existing match requirements; and (3)
the action sets tag=1 in addition to the rules’ existing actions (line 10, Algorithm
3). Note that a single tag bit is used for all rules in the batch. The temporary
rules T will gradually be updated and eventually turn into the new rules. Initially,
these rules are invisible because no transmitted packets have tag=1. But once
packets do start using the new tag (i.e., the rules’ increased virtual clock value),
the switches are prepared and thus will not have to pay the expensive [116] cost
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of relaying packets to the controller while the new rule is “paged in”. Specifically,
since the rules have higher priority than the old rules, if a packet matches both a
T and an old rule, the action of the new rule will be applied on it.
Once confirmations are received, the T rules are updated not to need the TB=1
for matching packets. This makes the update visible as endpoints now can receive
packets matched and handled by these rules. After receiving the confirmations (
wait-conf(T)), every instance of the rule is ready to handle packets with or
without TBs. So packets do not need to be marked any longer and the old rules
can be deleted, since higher priority rules are already installed (line 12).
After receiving confirmation that the old rules are deleted, the priorities of T
rules are converted into the stable value (line 16). Note that this operation turns
the T rules into the stable new rules. Finally, once the controller receives the con-
firmations from the shells that they no longer tag packets with the TB and switches
have installed the new non-tagging rules, it can release the tag for v-net after wait-
ing for the flush time, the time for in-flight packets and the buffered packets (that
might be tagged) to be delivered or expired and dropped (line 18). Algorithm 3 is
Algorithm 3 Controller Update Algorithm
1: procedure UPDATE(set rule-batch, set shells, id v-net)
2: TB tag := get-tag(v-net)
3: map T
4: for b ∈ batch do
5: T [b] := b.new-rule
6: T [b].match := (T [b].mtach)&(tag = 1)
7: T [b].priority := 2× T [b].priority + 1
8: T [b].action := (tag = 1)&(T [b].action)
9: end for
10: install(T )
11: wait-conf(T ); update(T,match, T.match&(tag = ∗))
12: wait-conf(T ); update(T, action, T.action&(tag = ∗))
13: delete(rule-batch.old-rule)
14: wait-conf(T ); stop-tagging(shells, tag)
15: wait-conf(rule-batch.old-rule)
16: update(T, priority, T.priority-1)
17: wait-conf(shells); wait-conf(T )
18: release-tag(v-net, tag)
19: end procedure
for updating rules. Algorithms for deleting and adding new rules are similar: for
deleting a set of rules DR, we set rule-batch.new-rule and rule-batch.old-rule,
60
respectively, to the set of rules that should match packets after DR’s deletion,
and DR. The deletion procedure is identical to the update procedure except for
line 16, where instead of updating the priorities of T , T is deleted since switches
already host the rules that should match packets after DR is removed with their
correct priorities. For adding a set of new rules, rule-batch.old-rule=∅, and the
deletion of old rules (in line 13) and waiting for its confirmation should be skipped
(see details in [115]).
Shell operations are identical to the operations explained in §3.4.2 except that
each shell i keeps a V Ci for the TB bits tag (and not all the logical rules), shown
with V Ci[tag], a timer associated with each TB bit, shown with timer(tag). If the
shell receives a stop-tagging(TB tag) command from the controller , it
sets V Ci[tag]=0, resets tag’s timer, i.e., timer(tag)=0, and sends a confirmation
to the controller . Shells honor the stop-tagging(TB tag) commands for
the flushtime. If shell i receives a packet with tag=1 after the flush timer for
tag has elapsed, it assumes it to be related to a different update batch and sets
V Ci[tag]=1.
Handling Failures: We assume that different components of the system might
experience crash failure, but not Byzantine failure. We further assume that each
endpoint and its shell share fate, i.e., they fail together. Switches and the controller
are assumed to have reliable channels between them, similar to the main control
channel in OpenFlow. Updates related to failed links are carried out similar to
regular updates. Non-responsive switches (those not reacting to controller com-
mands within a threshold) are assumed to have failed. When a switch fails, other
switches and endpoints connected to it are populated with detour rules to reroute
the traffic originally sent to the failed switch, and drop traffic they receive from
it (failover operations). Dropping this traffic is essential for preserving safety; if
the controller loses control over a switch, the switch’s behavior, e.g., its tagging
operations, will be unknown. When a failed switch recovers, it communicates
with the controller which populates it with correct version of rules (including the
possible transient rules) before undoing the failover operations, i.e., removing the
rules that drop the traffic received from the failed switch from the network and
endpoints as well as deleting the detour rules.
3.5 Evaluation of Prototype
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We implemented a prototype of COCONUT (§3.5.1) and evaluated it in both a
hardware SDN testbed and a Mininet emulation with multiple SDN applications
and workloads (§3.5.2). We compared COCONUT ’s performance with a number
of baselines: simple replication (SR), a strawman solution which provides strong
consistency (SC), and CU. In summary, we found SC to be cost prohibitive, e.g.,
even in modest-sized networks, it causes 12 Gbps bandwidth overhead and a 20×
increase in user traffic latency, COCONUT, CU, and SR7 incur no measurable
data plane performance overhead (§3.5.3). In terms of forwarding rule update
delay and rule overhead, COCONUT has significantly lower overhead compared
to SC (3.5× and 2× times lower respectively in a 80-switch network), and CU
(1.5× and 245×, respectively). This overhead is only 1.2× and 1.3×, respec-
tively, higher than SR (§3.5.4). Moreover, COCONUT ’s extra temporary rules
are likely to be evacuated from the network faster (§3.5.5). This result should be
expected: switch update time is known to vary significantly [117, 118], with the
99th percentile 10 times larger than the median in some cases [117]. Thus, by up-
dating much fewer switches, COCONUT runs a lower risk of encountering strag-
glers. In some cases, the application developer can prevent replication-related
race conditions by rewriting her applications to take the network replication into
account. We show that in addition to offering programming simplicity, i.e., en-
abling developers to use their applications “as-is”, COCONUT’s efficient logical
clock-based approach of tracking causality results in 2.8× lower mean latency for
user data flow initiation compared to this approach (§3.5.3). We give more details
about each of these conclusions next.
3.5.1 Prototype Implementation
Our COCONUT prototype consists of approximately 4K lines of Java and python
code and integrates a number of third party libraries and tools. In our prototype,
the controller is implemented using the Floodlight platform [50]. Floodlight runs
a series of modules (e.g., user applications), and each module is supplied with
mechanisms to control and query an SDN network. The COCONUT controller is
implemented as a layer (which is itself a module) residing between the Floodlight
Virtual Switch, a simple network virtualization developed as a Floodlight applica-
tion, and the controller platform. Our prototype exposes much the same interface
7Note that CU and SR do not guarantee observational correctness.
62
as the Floodlight platform. Hence, modules such as the virtualization applications
that wish to be Floodlight clients simply use its interface instead. The COCONUT
controller instruments the rules received from client modules and coordinates with
shells to maintain correctness. We use OVS [43] to implement shells at the hosts
with a bridge through which passes all traffic between the network and hosts.
3.5.2 Experimental Setup
Environment: For the physical network, we use a hardware testbed which in-
cludes 13 Pica8 SDN Pronto 3290 switches, having a total of 676 switch ports.
We “sliced” these ports to emulate fat-tree topologies with various sizes (up to
20 switches). To test COCONUT at scale, we also use the Mininet emula-
tor [51] and implement fat-tree [119] and VL2 [15] topologies with a few hun-
dred switches in it. Switches’ delays to apply and confirm application of updates
(hereafter called control delay) are drawn from [107] in which the authors mea-
sure the performance of several commercial switches (HP Procurve, Fulcrum, and
Quanta). We emulate the behavior of the HP Procurve switches in our Mininet
experiments. We draw job allocation, flow interarrival times, and flow sizes from
[14, 96].
Controller & Applications: We used two network virtualization platforms,
OpenVirtex [5] and Pyretic [37] to create one-big-switch abstractions over physi-
cal fat-tree [119] and VL2 [15] networks of various sizes. Tenants of the network
use several canonical applications to insert and update rules on their virtual one-
big-switches. For OpenVirtex, the tenant runs the Floodlight controller [50] and
its existing applications such as the learning switch and firewall, as well as the
applications explained in §3.3. When these applications install, remove, or up-
date a rule on the one-big-switch, OpenVirtex translates that to possibly multiple
FlowMod messages and sends them to the physical network. For Pyretic, we
use the parallel composition of the firewall and MAC learning implementations
provided in [37]. The graphs in this section, unless stated otherwise, show the
results for the ACL application running over an OpenVirtex’s one-big-switches
over fat-tree networks with parameter k={2,...,10}, i.e., networks with (2 hosts, 5
switches), (16 hosts, 20 switches) ..., and (432 hosts, 180 switches), and the work-
load from [14]. Over these one-big-switches, the tenant’s applications redirect a
stream of traffic to a different host. These logical rules are then mapped to many
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Figure 3.5: (a) SC causes significant bandwidth overhead, (b) Replication-aware
app increases delay.
physical rules: one rule for each port that connects to a host. We then update all
those rules concurrently. Unless stated otherwise, we observe similar trends for
other explained settings.
Scale-out schemes evaluated: COCONUT, SR, SC, CU. In addition to simple
replication (SR) as a baseline, we use an implementation of Strong Consistency
(SC) in SDNs [34]. For updating a rule, SC first installs temporary tunneling rules
to direct all traffic that would be affected by the change to the controller (where it
is handled by a single, strongly consistent, version of the logical rule), and from
the controller to its destination. It then updates the rule at the controller; next it
updates switches with the new rule and tears down the tunnels.
As another comparison point, we implemented a version of consistent updates
(CU) which provides per-packet or per-flow consistency (§3.3.3). Of course, CU
and COCONUT provide different correctness properties. The goal of this compar-
ison is to evaluate whether COCONUT is expensive relative to the most powerful
previously-studied notions of correctness8. Note that CU fundamentally oper-
ates at the granularity of a flow: (a subset of) traffic between ingress and egress
switches [117]; it installs rules that are tagged to be specific to that flow. How-
ever, the abstraction we work with here operates on forwarding rules in a virtual
network, and a single rule may apply to multiple flows. To translate CU to this
rule-based abstraction, we implemented a module that duplicates rules so each
flow using the rule has its own copy. It then runs CU to update each of those flows
in parallel.
8Recent works on optimizing CU require special rule-formats [120, 117, 47], e.g., each rule is
exact-match on a single flow [117]. Such assumptions are more likely to hold in the network core
as those rules that violate those constraints are being moved to the network edge in virtualized
datacenters [117, 121]. Thus, CU remains the most appropriate comparison for our setting.
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Figure 3.6: Testbed’s (a) update initiation & (b) termination delays.
3.5.3 Data Plane Performance Impact
While the correctness problems discussed in §3.3 can be avoided via preserv-
ing strong consistency instead of weak causal consistency, doing so comes at
a great data plane performance cost. Figure 3.5(a) shows the aggregate band-
width overhead imposed by SC on the controller, already a bottleneck in SDNs
[96, 122, 116, 118, 6], for the IDS example of §3.3.1. In addition to bandwidth
overhead, this practice imposes added latency to flows. The overhead is pro-
hibitive and rapidly increases with scale, e.g., for networks of size 100, over 5,000
flows experience an average of 20× increase in latency due to an ACL rule update
(not shown). This approach, therefore, is not practical and scalable.
In some cases, the application developer can rewrite her applications to take
the network replication into account. In the example of §3.3.2, for instance, if the
firewall application developer is aware of the underlying replication, she could
ensure correctness by preserving the orderings of installed rules on not just one
switch but across all replicas, e.g., after receiving a packet from a client, the appli-
cation could send the rules for allowing bidirectional communication to all repli-
cas, followed by BarrierRequests (line 8 in Figure 3.4) and wait to receive the
BarrierReplies from all replicas before sending the packet out. This approach,
however, increases the delay of communication. With the previous experimental
setup, for instance, more than half of the sessions experience an increase of 2.8×
or higher in their connection initiation latency compared to COCONUT. Figure
3.5(b) shows the CDF of connection initiations’ delays caused by this approach
over 100 runs. In addition to the performance penalty, in this approach, the pro-
grammer needs to be aware of the underlying replication and rewrite her applica-
tions to account for it. Note that while COCONUT’s delay is slightly higher than
SR, unlike SR, it prevents incorrect blocking.
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3.5.4 How Long Are Updates Delayed?
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Figure 3.7: How long does it take to initiate and
finish updates? Top: initiation delays for the
firewall app; middle and bottom: initiation and
termination delays for the IDS app.
When network state changes,
SC installs tunneling rules to
and from the controller; CO-
CONUT and CU start with
a phase that installs some
initially-invisible rules. These
operations cause delay before
the change starts to become
visible to data traffic (update
initiation delay), and before
all switches have informed the
controller their update is com-
plete (what we call update ter-
mination delay).
For a given “target” rule
R being updated, COCONUT
and SC only install rules that
are co-located with R (here,
the edge rules produced by
OpenVirtex). CU, in its stan-
dard implementation, updates
all rules along the paths of
flows passing through R. In
our evaluation, as an optimiza-
tion for CU, we limit this to
flows that have active traffic.
First, we measure update
delays on the testbed sliced to
emulate a 20-switch fat-tree topology. Figure 3.6 shows that while compared to
SR, COCONUT increases the delay (e.g., 1.4× increase in the median update ter-
mination time), it reduces the delay of SC and CU (2× and 1.8× lower median
update termination delay, respectively). We use Mininet to measure this metric
at scale and observe similar trends. Figure 3.7 shows mean values; error bars show
10th and 90th percentile over 100 runs. We observe similar trends for the IDS and
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Figure 3.8: How much rule-overhead is imposed and where?
firewall applications. Note that SC’s costs rapidly increases with scale.
The impact of the topology: In addition to the fat-tree networks, we exper-
imented with the VL2 network [15] in Mininet. We found the number of edge
switches, which are the switches that need to be updated, is the key player in CO-
CONUT’s speed, with little variation across these topology types. For example,
the mean initiation delay for the IDS application was 47.8 ms on a VL2 network
with 25 edge switches (35 switches total and 500 hosts), which is very close to
the delay on fat-tree networks of similar size: 45.1 ms with 18 edge switches (45
switches total and 54 hosts) and 49.8 ms with 32 edge switches (80 switches total
and 128 hosts). Similarly, COCONUT’s mean termination delays were 95.4 ms,
90.2 ms, and 99.3 ms on those three networks. SR and SC were similarly unaf-
fected by the topology change, and CU worsened; we omit the results for bevity.
3.5.5 How Much Rule Overhead Is Imposed and Where?
COCONUT’s, SC’s, and CU’s operations all require installing some temporary
extra rules. Since the number of rules switches can support is limited [41], it is
important to keep this cost low. We measure the amount, locations, and lifespans
of this overhead.
By installing only one set of temporary rules, T s, and morphing them into the
final desired rules, COCONUT keeps the number of extra rules minimal.
Plus, similar to SR and SC, COCONUT imposes this rule overhead only on
the switches directly hosting the rules in the update batch. This implies that if
COCONUT is used in conjunction with the common systems that place virtualized
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rules at the edge of the network [6, 36, 38], then only edge switches need to
tolerate this overhead. In contrast, CU imposes this overhead on all the switches
hosting the rules of the associated flows, possibly including core switches. Figure
3.8 shows the rule overhead (number of extra rules) and its location. Unlike CU,
COCONUT and SC only have overhead at edge switches. Even for edge switches,
COCONUT’s overhead is singnificantly lower than SC’s and CU’s, e.g., in a 80-
switch network, respectively 2× and 245× lower.9
How Long Does Rule-overhead Persist? The extra rules installed by SC,
CU, and COCONUT are supposed to be short-lived and all techniques remove
those rules in their clean-up operations. Figure 3.9 shows that only 0.7% of CO-
CONUT’s rule overhead persists in the network for more than 100ms compared to
80.6% for SC and 60.7% for CU. This can again be explained by the fact that CU
and SC update a significantly larger number of rules and impose a greater load on
switches and controllers.
3.5.6 Can Header Bits Become a Scalability Bottleneck?
COCONUT ’s ability to handle concurrent updates is limited by the number of
header bits available to it; if there are too many concurrent updates, COCONUT
will have to queue the requests. With this in mind, can COCONUT handle mod-
ern network dynamics? A campus network may experience up to 18K updates per
month [123], but the rate is significantly larger and more bursty in cloud environ-
ments where customers continuously deploy, delete, and migrate services, with
an average of 12K updates per day in a typical cluster, peaking at one update per
second [12].
To test COCONUT’s rate of applying updates, we reserve 12 header bits (the
number of bits of the VLAN tag, the header field reserved for the update op-
erations in CU [46]), 19 header bits (the number of bits in one MPLS label),
and 4 header bytes (the smallest possible option length in Geneve [124]) for CO-
CONUT and modify the IDS application to send to COCONUT 12K update re-
quests, equivalent to the average number of updates in one day in a cloud en-
vironment of [12]. We run this experiment on a fat-tree with 180 switches and
measure the time COCONUT consumes to apply all the updates. Over 20 runs
of this experiment, COCONUT applies these updates in respectively 2.4, 1.3, and
9Note that we measure only CU’s overhead on top of the rules we duplicated to move from a
flow-based to a rule-based abstraction (3.5.2).
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0.9 minutes on average. Its 90th percentile update time is respectively, 2.6, 1.8,
and 1.4 minutes, i.e., more than 90% of the time its rate is 76×, 112×, and 144×
faster than the peak update rate cited in [12]. Thus, we believe the existing header
fields for carrying meta-data are more than sufficient for COCONUT’s operations
[12].
3.6 Related Work
Sequence planning techniques synthesize an ordering of updates to preserve cer-
tain invariants (verified by verification tools [125, 126]) during updates [127].
Finding such orderings is NP-complete [127] and there does not always exist a
sequence that preserves invariants such as loop freedom and congestion freedom
[46, 128]. Thus, CU proposes an alternative approach for updating the network
that guarantee to preserve trace properties [46]. CU formalized trace properties
characterizing the paths individual packets take through the network, introduced
per-packet consistency, and used a 2-phase update algorithm to implement it. As
discussed previously, per-packet consistency does not preserve the weak causal
correctness that is of interest to us (but also, COCONUT does not attempt to pre-
serve per-packet consistency; to achieve these, the network provider could choose
to run CU). While there are a few aspects of technical similarity in mechanism
between CU and COCONUT (e.g., version numbers and preloading initially in-
visible rules), COCONUT also has quite different mechanisms, in particular a
vector of virtual clocks, each implemented as a single bit.
A few recent studies try to improve CU’s efficiency, with various restrictions —
either preserving narrower properties such as loopfreedom that are subsets of per-
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packet consistency or with constraints on forwarding rules [129, 117, 120, 48, 47].
None of those works provide guarantees that are stronger than CU’s per-packet
consistency.
The recently added atomic update operation of OVS[130] and the bundle ca-
pability of OpenFlow [131] enable atomic update of a single switch and cannot
be extended to multiple replicas at different locations. For the short-lived repli-
cation caused by migrations of middleboxes or virtual networks, OpenNF, LIME,
and Split/Merge strive to retain strong consistency (SC) by heavy-weight opera-
tions10 such as dropping packets or redirecting them to the controller [11, 34, 132].
In COCONUT , the dataplane continues processing packets during the update,
i.e., packets are not buffered (unlike [132, 11]), not redirected to the con-
troller (unlike [34, 108, 11]) which is already a scalability bottleneck in SDNs
[96, 122, 116, 118, 6], and not dropped (unlike [34, 132]).
3.7 Conclusion
We demonstrated that current network scale-out techniques do not preserve the
semantics of the native network, leading to application-level incorrectness, and
presented COCONUT , a system that solves this problem by preserving weak
causal correctness. Some practical challenges remain, e.g., requiring modification
at endhost hypervisors. However, COCONUT appears to be surprisingly feasi-
ble, and represents a promising first step in an area that we believe will become
increasingly important with roll-out of network virtualization and NFV.
10OpenNF’s implementation of SC, for instance, adds 10s of ms latency to each packet (avg.
RTT<1ms in datacenters). The added latency rapidly increases with traffic rate and number of
flows [11].
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Chapter 4
TOWARDS A RIGOROUS FRAMEWORK
FOR REASONING ABOUT NETWORK
BEHAVIORS
In the previous chapter, we argue that focusing on end-points’ observations is key
for providing simple network abstractions with well understood semantics. In this
chapter, we introduce a mathematical framework, Input Output Automata (IOA),
that allows us to rigorously define and reason about observational correctnessand
explains its prominent features that make it a suitable choice for us. We then
model COCONUT in this framework and prove its observational correctness.
4.1 Introducing the IOA Framework
Input/Output automaton (IOA) is a mathematical framework used for analyzing
concurrent and distributed discrete systems that exhibit a combination of discrete
and continuous behavior. It models each system component as a nondeterministic,
I/O state machine which is essentially an automaton with an action labeling each
transition [109]. One key feature of this model is its rigorously defined notion of
external behavior which captures the visible behavior and interactions of systems
with their environments [109]. COCONUT’s core idea of focusing on observa-
tions discernible to external entities makes this framework a natural fit for us.
An IOA is a state machine, with a set of states, where transitions are associated
with external and internal actions. External actions consist of input and output
actions and are used for communicating with the environment of the automaton
whereas internal actions are visible only to the automaton. More precisely, an
IOA A =< X,Q, T,D, τ > has the following components [133, 109]:
• A set of states, X , which describes the collection of A’s state variables.
Each variable could be external (visible toA’s environment) or internal (vis-
ible only to A).
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• A set of start or initial states, Q, which is a non-empty subset of states of
A.
• A signature that lists the disjoint sets of input, output, and internal actions
of A, A.
An action x is said to be enabled in a state s if there is another state s′ such
that (s, x, s′) is a transition in the automaton. While output and internal ac-
tions that are under the control of the automaton, i.e., it can decide which
internal and output actions to perform, input actions are not assumed to the
its control. In other words, input actions are enabled in every state and the
IOA is not able to “block” them [133]. Transition relations are usually ex-
pressed in precondition-effect style in which a precondition is a predicate
on the state indicating the conditions under which the action is permitted
and the effect describes the change in the IOA’s state that results from per-
forming the action [133].
• A set of state transition relations,D, which contains tuples, usually referred
to as transitions or steps, of the form (state, action, state). D ⊂ val(X) ×
T × val(X). We write (u, a, u′) ∈ D in short as u→a u′.
• A Set of trajectories ofX , τ , that is closed under prefix, suffix, and concate-
nation. If t is a trajectory, then t.fstate shows the first valuation of t and, if
t is closed, t.lstate is the last valuation of t.
An execution segment of an IOA is a, finite or infinite, sequence s0, x1, s1, x2, ...
of alternating states si and actions xi such that ∀i ≥ 0, (si, xi+1, si+1) is a tran-
sition in the IOA. An execution is an execution segment that starts with an initial
state [133]. The trace, external behavior, or behavior for short, of an execution is
the sequence of external actions in that execution. The behavior of an IOA is the
set of all plausible traces of that IOA. One important operation of IOA is composi-
tion which enables this framework to model large complex systems by composing
their individual components [133].
Moreover, this framework defines what it means for one IOA A to be an “ab-
straction” of another IOA B, based on an inclusion relationship between their
external behavior sets, defines a notion of simulation which provides a sufficient
condition for demonstrating abstraction relationships, and includes a composition
operation for IOAs which respects the abstraction relation (§4.2).
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We show how the system can be modeled in this framework before formalizing
observational correctnessand proving that COCONUT is observationally correct.
4.2 Defining Observational Correctness
We may express the correctness of an implementation of an abstraction by show-
ing that its IOA implements an abstract specification automaton. An IOA A im-
plements an IOA B (equivalently, B is an abstraction of A) if there is a forward
simulation relation from A to B [109]. Forward simulation guarantees that any
trace (external behavior) of A is a plausible trace of B. At a high level, a for-
ward simulation relation is a binary relation from the state variables of A to B
that satisfies three types of conditions (relating start states, discrete transitions,
and trajectories of A and B). After modeling the system, we show that such
a binary relation exists from COCONUT’s implementation of one-big-switch to
the one-big-switch abstraction. Consequently, any behavior of the physical im-
plementation of the one-big-switch abstraction, implemented by COCONUT, is
guaranteed to be a plausible behavior of the ideal, non-virtualized implementation
of it:
Theorem 1: Any external behavior of COCONUT’s implementation of one-
big-switch could have happened in the logical one-big-switch.
COCONUT’s IOAs are composable: Composition of IOAs requires certain
“compatibility” conditions, i.e., (a) no interference, internal variables and actions
of one automaton cannot be shared by any other automaton and (b) exclusive con-
trol, each output variable and output action be controlled by at most one automa-
ton [109]. We show later in this section that the output actions, as well as the
internal variables and actions of the COCONUT’s IOAs are disjoint, e.g., only
Hypervisors send packets to the end-points (exclusive control), or at most one
switch can modify the vector clock of a packet stored on a switch (no interfer-
ence). Moreover, it is proven that if an IOA Abs1 is an abstraction of IOA Impl1,
and another IOA Abs2 is an abstraction of IOA Impl2, then composition of Abs1
and Abs12 is an abstraction of Impl1 and Impl2. Hence, multiple COCONUT’s
switch IOAs can be composed to form different topologies while guaranteeing
observational correctness. Later in this section, we prove:
Theorem 2: COCONUT’s one-big-switch is composable.
We now model each component of the system, before composing them and
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proving the above theorems about them.
4.3 Modeling Logical Networks as IOA
Non-virtualized ideal implementation of virtual network abstractions is composed
of switches and links. We model links and switches below.
4.3.1 Modeling Links as IOA
We assume that links connect ports. Following the common convention in model-
ing networks and to keep the model simple, we also assume that ports have unique
identifiers, Port 1. The type Port has subtypes Ext port and Int port for,
respectively, ports connected to applications or end-points. Such ports are visible
to the users of the network and are therefore classified as external in the network
IOA. Other ports are connected to switches that are not visible to users (end-
points or applications) and are therefore classified as internal in the network IOA.
Links in the network are assumed to be best-effort, i.e., connecting ports of type
be port. These ports can fail to deliver packets and they can reorder them.
Internal variable to sendl is a map that for each port keeps the, possibly
empty, sequence of packets that need to be sent on that port. To represent the
best-effort nature of networks, packets will be sent without any predetermined or-
der; this is automatically achieved by the internal non-determinism of IOA and
the way we model the sending process. The internal variable status maps each
port to the type of connectivity it provides: reliable FIFO2, best-effort, or failed
(if the port has failed and not yet recovered). A failed link is modeled as a link
connected to at least one failed port.
End-host and controller applications interface with links via two external
app sendi and app receivei actions where i is the ID of the external port
connected to applications or end-points3. These two sets of actions are the only
visible part of the network automaton to applications and end-points.
1It is straightforward to replace this choice for port IDs with (switch ID, port ID) and (host ID,
port ID).
2This is similar to the main control channel in OpenFlow. We use this type of connectivity for
the communication between the controller and shells and switches.
3Following the common convention of modeling IOAs, the pre keyword shows the condition
that should be met for the IOA to make the transition, i.e., it shows how that action is “enabled”,
and the statement after the pre keyword shows how the state changes in that transition.
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automaton Links
types Bit : {0, 1}
Packet : Bit+
Port : {1, ..., k}
Connectivity : {RELIABLE FIFO,
BEST EFFORT, FAILED}
Ext port ⊂ Port
Int port ⊂ Port
rf port ⊂ Port
be port ⊂ Port
internal variables
to sendl : [Port→ Packet∗]
statusl : [Port→ Connectivity]
signature
input app sendi(p:Packet)
output app receivei(p:Packet)
input switch sendi(p:Packet)
output switch receivei(p:Packet)
internal link drop(i:be port, p:Packet)
input port faill(i: bf port)
input port recoverl(i: bf port)
transition
∀i ∈ Ext port :
input app sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendl[i].append(p)
output app receivei(p: Packet)
pre statusl[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sendl[i].head)
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
output app receivei(p: Packet)
pre statusl[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(p ∈ to sendl[i])
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
Figure 4.1: Links as IOA.
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automaton Links (cont.)
transition
∀i ∈ Int port :
input switch sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendl[i].append(p)
output switch receivei(p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendl[i]
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
internal link deliver(i,j: be port, p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendl[i]
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
to sendl[j].append(p)
internal link deliver(i,j: rf port, p: Packet)
pre p = to sendl[i].head
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
to sendl[j].append(p)
internal link drop(i: be port, p: Packet)
pre statusl[i]=FAILED
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
input port faill(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusl[i] := FAILED
input port recoverl(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusl[i] := BEST EFFORT
Figure 4.1 (cont.)
76
automaton Switch(Switch ID: ID)
types
Priority : Int
Time : Real
Idle-Timer : Time ∪ null
Idle-Timeout-Cst : Time ∪ null
Hard-Timer : Time ∪ null
Hard-Timeout-Cst : Time ∪ null
Counter : Int
Match : {1, 0, ∗}+
R action : {MOD, SEND, DROP,
UPDATE RULES,
UPDATE TSTAT}
MOD : Match
UPDATE RULES : (Priority,
Idle-Timer, Idle-Timeout-Cst,
Hard-Timer, Hard-Timeout-Cst,
Counter, Match, R action∗)
Rule : (Priority,
Idle-Timer, Idle-Timeout-Cst,
Hard-Timer, Hard-Timeout-Cst,
Counter, Match, R action+)
internal variables
RulesSwitch ID : set(Rule)
switch failedSwitch ID : Boolean
statusSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ Connectivity]
to sendSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ Packet∗]
receivedSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ (Packet,R action+)∗]
Backup rulesSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ set(Rule)]
Figure 4.2: Switch as IOA: types and variables.
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automaton Switch(Switch ID: ID) (cont.)
transition
∀i ∈ Int port connected to Switch ID:
input switch receivei(p:Packet)
pre true
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].add((p, lookup(p, i)))
∀i ∈ Int port connected to Switch ID:
output switch sendi(p:Packet)
pre statusSwitch ID[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sendSwitch ID[i].head)
eff to sendSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
output switch sendi(p:Packet)
pre statusSwitch ID[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(p ∈ to sendSwitch ID[i])
eff to sendSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
internal switch int deliverSwitch ID(i, j: Int port, p:Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(statusSwitch ID[j] 6= FAILED)
∧(lookup action(p, i).type = SEND)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p, i)
to sendSwitch ID[lookup outPort(p, i)]
.append(p)
internal switch rewriteSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(lookup action(p, i).type = MOD)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
receivedSwitch ID[i].replace(
rewrite(p, lookup pattern(p, i)))
Figure 4.3: Switch as IOA: packet handling transitions.
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automaton Switch(Switch ID: ID) (cont.)
transition
internal rules updateSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(lookup action(p).type = UPDATE RULES)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
RulesSwitch ID.update(
lookup update(p, i))
internal stats updateSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(lookup action(p).type = UPDATE TSTAT)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
RulesSwitch ID.updateStat(p, i)
internal switch dropSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])∧
((switch failedSwitch ID)
∨(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∨(lookup action(p).type = DROP))
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
internal switch dropSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:Packet)
pre (p ∈ to sendSwitch ID[i])∧
((switch failedSwitch ID)
∨(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED))
eff to sendSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
Figure 4.3 (cont.)
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automaton Switch(Switch ID: ID)
transition
input local failoverSwitch ID(i: be port)
pre true
eff RulesSwitch ID.update(backup rules[i]))
input port failSwitch ID(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusSwitch ID[i] := FAILED
input switch failSwitch ID
pre true
eff switch failedSwitch ID := true
input port recoverSwitch ID(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusSwitch ID[i] := BEST EFFORT
input switch recoverSwitch ID
pre true
eff switch failedSwitch ID := false
Figure 4.4: Switch as IOA: failure and recovery transitions.
automaton Switch(Switch ID: ID)
transition
internal rule expireSwitch ID(rule: ∈ Rule)
pre (rule ∈ Rules)∧
(rule.Idle-Timer ≥ rule.Idle-Timeout-Cst∨
rule.Hard-Timer ≥ rule.Hard-Timeout-Cst)
eff RulesSwitch ID.remove(rule)
trajectories
∀rule ∈ RulesSwitch IDsuch that rule.Idle-Timer 6= null:
evolve d(rule.Idle-Timer) = 1
∀rule ∈ RulesSwitch IDsuch that rule.Hard-Timer 6= null:
evolve d(rule.Hard-Timer) = 1
Figure 4.5: Switch as IOA: time-evolving trajectories and transitions.
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automaton Hypervisors
internal variables
to sendh : [Port→ Packet∗]
statush : [Port→ Connectivity]
transition
∀i ∈ Ext port :
input app sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendh[i].append(devirtualize(p))
output app receivei(p: Packet)
pre statush[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sendh[i].head)
eff to sendh[i].remove(virtualize(p))
output app receivei(p: Packet)
pre statush[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(p ∈ to sendh[i])
eff to sendh[i].remove(virtualize(p))
∀i ∈ Int port :
input link sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendh[i].append(p)
output link receivei(p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendh[i]
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
internal hypervisor deliver(i,j: be port, p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendh[i]
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
to sendh[j].append(p)
internal hypervisor deliver(i,j: rf port, p: Packet)
pre p = to sendh[i].head
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
to sendh[j].append(p)
Figure 4.6: Hypervisors as IOA.
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automaton Hypervisors (cont.)
transition
internal hypervisor drop(i: be port, p: Packet)
pre statusl[i]=FAILED
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
input port failh(i: be port)
pre true
eff statush[i] := FAILED
input port recoverh(i: be port)
pre true
eff statush[i] := BEST EFFORT
Figure 4.6 (cont.)
switch sendi, switch receivei, link deliver, and link drop
are, respectively, responsible for receiving the packets a switch sends and sending
a packet to a switch on an internal port i connected to the switch, moving a packet
from one side of a link to another, and dropping packets in case a best-effort link
fails. port faill and port recoverl represent failure and recovery of ports.
To enable switches and links to communicate, we initially define
switch sendi and switch receivei actions as external actions in Links
and Switch IOAs. In the next section, we explain why and how, in the composi-
tion of Links and Switches, we “hide” these two actions such that applications
and end-points do not observe them.
4.3.2 Modeling Switches as IOA
Similar to regular SDN switches, the virtual switch is assumed to have a set of
rules each having a “priority”, a “match field”, and a partially ordered set of
“actions”. Match fields could match packets based on their headers and some
state local to the switch such as counters.
For modeling, we make the following realistic assumptions about switches:
• Switches are distributed systems and consist of several chassis. In general,
switches might internally re-order events, e.g., they might reorder the
packets they receive, look them up with different orders, apply actions on
them with arbitrary orders, etc. The applications cannot make assumptions
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automaton Virtualized Links
internal variables
to sendl : [Port→ Packet∗]
statusl : [Port→ Connectivity]
transition
∀i ∈ Port connected to Hypervisors:
input hypervisor sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendl[i].append(p)
output hypervisor receivei(p: Packet)
pre statusl[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sendl[i].head)
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
output hypervisor receivei(p: Packet)
pre statusl[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(p ∈ to sendl[i])
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
∀i ∈ Ext port :
input switch sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendl[i].append(p)
output switch receivei(p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendl[i]
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
internal link deliver(i,j: be port, p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendl[i]
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
to sendl[j].append(p)
internal link deliver(i,j: rf port, p: Packet)
pre p = to sendl[i].head
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
to sendl[j].append(p)
internal link drop(i: be port, p: Packet)
pre statusl[i]=FAILED
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
Figure 4.7: Virtualized links as IOA.
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automaton Virtualized Links (cont.)
internal variables
to sendl : [Port→ Packet∗]
statusl : [Port→ Connectivity]
transition
input port faill(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusl[i] := FAILED
input port recoverl(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusl[i] := BEST EFFORT
Figure 4.7 (cont.)
LC : Int
V C : vector(LC)
COCONUTPacket : [Packet,VC]
Figure 4.8: COCONUT types.
about the internal orderings of events in the switch without receiving pack-
ets from the switch. If the applications require switches to perform certain
actions with specific orderings, then they should use the existing mecha-
nisms such as “barrier” or confirmations from switches to enforce those
orderings.
We use the nondeterminism of IOAs to model this: Multiple actions may be
enabled from the same state, and there may be multiple post states from the
same action.
• We assume that switches might experience crash failures, but not Byzan-
tine failures.
4.4 Modeling Existing Implementations of Logical
Networks as IOA
For providing address space virtualization, isolation, and decoupling logical and
physical topologies, current network virtualization platforms act as a proxy be-
tween the tenants and the actual network, such that they can rewrite data packets,
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automaton COCONUT Links
internal variables
to sendl : [Port→ COCONUTPacket∗]
statusl : [Port→ Connectivity]
transition
∀i ∈ Port connected to Shells:
input shell sendi(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre true
eff to sendl[i].append(p)
output shell receivei(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre statusl[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sendl[i].head)
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
output shell receivei(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre statusl[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(p ∈ to sendl[i])
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
∀i ∈ Ports connected to COCONUT Switches :
input switch sendi(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre true
eff to sendl[i].append(p)
output switch receivei(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendl[i]
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
internal link deliver(i,j: be port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendl[i]
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
to sendl[j].append(p)
internal link deliver(i,j: rf port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre p = to sendl[i].head
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
to sendl[j].append(p)
internal link drop(i: be port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre statusl[i]=FAILED
eff to sendl[i].remove(p)
Figure 4.9: COCONUT links as IOA.
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automaton COCONUT Links (cont.)
internal variables
to sendl : [Port→ COCONUTPacket∗]
statusl : [Port→ Connectivity]
transition
input port faill(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusl[i] := FAILED
input port recoverl(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusl[i] := BEST EFFORT
Figure 4.9 (cont.)
control messages, and packet handling rules. Similar to the terminology used
in prior work [5], we call the functions that translate tenants’ packets, control
messages, and rules to the physical packets that will travel the physical network,
the messages that will be sent to the physical network and the rules that will be
installed in the physical network devirtualize. devirtualize function
takes as input one or more virtual entities and translates them to the corresponding
physical entities, e.g., they translate one logical FlowMod from a tenant’s appli-
cation for installing a rule on her one big switch abstraction to the corresponding
set of FlowMods that will be sent to physical switches used for implementing
that one-big-switch. Similarly, virtualize functions are responsible for trans-
lating physical entities to their corresponding logical ones, e.g., they translate a
Packet-In message from received from the physical network to the corresponding
virtual message that should be sent to a tenant.
Virtualization and devirtualization actions are carried out by the network hy-
pervisors that are placed between the tenants’ end-host and controller applications
and the physical network. Hence, in a virtualized physical networks, applications
interface with hypervisors (and not directly with links). Therefore, for modeling
such networks, we add hypervisor IOAs that, similar to Links IOA in the non-
virtualized networks, have external app-send and app-receive actions to
interact with application (Figure 4.6). Virtualized Links IOA in virtual-
ized networks are similar to non-virtualized ones except that instead of interfac-
ing with apps directly, they interface with Hypervisors (Figure 4.7). Switch
IOAs are the same; one should note that the rules installed on and packets travers-
ing the virtualized network, however, are devirtualized by the hypervisors before
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automaton COCONUT Switch(Switch ID: ID)
internal variables
RulesSwitch ID : set([Rule, VC])
switch failedSwitch ID : Boolean
statusSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ Connectivity]
to sendSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ COCONUTPacket∗]
bufferSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ COCONUTPacket
∗]
receivedSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ (COCONUTPacket,
R action+)∗]
Backup rulesSwitch ID : [Int port ⇀ set([Rule,VC])]
RF packetsSwitch ID : [COCONUTPacket, Int port,R action
+]∗
pending updateSwitch ID : [Rule→ Boolean]
transition
∀i ∈ Int port connected to Switch ID:
input switch receivei(p:COCONUT Packet)
pre true
eff bufferSwitch ID[i].append((p, lookup(p, i)))
∀i ∈ Int port connected to Switch ID:
output switch sendi(p:COCONUT Packet)
pre statusSwitch ID[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sendSwitch ID[i].head)
eff to sendSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
output switch sendi(p:COCONUT Packet)
pre statusSwitch ID[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(p ∈ to sendSwitch ID[i])
eff to sendSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
internal switch int deliverSwitch ID(i, j: Int port, p:COCONUT Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i].HeadKey)
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(statusSwitch ID[j] = BEST EFFORT)
∧(lookup action(p, i).type = SEND)
∧(lookup outPort(p, i) = j)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p, i)
to sendSwitch ID[j].append(p)
Figure 4.10: COCONUT switch as IOA: variables and packet handling
transitions.
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automaton COCONUT Switch(Switch ID: ID) (cont.)
transition
internal switch int deliverSwitch ID(i, j: Int port, p:COCONUT Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i].HeadKey)
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(statusSwitch ID[j] = RELIABLE FIFO)
∧(lookup action num(p, i) 6= 1)
∧(lookup action(p, i).type = SEND)
∧(lookup outPort(p, i) = j)
eff tuple = pop(p, i)
internal switch rewriteSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:COCONUT Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(lookup action(p, i).type = MOD)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
receivedSwitch ID[i].replace(
rewrite(p, lookup pattern(p, i)))
internal rules updateSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:COCONUT Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(lookup action(p).type = UPDATE RULES)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
RulesSwitch ID.updatewV C(
lookup update(p, i))
internal stats updateSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:COCONUT Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])
∧(!switch failedSwitch ID)
∧(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∧(lookup action(p).type = UPDATE TSTAT)
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
RulesSwitch ID.updateStat(p, i)
Figure 4.10 (cont.)
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automaton COCONUT Switch(Switch ID: ID)
transition
internal switch dropSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:COCONUT Packet)
pre (p ∈ receivedSwitch ID[i])∧
((switch failedSwitch ID)
∨(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED)
∨(lookup action(p).type = DROP))
eff receivedSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
internal switch dropSwitch ID(i: Int port, p:COCONUT Packet)
pre (p ∈ to sendSwitch ID[i])∧
((switch failedSwitch ID)
∨(statusSwitch ID[i] 6= FAILED))
eff to sendSwitch ID[i].remove(p)
input local failoverSwitch ID(i: be port)
pre true
eff RulesSwitch ID.update(backup rules[i]))
input port failSwitch ID(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusSwitch ID[i] := FAILED
input switch failSwitch ID
pre true
eff switch failedSwitch ID := true
input port recoverSwitch ID(i: be port)
pre true
eff statusSwitch ID[i] := BEST EFFORT
input switch recoverSwitch ID
pre true
eff switch failedSwitch ID := false
Figure 4.11: COCONUT switch as IOA: failure and recovery transitions.
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automaton COCONUT Switch(Switch ID: ID)
transition
internal rule expireSwitch ID(rule: ∈ Rule)
pre (rule ∈ Rules)∧
(rule.Idle-Timer ≥ rule.Idle-Timeout-Cst∨
rule.Hard-Timer ≥ rule.Hard-Timeout-Cst)
eff RulesSwitch ID.rewriteAction(rule, null)
trajectories
∀rule ∈ RulesSwitch IDsuch that rule.Idle-Timer 6= null:
evolve d(rule.Idle-Timer) = 1
∀rule ∈ RulesSwitch IDsuch that rule.Hard-Timer 6= null:
evolve d(rule.Hard-Timer) = 1
Figure 4.12: COCONUT switch as IOA: time-evolving trajectories and
transitions.
entering the network, and the packets sent from the network to the applications
are virtualized by hypervisors before reaching them.
We assume that hypervisors can experience crash failure on any ports connected
to them. For simplicity of the model, the ID of the ports connected to them are
assumed to be identical to the ID of the ports on physical network. That is, if an
application and a link are connected with port X in the non-virtualized network,
then in the virtualized network, the hypervisor receives and sends packets between
the application and the network on the same port X.
The virtualized network is the composition of Hypervisors,
Virtualized Links, and Switches.
4.5 Modeling COCONUT as IOA
COCONUT system is a composition of COCONUT links, COCONUT
Switches, Shells, Controller, and COCONUT Hypervisors.
COCONUT types: To model the COCONUT system, we define a few new
types: LC for logical clocks, VC for the vector of logical clocks that packets
carry, and shells and COCONUT switches keep, COCONUT Packet that is sim-
ilar to the original Packet type except that it has a vector of logical clocks of
type VC.
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automaton COCONUT Switch(Switch ID: ID)
transition
output notify shell(ID: Switch ID, [p:COCONUT Packet, in: Int port,
actions:R action+])
pre (RF packets.haedSwitch ID = [p, in, actions])
eff RF packets.remove([p, in, actions])
internal shell notificationSwitch ID([p:COCONUT Packet, in: Int port,
actions:R action+])
pre true
eff received[in].append([p, actions])
output request update(ID: Switch ID, r: Rule, vc: VC)
pre pending updateSwitch ID[r]
eff pending updateSwitch ID[r] = false
internal checkVC(r: Rule, vc: VC p: COCONUT Packet, i: Int port)
pre match(p, r) ∧ [r, vc] ∈ RulesSwitch ID∧
(p = bufferSwitch ID[i].head) ∧ (vc ≥ p.V C)
eff p.VC=max(p.VC, vc)
received[i]Switch ID.append([p, lookup(p, i)])
received[i]Switch ID.buffer[i]Switch ID.removehead
internal checkVC(r: Rule, vc: VC p: COCONUT Packet, i: Int port)
pre match(p, r) ∧ [r, vc] ∈ RulesSwitch ID∧
(p = bufferSwitch ID[i].head) ∧ NOT(vc ≥ p.V C)
eff pending updateSwitch ID[r] = true
Figure 4.13: COCONUT switch as IOA: lookup, notifying shell and querying
controller.
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automaton COCONUT Hypervisors
internal variables
to sendh : [Port→ Packet∗]
statush : [Port→ Connectivity]
transition
∀i ∈ Ext port :
input app sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendh[i].append(devirtualize(p))
output app receivei(p: Packet)
pre statush[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sendh[i].head)
eff to sendh[i].remove(virtualize(p))
output app receivei(p: Packet)
pre statush[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(p ∈ to sendh[i])
eff to sendh[i].remove(virtualize(p))
∀i ∈ Int port :
input shell sendi(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sendh[i].append(p)
output shell receivei(p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendh[i]
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
internal hypervisor deliver(i,j: be port, p: Packet)
pre p ∈ to sendh[i]
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
to sendh[j].append(p)
internal hypervisor deliver(i,j: rf port, p: Packet)
pre p = to sendh[i].head
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
to sendh[j].append(p)
Figure 4.14: COCONUT hypervisors as IOA.
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automaton COCONUT Hypervisors (cont.)
internal variables
to sendh : [Port→ Packet∗]
statush : [Port→ Connectivity]
transition
internal hypervisor drop(i: be port, p: Packet)
pre statusl[i]=FAILED
eff to sendh[i].remove(p)
input port failh(i: be port)
pre true
eff statush[i] := FAILED
input port recoverh(i: be port)
pre true
eff statush[i] := BEST EFFORT
Figure 4.14 (cont.)
COCONUT links are modeled similar to Virtualized Links ex-
cept that (a) they interface with Shells instead of Hypervisors, i.e.,
hypervisor send and hypervisor receive actions are replaced by
shell send and shell receive, and (b) they send, receive, save (in their
internal state), deliver, and drop COCONUT Packets and not Packets (4.9).
COCONUT switches (COCONUT Switch) are similar to regular switches
except that (a) they process COCONUT Packets instead of Packets, (b) for
their internal state, they also keep vectors of logical clocks for each rule re-
siding on them, (c) their lookup functions in the switch receive actions
check vectors that COCONUT Packets carry, in addition to the normal lookup
operation, (d) the actions that modify the forwarding rules on switches, i.e.,
rules update, local failover, and rule expire, also update the vec-
tor of logical clocks of the switch, in addition to their normal operations.
Also, backup rules of COCONUT switches are assumed to have higher VCs
than current active rules. Unlike regular switches, when an COCONUT switch
receives an COCONUT packet, the packet is first buffered (in buffer) where
its VC is checked and the switch makes sure that the related rule that matches
the packet is up to date for handling that packet, i.e., its VC is equal or larger
than that of the packet, before removing the packet from the buffer and putting it
(as regular switches) into received. If the rule is not updated enough, its key
in the pending updateSwitch ID is set to true (and the packet is not moved to the
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automaton Shells
internal variables
to sends : [Int port→ COCONUTPacket∗]
buffers : [Int port→ COCONUTPacket∗]
statuss : [Port→ Connectivity]
vcs : VC
RFs : [SwitchID,COCONUTPacket, Int port, R actions
+]∗
transition
∀i ∈ Port connected to Hypervisors:
input shell receivei(p: Packet)
pre true
eff to sends[i].append(addV C(p))
output shell sendi(p: Packet)
pre statuss[i] = RELIABLE FIFO
∧(p = to sends[i].head.PACKET )
eff to sends[i].remove(rmV C(to sends[i].head))
output shell sendi(p: Packet)
pre statuss[i] = BEST EFFORT
∧(∃q : COCONUTPacket ∈ to sends[i]
such that q.PACKET = p)
eff to sends[i].remove(rmV C(q))
∀i ∈ Int port :
input link sendi(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre true
eff buffers[i].append(p)
output link receivei(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre p ∈ to sends[i]
eff to sends[i].remove(p)
internal shell deliver(i,j: be port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre p ∈ to sends[i]
eff to sends[i].remove(p)
to sends[j].append(p)
internal shell deliver(i,j: rf port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre p = to sends[i].head
eff to sends[i].remove(p)
to sends[j].append(p)
Figure 4.15: Shells as IOA.
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automaton Shells (cont.)
transition
internal shell drop(i: be port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre statuss[i]=FAILED
eff to sends[i].remove(p)
input port fails(i: be port)
pre true
eff statuss[i] := FAILED
input port recovers(i: be port)
pre true
eff statuss[i] := BEST EFFORT
internal notify shell(ID: Switch ID, [p:COCONUT Packet, in: Int port,])
actions:R action+])
pre true
eff RFs.append([ID, p, in, actions])
internal updateVC(i: Int port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre buffer[i].head.V C > vcs
eff vcs = buffer[i].head.V C
to− sends.append(buffer[i].head)
buffer[i].removehead
internal updateVC(i: Int port, p: COCONUT Packet)
pre NOT(buffer[i].head.V C > vcs)
eff to− sends.append(buffer[i].head)
buffer[i].removehead
∀Switch IDes connected to Shells:
output shell notificationSwitchID([p:COCONUT Packet, in: Int port,]
actions:R action+])
pre RFs.head = SwitchID
eff RFs.removeHead
Figure 4.15 (cont.)
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automaton Controller
internal variables
to sendco : [SwitchID→ Packet∗]
sw requests : [sw→ [Rule,VC]∗]
batch : set([SwitchID,Rule])
transition
input request(sw: Switch ID, r: Rule)
pre true
eff to sendco[sw].append(FlowMod(r))
output shell sendi(p: COCONUT Packet)
pre ∃sw ∈ Switch ID such that
(connect(i, sw)) ∧ (to sendco[sw].head = p)
eff to sendco[sw].removehead
input request update(sw: Switch ID, r: Rule, vc: VC)
pre true
eff switch requests[sw].append([r, vc])
internal process switch request(sw: Switch ID, rule: Rule, vc: VC)
pre (switch requests[sw] 6= null)∧
(to sendco[sw].includeRule(sw requests[sw].headRule)
∧(sw requests[sw].headV C = V C)
eff switch requests[sw].removehead
internal process switch request(sw: Switch ID, rule: Rule, vc: VC)
pre (switch requests[sw] 6= null)∧
(!to sendco[sw].includeRule(sw requests[sw].headRule)
∧(sw requests[sw].headV C = V C)
∧(maxV C(queryBatch(sw, rule)) > V C)
eff to sendco[sw].append(
(FlowMod(maxRule(queryBatch(sw, rule))))
switch requests[sw].removehead
internal process switch request(sw: Switch ID, rule: Rule, vc: VC)
pre (switch requests[sw] 6= null)∧
(!to sendco[sw].includeRule(sw requests[sw].headRule)∧
∧(sw requests[sw].headV C = V C)
∧(maxV C(queryBatch(sw, rule)) ≤ V C)
eff to sendco[sw].append(
FlowMod(modifyAction(rule,DROP )))
switch requests[sw].removehead
Figure 4.16: Controller as IOA.
96
received). Rules pending to be updated are not applied on packets before they
are updated.
COCONUT hypervisors are similar to regular hypervisors except that they
interface with Shells instead of Virtualized Links.
COCONUT’s controller is modeled as an IOA with the internal state
rule-state that is a set of [rule: Rule, switch: Switch ID,
vc: VC] tuples. Each tuple shows a rule, the hosting switch, and the VC of
that rule that the controller is aware of 4. The internal action request is used
for modeling the batch requests that users of COCONUT, such as the network
virtualization systems, send to it.
OpenFlow Implementation of COCONUT: In addition to the high-level
algorithms and design of COCONUT, we also provide its OpenFlow imple-
mentation. This OpenFlow implemtation is a system composed of COCONUT
links, COCONUT ISwitches, IShells, IController, Edge
controller, and COCONUT Hypervisors. These IOAs are very similar to
their high-level counterparts explained above. We discuss the differences below:
COCONUT OpenFlow implementation shells IShells are similar to
Shells except that they get information about (de)activation of tags from the
edge controller.
COCONUT OpenFlow implementation switches (COCONUT ISwitch)
are similar to COCONUT CSwitches except for their actions of updating rules:
rules update only update the forwarding state if the command to do so is
sent by the controller and otherwise sends an update request to the controller.
Similarly, rule expire and local failover send update requests to the
controller instead of updating the switch rules.
COCONUT OpenFlow implementation controller (IController) is sim-
ilar to COCONUT’s controller in the high-level design, except that it has actions
for handling rule updates that switches autonomously do in the high-level ver-
sion. IController controller keeps track of tags and informs the edge
controllers about them.
COCONUT edge controller (Edge Controller) gets tag information
from the IController. IShells consult it for knowing whether they should
tag a packet with a tag or not.
4Note that switches are allowed to locally update their rules without informing the controller.
In this case, the VCs might be outdated. This does not cause any COCONUT correctness issue.
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4.5.1 More Details on the Modeled IOAs
Initial (start) states: we assume that in the initial state all buffers (buffers,
to send, and received variables) as well as the sw requests, and batch
variables are all initially empty; the vc variables are set to 0; no port or switches
has failed (hence, failed variables are false and status variables show the
connectivity type: best effort or reliable FIFO). It is also assumed that the Rules
and Backup rules variables of the COCONUT switches are populated by
translating Rules and Backup rules variables of the logical switch by the
virtualization system, i.e., by applying the devirtualize function on them.
In addition to the actions, each IOA also uses internal functions (that do not
alter its state). The functions are listed below:
• lookup(p: Packet, i:Port), lookup(p: COCONUT
Packet, i:Port): look up packet (or COCONUT packet) p from
input port i in the rules and returns a list of actions that should be applied
on p.
• lookup action(p: Packet, i:Port),
lookup action(p: COCONUT Packet, i:Port): return
the head action of the packet p which is received on port i.
• remove(i: Port): remove the head action of the [packet,
action sequence] at the head of the received[i], i.e., the first ac-
tion that needs to be applied on the packet buffered at port i that is being
processed. If the actions sequence becomes null, it also removes the tuple
from the received[i] buffer.
• lookup outPort(packet, i: Port): return the output port of
the head action of received(i).
• rewrite(p: Packet, pattern: Match), rewrite(p:
COCONUT Packet, pattern: Match): return a packet that is
similar to p except for the bits in pattern.
• replace(p’: Packet), replace(p’: COCONUT
Packet): (called on received[i]) replace the head packet of
received[i] with p′.
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• lookup update(p: Packet, i: Port),
lookup update(p: COCONUT Packet, i: Port): re-
turn the update action (with UPDATE type) of packet p in received[i]
that should be applied to rules.
• updateStat(p: Packet, i: Port), updateStat(p:
COCONUT Packet, i: Port): (called on Rules) replace the rules
that match packet p received on port i in Rules with those with updated
stats, e.g., with rules with incremented counters.
• lookup outPort(p: Packet, i: Port),
lookup outPort(p: COCONUT Packet, i: Port): re-
turn the output port of the head action of received[i] for p.
• lookup action(p: Packet, i: Port),
lookup action(p: COCONUT Packet, i: Port): return the
head action of received[i] for p.
• lookup action num(p: Packet, i: Port),
lookup action num(p: COCONUT Packet, i: Port):
return the size of the action-list of received[i]’s head.
• pop(p: Packet, i: Port), pop(p: COCONUT Packet,
i: Port): return the [q: Packet, i: Port, R actions+]
tuple where [q: Packet, R actions+] is the head of
received[i] and removes it from received[i]. This is used
for sending packet q with R actions+ actions on receive[i] again.
• replace(p: Packet), replace(p: COCONUT Packet):
(called on received) replaces the head packet of received[i] with p.
• updatewVC(a: UPDATE): (called on Rules inside rule update) incre-
ments VC of the rules that a updates.
• rewriteAction(rule: Rule, a: Action): rewrites rule by
replacing its action with a. Dropping is explicitly modeled an an action.
So, passing null for a means that the rule was removed. In this case, any
matching packet needs to just check its VC against the VC of this rule (no
action will be performed on it on behalf of this rule), and the actions of
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other rules matching on it will be performed on the packet. Normal VC
operations are performed — both for updating the rule and for matching
packets against it.
Put differently, lookup function returns a rule whose action is not null, but
triggers request update if the rule with the null action matches a packet and
has a higher VC than it.
• addVC(p: Packet): takes a packet p as input, adds a VC to it, and
returns an COCONUT Packet as output.
• PACKET: (called on COCONUT packets) discards the VC of the CO-
CONUT Packet and returns its packet.
• rmVC(p: COCONUT Packet): removes VC from the packet (in
Shells).
• FlowMod(r: Rule): creates and returns a packet out of the r rule.
This packet can then be sent to the switch for applying r.
• connect(i: Port, sw: Switch ID): returns true iff sw is con-
nected to port i of shell.
• includeRule(r :Rule): (called on to send[sw]) returns true iff the
entry for switch sw has the packet for the rule r.
• queryBatch(sw: Switch ID, rule: Rule): queries all
switches in the same batch with (sw, rule) pair for the rule r. It returns
a set of rules and their VCs, i.e., set ([rule: Rule, vc: VC]).
• maxVC(set([rule: Rule, vc: VC])): returns maximum value
of VC of all rules in the set.
• maxRule(set([rule: Rule, vc: VC])): returns the rule with
the maximum VC value in the set.
• modifyAction(rule: Rule, a: Action): modifies rule r to
set its action to a.
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4.6 COCONUT Guarantees Observational
Correctness
IOA A is an observationally correct implementation of IOA B iff any behavior
of A is a plausible behavior of B. Informally, A is an observationally correct
implementation of B if anything that happens in A could have happened in B.
This is essentially akin to the way that correctness of abstractions and simulations
are defined in the IOA framework [109, 133]. To prove the observational correct-
nessof COCONUT, we first “hide” the external actions that are not visible to the
end-points and applications, then prove that the logical one-big-switch (composi-
tion of Links and Switch) is an abstraction of the COCONUT implementation
of it that uses replication. Finally, we show that COCONUT IOAs are compos-
able. Hence, any composition of multiple COCONUT switches to form arbitrary
topologies is observationally correct.
4.6.1 External and Internal Actions, and Hiding
To compose IOAs and enable communication between them, we initially define
the actions that they use for interacting with each other (such as the actions for
sending and receiving COCONUT packets between the COCONUT links and
shells) as external input and output actions in the model.
In the next phase and to prove correctness, we “hide” those extra external ac-
tions that we defined for easier composition of IOAs. In other words, in the com-
position of various IOAs such as Links and Switch IOAs, we hide all external
actions except sending and receiving from applications using the hiding opera-
tion [109]. This operation simply reclassifies external actions as internal and hide
them from the external world, i.e., the applications.
Action hiding respect the implementation relationship i.e., if IOA A < B (B
is an abstraction of A), and E is a subset of actions, then ActHide(E,A) < Ac-
tHide(E,B), where ActHide(X,Y) represents hiding the action set X in IOA Y
[109].
By providing a forward simulation relation from the high-level algorithms of
COCONUT to the abstract virtual network, and from the OpenFlow implementa-
tion of COCONUT to its high-level version, and by using the theorem that forward
simulation is transitive [109], we prove that both our high-level and OpenFlow im-
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plementation designs are correct implementation of virtual network.
4.6.2 Proving that COCONUT Guarantees Observational
Correctness
The IOAs outlined above and their hiding and composition operations enable us
to prove the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 1: COCONUT is observationally correct, i.e., any external behavior
of COCONUT’s implementation of one-big-switch could have happened in the
logical one-big-switch.
Proof: We prove that the COCONUT algorithms (§3.3.3) are correct by prov-
ing that the Abstraction IOA is an abstraction of the Implementation IOA, where
the Abstraction IOA is the composition of one logical switch and links IOAs, and
the Implementation IOA is the composition of (a) multiple physical COCONUT
switches that together implement the one big logical switch, i.e., each physi-
cal switch is the output of devirtualize(Abstraction), (b) COCONUT
links, (c) shells, (d) hypervisors, and (e) the controller.
This is achieved by showing that there always exists a binary relation R ⊂
val(Implementation)5 × val(Abstraction). Equivalently, for every θImp ∈
val(Implementation), we have θImp R θAbs where θAbs ∈ val(Abstraction),
and:
• θAbs.RulesL = virtualize(rulesWithOldestV Cs(θImp.RulesP)),
where P represents the set of IDs of the physical switches, i.e., those con-
tained in the Implementation IOA and L shows the ID of the logical
switch, i.e., the switch in the Abstraction IOA.
• θAbs.Backup rulesL =
virtualize(rulesWithOldestV Cs(θImp.Backup rulesP))
• ∀i ∈ Ext port θAbs.to sendl[i] = [θImp.to sendh[i], θImp.to sends[j],
θImp.to sendl[k]] where similar to the logical network, the end-point is con-
nected to the network at port i in the COCONUT network. Unlike the log-
ical network in which i directly connects an end-point and a link, in the
5val(A) represents the valuation of IOA A’s state.
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COCONUT network, port i connects the end-point to the hypervisor. Hy-
pervisor’s port i in turn is connected to a shell’s port (let’s call this port j).
j is then connected to a link’s port k.
• ∀i ∈ Int port θAbs.to sendL[i] =
[θImp.bufferP1 [i1], θImp.to sendP1 [i1],
θImp.bufferP2 [i2], θImp.to sendP2 [i2], ...,
θImp.bufferPN [iN ], θImp.to sendPN [iN ]](P1,i1),(P2,i2),...,(PN ,iN )∈devirtualize(L,i)
where similar to the logical network in which switch L is connected to the
Links IOA at port i, the replicated physical switches P1, P2, ..., PN are con-
nected to links at ports i1, .., iN .
• θAbs.statusl = θImp.statusl
• θAbs.switch failedL = ∧P∈{devirtualize(L)}(θImp.switch failedP)
• θAbs.statusL = virtualize(θImp.statusP)
• θAbs.to sendL = ∪P∈{devirtualize(L)}(θImp.to sendP.PACKET)
• θAbs.receivedL = ∪P∈{devirtualize(L)}(θImp.receivedP.PACKET)
Note that R does not place any restrictions on values of other variables of θImp
except those outlined above, i.e., vc variables can assume any values. This allows
a high degree of flexibility—we do not need to keep the state in the physical
replicas consistent unless that violates observational correctness.
R provides a simulation relation from Implementation to Abstraction because:
• For every initial state θImp of Implementation, that is for every state of Im-
plementation that meets the conditions in §4.5.1, R maps θImp to an initial
state θAbs of Abstraction that meets the conditions in §4.5.1, i.e., where
buffers are empty and θAbs.Rules and Backup rules are rules on which
virtualize function of the virtualization systems are applied.
• ∀x1, x′1, x1 →α x′1 ∈ val(Implementation) and x2 ∈ val(Abstraction)
with x1 R x2, ∃x′2 such that (a) x2 →β x′2, (b) x′1 R x′2, and (c) trace(β) =
trace(α), where trace(x) shows the external (input and output) action of x.
– For every external action a of Implementation (after hiding) these
conditions hold: a = app send or app receive actions of
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the COCONUT hypervisor. In this case, β = app send or
app receive actions of the Links, and the change in variables
for both automata is that the packet that is sent by the end-point is,
respectively, added or removed from the to sendh in the Implemen-
tation and from the to sendl in the Abstraction. Thus, if we had
θAbs.to sendl = θImp.to sendh before these actions, we will have the
same equation, after that too (other variables are not changed). Hence
x′1 R x
′
2. Also, trace(β) = app send or app receive which is
similar to α.
– For action a being the failure and recovery of physical ports and
switches, β is the failure and recovery of the related virtual elements.
– For rule updates, (a) if the physical switch is the only physical switch
with the old rule among the physical replicas that the logical switch is
mapped to, then updating the rule r has an equivalent in Abstraction:
updating the virtualized(r), (b) if it’s not, then β = null.
– When action a is the internal actions of delivering a packet from one
port of links, switch, shells hypervisors to the other port, e.g., for
actions shell send, shell receive, shell deliver,
link send, link receive, hypervisor deliver,
switch send, switch receive, the trace is empty (hence
β=null and trace(a) = trace(β) =null ). The change in the state of
the physical network is moving a packet from the head of a buffer i-1
to the back of buffer i where by contactation of buffers i-1 and i have
a binary relation to a buffer in the logical network by R. Since before
a that relation was hold, it is guaranteed to hold after it too.
As an example, for a = switch receiveP in Implementation, β =
switch receivevirtualize(P ) in Abstraction. The change in variables
for Implementation is adding the packet to buffer, and the change
in variables for Abstraction is adding the packet to to send and
buffer in Implementation is mapped by R to to send in Ab-
straction. So, θAbs.buffer = ∪s∈swθImp.buffers[s], and consequently,
x′1 R x
′
2 will continue to hold. trace(β) = receive which is similar to
α.
– For a ∈ {switch internal deliver, switch rewrite,
stats update, switch drop} actions in the physical network,
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related actions β with identical name exist in the Abstraction
• ∀t ∈ τImplementation, x2 ∈ val(Abstraction) with t.fstateRx2, ∃β ∈
τAbstraction such that (a) β.fstate = x2 (because the initial values of the
idle- and hard-timers are identical), (b) t.lstateRβ.lstate since timer of an
expired physical rule has a corresponding value in the logical network, and
(c) trace(β) = trace(t)=null.
4.6.3 Composing One-Big-Switches (and Other IOAs)
In this section, we show that COCONUT’s one-big-switch abstractions are com-
posable, i.e., any arbitrary topology built out of COCONUT’s one-big-switch ab-
stractions is guaranteed to be observationally correct,
Theorem 2: COCONUT’s one-big-switch is composable.
Proof: In the IOA framework, abstraction and implementation relations are
preserved under composition [109]. That is, if an IOA Abs1 is an abstraction of
IOA Impl1, shown as Impl1 < Abs1, and a different IOA Abs2 is an abstraction of
IOA Impl2, i.e., Impl2 < Abs2, then composition of Abs1 and Abs12 is an abstrac-
tion of Impl1 and Impl2, i.e., (composition of Impl1 and Impl2) < (composition
of Abs1 and Abs2). Hence, multiple COCONUT Switch IOAs can be composed
to form different topologies while guaranteeing correctness [109].
Composition in the IOA framework, however, requires several conditions [109]:
• No interference, internal variables and actions of one automaton cannot be
shared by any other automaton.
• Exclusive control, each output variable and output action be controlled by
at most one automaton.
These two conditions hold in COCONUT , because the action and variable
names of each IOA in each system (logical network and COCONUT) are chosen
to be distinct, i.e., there is no overlap between actions and variables of any two
IOA in one system. This enforces exclusive control and avoids interference. Note
that this is not solely a syntactical consideration, as an example the mechanisms
for managing logical clocks is designed in a way to ensure multiple logical rules
composed into a single physical one do not share control over the same logical
clocks, e.g., they each have their own separate dimension on the vector clocks.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
This thesis studies two areas of parallelism in networks: multi-pathing or the path
parallelism in the data plane, and the network function parallelism. When hav-
ing multi-paths, in contrast to the currently pervasive approach of balancing the
load based on global and macroscopic view of traffic, we explore an alternative
approach of micro load balancing (§2). We present a datacenter micro load bal-
ancer, DRILL, which enables the network fabric to make load balancing decisions
at microsecond time scales based on traffic information local to each switch. Our
experiments show that DRILL’s simple provably-stable switch scheduling algo-
rithm outperforms the state-of-the-art load balancing schemes in Clos networks,
particularly under heavy load. We leave the investigation of micro load balancing
in other topologies to future work.
In addition to multi-pathing, parallelism is used extensively today for imple-
menting network functions. Notably, modern virtualized data centers provide a
simple virtual abstraction of network. The implementations of these virtual net-
works, such as a “big switch” abstraction, commonly use nontrivial mappings
from one virtual element to multiple physical elements. A key question is, do
these abstractions faithfully preserve their native semantics? In §3, we show that
the answer to that question is “no” for existing network virtualization methods:
behavior can differ between the virtual network abstractions and their physical
implementations, resulting in incorrect application-level behavior, even when the
common correctness condition of per-packet consistency is preserved throughout.
This indicates that a new understanding of correctness and new techniques to guar-
antee it are needed. We develop the COCONUT framework for seamless scale-out
of composable one-big-switch abstractions, so that any virtual network composed
in COCONUT is guaranteed to have a plausible behavior of its ideal implemen-
tation. Surprisingly, we show that this strong correctness condition is feasible:
our experiments demonstrate that COCONUT does not impose greater overhead
compared with existing systems. Finally in §4, we present, IOA, an analytical
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framework to describe network behavior observable by end-points. We formally
prove that COCONUT preserves observational correctness, i.e., any external be-
havior of COCONUT’s implementation of one-big-switch could have happened
in the logical one-big-switch. Furthermore, we show that COCONUT’s one-big-
switch is composable.
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Appendix A
MODELING AND PROOFS OF CHAPTER 2
In this section, we prove that in Clos networks DRILL provides network-wide
stability and can deliver 100% throughput. We assume that arrival processes are
independent and the traffic is admissible, i.e., for each leaf switch, its overall ar-
rival rate is less than its overall departure rate (formalized in the assumption in
Theorem 2), and for each component, its overall arrival rate for each destination
is less than its overall departure rate to that destination (formalized in the assump-
tion in Theorem 3). We prove DRILL’s stability and 100% throughput by first
proving that every leaf switch is stable and delivers 100% throughput (Theorem
2) and that the spine layer is stable and delivers 100% throughput (Theorem 3).
Intuitively, if the traffic is not admissible, the traffic sent to the network has a
greater volume than it can transmit and no load balancer is stable. We decouple
the overall rate adjustment, typically done by higher layer protocols such as TCP,
and load balancing inside the network. DRILL only addresses the second problem
and should be used along with a rate control mechanism such as TCP.
We also prove that ESF is optimal for load balancing in any Clos (Theorem 4).
Theorem 2. DRILL(1,1) is stable and provides 100% throughput for all ad-
missible independent arrival processes.
Proof. We first prove the leaf-level switch stability and 100% throughput before
proving these properties for the spine layer (Theorem 3). Consider discrete in-
stances of time when there is either an arrival or a departure, since these are the
only times that the state of the system changes. We assume the speedup is K. We
further assume at each time instance up to M packets arrive at the system accord-
ing to M independent Bernoulli processes and the arrival rate to the input port i
is δi (1 ≤ i ≤ M ). We denote by µi (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) the service rate of output port i
(1 ≤ i ≤ N ). We assume that at most one packet can enter or leave each queue at
any given time instance (this assumption can be easily relaxed). Hence, the prob-
ability of having an arrival at any given time instant at input i is δi∑M
i=1 δi+
∑N
i=1 µi
.
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Similarly, the probability that a departure occurs from output port i at any instant
of time is µi∑M
i=1 δi+
∑N
i=1 µi
.
Let qk(n), q˜i(n) and q∗(n) represent the length of the k-th output queue, the
length of the output queue chosen by the input i and length of the shortest output
queue in the system under policy (1, 1) at time instance n, respectively.
If n is an arrival instant, then the probability that under (1, 1) policy input i
chooses the shortest output queue, i.e., q˜i(n) = q∗(n), is at least 1/N. At each time
instant, from up to M input ports that are contending for the same output port, at
most K of them will be granted permission to direct their packets to that output.
If by λi we refer to the arrival rate at output port i, then λi will be the summation
of the arrival rate of these K input ports, and
∑N
i=1 λi ≤
∑M
i=1 δi. The probability
of having a packet forwarded to output port i is λi∑M
i=1 δi+
∑N
i=1 µi
. Moreover, by
Lemma 1, proved in the appendix, we will show that
N∑
i=1
λi × qi(n) ≤
M∑
i=1
δi × q˜i(n).
To prove that the algorithm is stable, using the result of Kumar and Meyn [71],
we show that for an M × N switch scheduled using the (1, 1) policy, there is a
negative expected single-step drift in a Lyapunov function, V. In other words,
E[V (n+ 1)− V (n)|V (n)] ≤ V (n) + k,
where k > 0 and  > 0. Let V (n) be:
V (n) = V1(n) + V2(n),
where
V1(n) =
M∑
i=1
V1,i(n),
V1,i(n) = (q˜i(n)− q∗(n))2,
V2(n) =
N∑
i=1
q2i (n).
Since at most K packets can be enqueued at time instance n + 1 in q˜i when the
speedup is K,
q˜i(n+ 1)− q˜i(n) ≤ K.
119
And at most one packet can leave q∗ at time instant n. So,
−q∗(n+ 1) + q∗(n) ≤ 1.
Therefore,
q˜i(n+ 1)− q∗(n+ 1) ≤ q˜i(n)− q∗(n) +K + 1.
Now consider:
E[V1(n+ 1)− V1(n)|V1(n)] =
1
M
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
M∑
i=1
δi × ((q˜i(n+ 1)− q∗(n+ 1))2 − (q˜i(n)− q∗(n))2)+
N∑
i=1
(1− 1
M
δi∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
)×
((q˜i(n+ 1)− q∗(n+ 1))2 − (q˜i(n)− q∗(n))2) ≤
− 1
M
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
M∑
i=1
δi(q˜i(n)− q∗(n))2+
M∑
i=1
(2(q˜i(n)− q∗(n)) +K + 1) ≤
− 1
M
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
M∑
i=1
δiV1,i(n)+
M∑
i=1
(2
√
V1,i(n) +K + 1)
So,
E[V1(n+ 1)− V1(n)|V1(n)] ≤
− 1
M
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
M∑
i=1
δiV1,i(n)+
M∑
i=1
2
√
V1,i(n) +M +MK.
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And for V2,
E[V2(n+ 1)− V2(n)|V2(n)] =
N∑
i=1
λi∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
(qi(n+ 1) + qi(n))(qi(n+ 1)− qi(n))+
N∑
i=1
µi∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
(qi(n+ 1) + qi(n))(qi(n+ 1)− qi(n)) ≤
At time n + 1, if we have a packet arrival at input j, i.e., δj > 0, and it selects
qi, then qi(n + 1) = qi(n) + 1 = q˜j(n) + 1. Hence, qi(n + 1) − qi(n) = 1
and qi(n + 1) + qi(n) = 2q˜j(n) + 1. Otherwise, qi(n + 1) − qi(n) = 0. So
(qi(n+1)+ qi(n))(qi(n+1)− qi(n)) = (2q˜i(n)+ 1) Similarly, if a packet leaves
queue i, then qi(n+1)−qi(n) = −1 and qi(n+1)+qi(n) = 2qi(n)−1. Otherwise,
qi(n+ 1)− qi(n) = 0. Therefore
E[V2(n+ 1)− V2(n)|V2(n)] ≤
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
M∑
i=1
δi × (2q˜i(n) + 1)+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
N∑
i=1
µi × (−2qi(n) + 1) =
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
(
M∑
i=1
δi × (1 + 2
√
V1,i + 2q
∗(n)) +
N∑
i=1
µi − 2
N∑
i=1
µiqi(n)) =
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
[
M∑
i=1
δi × (1 + 2
√
V1,i)+
2q∗(n)(
N∑
i=1
δi −
N∑
i=1
µi)+
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2
N∑
i=1
µi(q
∗(n)− qi(n))].
So,
E[V2(n+ 1)− V2(n)|V2(n)] ≤∑N
i=1 δi∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
+
2
∑N
i=1 δi
√
V1,i(n)∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2q∗(n)(
N∑
i=1
δi −
N∑
i=1
µi)+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2
N∑
i=1
µi(q
∗(n)− qi(n)).
Thus,
E[V (n+ 1)− V (n)|V (n)] ≤
− 1
M
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
×
M∑
i=1
δiV1,i(n)+
2
M∑
i=1
√
V1,i(n)(
δi∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
+ 1)+
∑N
i=1 δi∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
+M +MK+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2q∗(n)(
N∑
i=1
δi −
N∑
i=1
µi)+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2
N∑
i=1
µi(q
∗(n)− qi(n)).
Hence,
E[V (n+ 1)− V (n)|V (n)] ≤
N∑
i=1
−N(∑Ni=1 δi +∑Ni=1 µi)
δi
×
(
δi
√
(V1,i)
N(
∑N
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi)
− ( δi∑N
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
+ 1)
)2
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+(M + 1)
∑M
i=1 δi∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
+M
∑M
i=1 δi
∑N
i=1 µi∑M
i=1 δi
+ 3M+
MK +
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2q∗(n)(
N∑
i=1
δi −
N∑
i=1
µi)
+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2
N∑
i=1
µi(q
∗(n)− qi(n)).
So if we define
Ai =
δi
N(
∑N
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi)
Bi =
δi∑N
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
+ 1
C = (M + 1)
∑M
i=1 δi∑M
i=1 δi
∑N
i=1 µi
+
M
∑M
i=1 δi
∑N
i=1 µi∑M
i=1 δi
+ 3M +MK
Then, Ai ≥ 0 and Bi ≥ 0 and C ≥ 0, and
E[V (n+ 1)− V (n)|V (n)] ≤
M∑
i=1
−(
√
V1,i
Ai
− Bi
A2i
)2 + C (I)
+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2q∗(n)(
N∑
i=1
δi −
N∑
i=1
µi) (II)
+
1∑M
i=1 δi +
∑N
i=1 µi
× 2
N∑
i=1
µi(q
∗(n)− qi(n)) (II)
The following upper bounds are easily obtained: (I) ≤ C (II) ≤ 0, since
the traffic is admissible. (III) ≤ 0, by definition of q∗(n). Suppose that
V (n) is very large. If V1(n) is very large, (I) will be negative, from which
E[V (n + 1) − V (n)|V (n)] < −1 for V1(n) > L1 follows. Otherwise, if
V1(n) is not very large but V (n) is, then V2(n) should be very large which
implies that length of some output queue, qi(n), is very large. If q∗(n) is
not very large, then (III) will be less than −C which is a bounded constant.
If q∗(n) is also large, then (II) will be less than −C. In both cases, it fol-
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lows that E[V (n + 1) − V (n)|V (n)] < −2 for V2(n) > L2. Hence, there
existL and  such thatE[V (n+1)−V (n)|V (n) is very large] < − for V (n) > L.
The steps above prove the stability of DRILL’s scheduling algorithm in the
leaf layer. [31] shows that a switch can achieve 100% throughput if it is stable
for all independent and admissible arrivals. Hence, leaf switches under DRILL
can achieve 100% throughput. Theorem 3 proves the same properties for the
spine layer as long as the traffic is admissible inside the component. Together,
these two results prove the network-wide stability and the ability to achieve 100%
throughput under DRILL for independent admissible arrival processes.
Theorem 3. For every arbitrary source and destination pair, let δi and µi be,
respectively, the arrival and departure rates to the spine switch Si from the source
to the destination. For admissible and independent arrival processes, if the traffic
inside a component is admissible, i.e.,
∑
Si
δi ≤
∑
Si
µi, then DRILL’s failover
algorithm is stable and provides 100% throughput inside that component.
Proof. We prove that for any arbitrary spine Sr in the component, δr ≤ µr. Hence,
each queue is stable and delivers 100% throughput.
For any two spines Si and Sr to be in the same component, their utilization
factors should be equal via Si and Sr, i.e., µiδi =
µr
δr
. Therefore, if Si and Sr are in
the same component, δi
δr
= µi
µr
(note that we can infer from the way components
are constructed in DRILL that for any spine Sj in the component, δj 6= 0 and
µj 6= 0, since the leaves should be able to communicate via Sj). Hence,
∑
Si
δi =∑
Si
Xi,r × δr, and
∑
Si
µi =
∑
Si
Ti,r × µr, where Xi,r and Ti,r are defined as
Xi,r =
δi
δr
and Ti,r = µiµr . It derives from the equality of utilization factors that
Xi,r = Ti,r for all Sis. Plus, since rates are all positive, Xi,r > 0.
We have
∑
Si
δi −
∑
Si
µi = (δr − µr) ×
∑
Si
Xi,r. By the condition on the
admissibility of traffic,
∑
Si
δi −
∑
Si
µi ≤ 0, and we have Xi,r > 0. Hence,
(δr−µr) ≤ 0. Therefore, each queue at the spine layer of the component is stable
and, using the result of [31], can deliver 100% throughput. Note that the length of
the queue qi is proportional to its input minus output rate, δi−µi. Hence the result
above also shows that the lengths of the spine layer queues are bounded.
Theorem 4. In any Clos network [134], ESF is optimal, i.e., it achieves exactly
equal spreading of load across all available shortest paths between any source
and destination pairs.
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Proof. We prove this by an induction on the number of intermediary stages.
The base case: In the base 3-tier Clos network [134] with input, output, and
one intermediary stages, among a set of paths between a source input switch and
destination output switch, each first hop link (from the input switch to the interme-
diary stage) carries the same load as other paths since the input switch splits the
load equally among all available shortest paths, i.e., if there are N switches in the
intermediary stage, each link carries 1/N of the load from the source switch. Sec-
ond hop links (from each intermediary switch to the output switch) also all carry
equal loads because all input switches split their load equally among all intermedi-
ary switches. Hence, each intermediary switch receives 1/N of the load destined
to the destination output switch. Therefore, all the links from the intermediary
stage switches to the destination output switch carry equal load. Thus, overall,
all available shortest paths between the source input switch and the destination
output switch carry equal load.
The inductive step: ESF is optimal in any T -stage Clos network if we assume
that it is optimal for any R-stage Clos, where R < T . This statement is true
because (a) each input switch splits the load exactly equally among all interme-
diary stages (definition of ESF). This implies that the load that each intermediary
“level” [134]1. receives is exactly equal. So the first hop load on all paths are
equal. (b) Each of these levels is a smaller Clos [134]. Thus, by the hypothesis
of induction, ESF is optimal inside each of these smaller Clos, i.e., the first stage
switches in each level, balances the load exactly equal among all paths inside that
level. So the load on all hops except the first and last hops are equal. (c) Since
each level receives exactly equal share of traffic to each destination output switch
(part (a)), the last stage of all levels receive exactly equal traffic for each output
stage switch. So the last hop load on all paths are equal. Therefore, the overall
load on the paths are exactly equal.
Lemma 1.
∑N
i=1 λi × qi(n) ≤
∑M
i=1 δi × q˜i(n).
Proof. Let us define ρi,j
ρi,j =
{
δj input j chooses output i
0 otherwise
1In a 5 stage Clos, each level consists of three intermediary stages. In a 7 stage Clos, each level
consists of five intermediary stages, etc. [134].
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It immediately follows that
λi × qi(n) ≤
M∑
j=1
ρi,j × q˜j(n).
So,
∑N
i=1 λi × qi(n) ≤
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 ρi,j × q˜j(n). But since the input ports can
compete for only a single output port at a time, the term ρi,j can be non-zero only
for at most N pairs of (i, j). It follows that
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
ρi,j × q˜j(n) =
M∑
i=1
δi × q˜i(n).
So,
N∑
i=1
λi × qi(n) ≤
M∑
i=1
δi × q˜i(n).
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Appendix B
MODELING AND PROOFS OF CHAPTER 3
The goal of this section is to prove observational correctness of COCONUT . We
state the assumptions, and provide a few definitions and lemmas that assist us with
proving the theorem.
Assumptions about replication: As stated earlier, we assume that each phys-
ical instance is individually capable of fully implementing the virtual rule and a
packet that is supposed to be handled by a virtual rule will be handled by at most
one instance.
Mapping logical rules to multiple physical rules: In simple replication virtual
networks, each logical rule, LR, can have multiple physical instances, PRi, i ≥ 0,
in the network. We assume that there is a total ordering between rule versions
(version numbers shown by integers; higher values indicating newer versions),
and different entities, such as the controller, can update rules. It is possible for
instances of a single logical rule to be inconsistent, i.e., have different versions.
This can happen, for example, when the controller is in process of updating the
instances of a logical rule. We denote the version of instance of the logical rule
LR that handled packet pkt by v(LR, pkt). If no instance of LR is applied on
pkt then v(LR, pkt) is not defined. Virtualization systems use a combination
of rule placement and packet directing techniques to make sure that if a packet
is supposed to be handled by a logical rule, at most one instance of that rule is
applied on it. In NVP, for instance, logical datapaths for communications between
all pairs of VMs are computed and are implemented on the software switch where
the originating VM resides.
While in non-virtual networks, for packets p and q, p→ q implies that the rules
applied on q are at least as updated as those applied on p, this property does not
automatically hold under simple replication because the instances handling p and
q could be different. We define causality awareness to formalize this concept.
We define a causality chain, e1 → e2 → ... → en, to be chain of 0 or more
events or packets iff for any two consecutive packets or events ei and ei+1, 0 <
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i < n in it, the following two conditions hold: (a) ei → ei+1 and (b) there does
not exist any packet or event f such that ei → f → ei+1. Trivially, p→ q iff there
is a causality chain starting with p and ending at q.
A network is called causality aware iff for any two packets p and q and for any
logical rule LR, if v(LR, p) and v(LR, q) are defined, then p → q implies that
v(LR, p) ≤ v(LR, q).
Lemma 1.1: In COCONUT’s high-level algorithms, for every two packets p
and q, if p → q, then V Cp ≤ V Cq, i.e., each dimension of the VC of q is at least
as large as that of p.
Proof is a simple induction on the length of the causality chain, n:
• Basis: The statement trivially holds for n = 0, i.e., when the length of the
causality chain is zero.
• Inductive step: We show that if the statement holds for any causality chain
with length n, then it holds for any causality chain of length n+1. This can
be done as follows:
For a given causality chain e1 → e2 → ...→ en → en+1, we want to prove
that V Cej ≤ V Cen+1 , ∀j ≤ n. We claim that V Cen ≤ V Cen+1 , because
by definition of →, en → en+1 either they happen at the same end-point
and en comes before en+1, or en and en+1 are the same packet (sent at one
end-point and received at another). In both cases, V Cen ≤ V Cen+1 (I). By
the assumption of the inductive step we know that V Cj ≤ V Cen , j < n (II).
I and II imply that V Cej ≤ V Cen+1 , j ≤ n.
Lemma 1.2: In COCONUT’s OpenFlow algorithms, after receiving a packet
p with a TB tagged (e.g., processed by the newer version of an in flux rule), all
packets q, p→ q will be tagged at TB as long as the rule is in flux.
Proof is a straightforward induction on the causality chains’ lengths.
• Base case (empty causality chains) trivially holds.
• Inductive step: We assume that the statement holds for any causality chain
of length n, and prove it for an arbitrary causality chain of length n + 1,
p1 → p2 → p3... → pn → pn+1, where the first packet (p1) is a tagged
received packet. Let si,j(m) be the send-to event that results in pn+1
being received. Assumption of the inductive step implies that packet pn is
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tagged at TB. By definition of→, pn and pn+1 either (a) happen at the same
end-point or (b) they are the same packet (sened and received by potentially
different end-points). In both cases pn being tagged at TB implies that pn+1
will also be tagged: in case (a) since the rule is in flux, no shell (including
the shell where the tagged pn happened) stops tagging. In case (b), the
network does not use the TBs; during the time that the rule LR is in flux,
COCONUT does not use that TB for other rules, and the LR instances do
not remove the TBs, i.e., they do not set TB = 0. Hence, being sent as a
tagged packet guarantees that the packet will be received tagged.
Given Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2, it is easy to see that COCONUT is causality aware:
Theorem 2: COCONUT is causality aware.
Proof is by contradiction; assume that COCONUT does not provide causality
awareness, i.e., there are packets p and q and a logical rule LR such that v(LR, p)
and v(LR, q) are defined, and p→ q but v(LR, p) > v(LR, q). We call the events
associated with p and q, respectively, e1 and e2. The following two cases are
possible:
• At least one of the two events e1 or e2 is a send event. Let’s call the packet
associated with this send event a (a ∈ {p, q}). a is not handled by any rule
yet (given the assumption that each packet is unique). Therefore, v(LR, a)
is undefined. But this contradicts with the assumption that both v(LR, p)
and v(LR, q) are defined.
• Both e1 or e2 are receive events.
– High-level algorithms: By Lemma 1, if p → q, then V Cp ≤ V Cq
which implies that V Cp[i] ≤ V Cq[i] where i is in the index of LR.
V Cp[i] ≤ V Cq[i] causes the same or newer versions of LR to be ap-
plied on q compared to p, i.e., v(LR, p) ≤ v(LR, q) which contradicts
with the assumption.
– OpenFlow algorithms: By the assumption, the rule LR is in flux (it has
different versions applied on packets) and the newer version is applied
on p. In the OpenFlow algorithms, these imply that p is tagged by a
TB used for LR. By Lemma 2, q will also be tagged. A tagged packet
is not handled by old instances. Therefore, either q is not handled by
an instance of LR, i.e., v(LR, q) is not defined, or it is handled by an
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instance at least at updated as the one applied on p, i.e., v(LR, q) ≥
v(LR, p). Both cases contradict our assumption.
It is easy to see that if no rule changes, then simple replication provides a correct
virtualization, i.e., any trace in it is a plausible trace in the logical network.
Lemma 3: Any static simple replication is correct. When no rule changes,
simple replication is a correct virtualization.
The proof is by induction on the traces’ lengths and follows almost immediately
from simple replication definition.
• Base case: The empty trace (length = 0) is a plausible trace in any net-
work, including simple replication and logical network. Hence, the simple
replication network trace’s with length 0 is a plausible trace in the logical
network.
• Inductive step: We prove that if any trace of simple replication with length
m ≤ n is a plausible trace in the logical network with no rule change, then
any trace of length n+1 of simple replication is also a plausible trace in the
logical network assuming that the rules do not change.
For any given trace of length n + 1, 〈e1, e2, ..., en, en+1〉, either (a) en+1
is a send event, or (b) it is a receive event. If it is a send event, then the
trace is plausible, because 〈e1, e2, ..., en〉 is a plausible trace (assumption)
and end-points are allowed to send any packets at any time. If it is a receive
event and if it does not have any dependencies, it can happen at any time.
Therefore, 〈e1, e2, ..., en, en+1〉 is plausible. If it is a receive event and it
has dependencies, let ei be that last event in the trace such that ei → en+1,
i.e., ∀j > i, ej and en+1 are concurrent. In that case, by the assumption
of the inductive step, 〈e1, ..., ei〉 is a plausible trace. Moreover, by defini-
tion of →, ei must be a send event. Given the assumptions about simple
replication (the traffic is directed to at most one instance of the appropriate
logical rules) and the fact that rules are not changing, the exact same rules
that would handle the packet sent by ei in the logical network will handle
the packet in simple replication . Therefore, 〈e1, ..., ei, en+1〉 is a plausi-
ble trace. Thus, given that en+1 is concurrent with all ej, j > i and by
Lemma 3.2, 〈e1, ..., ei, en+1, ei+1, ..., en〉 is also plausible, and by Lemma
3.1., 〈e1, ..., ei, ei+1, ..., en, en+1〉 = 〈e1, e2, ..., en, en+1〉 is also plausible.
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The following lemmas follow almost immediately from the best-effort net-
works’ properties — the fact that they can drop packet, arbitrary delay delivery of
packets, and reorder the packets that have no dependencies.
Lemma 3.1: In best effort networks, if e1, e2, ..., en is a plausible trace and for
two events/packets, ei and ej, i < j (i.e., e1, e2, ..., ei, .., ej, ..., en), ei is concurrent
with all ek, i < k ≤ j, then the trace resulting from shuffling ei and ej (i.e.,
e1, e2, ..., ej, .., ei, ..., en) is also plausible.
This holds because reordering of the packets and events that are not dependent
in best-effort networks is permissible.
Lemma 3.2: In best effort networks, if E1, ri,j(pkt) and E1, E2 are plausible
traces, and ri,j(pkt) is concurrent with all the events in E2 then E1, ri,j(pkt), E2
is also a plausible trace.
This holds because best-effort networks can delay delivery of independenct
packets, e.g., delivery of pkt of event ri,j(pkt) and the E2 postfix events.
Lemma 3.3: In any best effort network, if E is a plausible trace, and e is a send
event, then E, e is also a plausible trace.
End-points can send packets at any time. It is the receive events that might
make a trace non-plausible, and E, e does not include e’s corresponding receive
(if any), given that e is the last event.
Theorem 1: COCONUT is correct, i.e., any trace in COCONUT is a plausible
trace in the logical network that it implements.
By Lemma 3, we know that the incorrect behavior might happen only if rules
change. We prove that even when rules change, COCONUT is correct, i.e., any
trace of it a plausible trace of the logical network. Proof is by induction on the
length of traces.
• Base case: Empty trace (length=0) is a plausible trace in any network, in-
cluding the simple replication network with COCONUT and the logical net-
work. Hence, this trace is a plausible trace in the logical network.
• Inductive step: We prove that if all traces of length m ≤ n in COCONUT
are plausible traces in the logical network, then any trace of length n+ 1 in
COCONUT will also be a plausible trace in the logical network.
For any given COCONUT trace of length n + 1, 〈e1, e2, ..., en, en+1〉,
〈e1, e2, ..., en〉 is a plausible trace (assumption). Thus, if en+1 is a send
event or a receive event without dependency, then the trace is plausible be-
cause end-points can send any packet at any time or receive packets that do
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not depend on other packets or events such as packets informing them of
link failures. If en+1 is a receive event with dependency, then assume the
last event happening before en+1 in the trace is ei, i ≤ n, i.e., ei → en+1.
By definition of→, ei must be a send event. By the assumption of the in-
ductive step, 〈e1, ..., ei〉 is a plausible trace, i.e., it could have happened in
the logical network. simple replication directs the packet sent by ei only to
the instances of the logical rules that this packet would be forwarded to if it
was being sent in a non-virtual network. By Theorem 2 we know that these
instances are at least as uptodate as the instances applied on prior packets.
〈e1, ..., ei, en+1〉 will, therefore, be plausible. Given that en+1 and ej, j > i
events are concurrent, and by Lemma 3.2, 〈e1, ..., ei, en+1, ei+1, ..., en〉 is
plausible, and by Lemma 3.1, 〈e1, ..., ei, ei+1, ..., en, en+1〉 is plausible.
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